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1The purpose of this study is to evaluate an experiment in
the prevention and suppression of war*
The Italian aggression in Abyssinia in 1955 provided the
League with another opportunity after the aggression of Japan
into Manchuria in 1931 to test the effectiveness of collective
security embodied in the League Covenant* The Geneva machinery
failed to meet this test* In May 1936* f^ussollni had accom-
plished his aim of incorporating Abyssinia into the Italian
Empire*
Collective security is a relatively new concept in the
history of the Western State System* If It is a concept that
is beneficial to nations in their affairs with other nations*
why didn’t it workt This Is the core of the investigation.
The League of Nations attempted to substitute security, 1
assured to each by all, in place of the pre-World War 1 system
of defensive alliances and balance of power system which had
proved incapable of suppressing wars* By entering the League,
a sovereign state theoretically denounced the right to go to
war to settle its affairs with other nations on the premise
that peace is indivisible*
In analysing the reasons why the League of Nations
failed to stop aggression In the I talo~Ethiopian dispute*
twc questions will be studied: (1) Was the League machinery
1* By ''security*' is meant the assurance to each state of its
political independence and territorial Integrity.
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alone inadeq uato to cope with a "law-breaker”, or (2) could
the failure of the League in this case be attributed to those
member s bakes who were unwilling to allow the machinery avail-
able to be used effectively?
The Covenant was by no means perfect, As long as the
principle of national sovereignty left each State unhampered
in its capacity to pursue its own international policies,
(however detrimental to its neighbors) to commit acts of
aggression, to build up powerful war machines, an internatior-
al organisation was shorn of sufficient power to restrain its
,
strong and protect its weakest members, as one writer aptly
put the way in which national sovereignty limits the effect-
iveness of a world organization:
'It is as reu3amble to expect billiard balls to
coalesce into a unit when they collide on the
table as it is to expect sovereign states to
follow a policy that Involves structural ’ oint
action in making and enforcing world law, 11 1
Another factor which hindered the league was that, as
an international organization, it was not universal in member-
ship, One of the big questions marks during the dispute was
what policy the more powerful non-member States, and parti-
cularly America, would pursue in the event an embargo was put
on Italian trade*
Despite these drawbacks, the League showed itself capable,
at a moment’s notice, when hostilities had begun, to improvise
1. Scott Nearing, United florid, p. 121
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3machinery for the Application of Article 16 (viz# the Imposi-
tion of economic sanctions#) The political decisions facing
the powerful members of the League in maintaining the European
balance of power by keeping Italy as a potential ally, seemed
more insuperable than organizing machinery to work out a plan
to punish an aggressor.
Unfortunately, Great Britain art! Prance, by the lack of
active support to the Geneva machine, failed to punish the
violator of the Covenant, thereby exposing their awn weakness#
But in their atterutp to placate Italy in order to maintain in
tact Italian friendship for a potential ally against Germany,
they also failed miserably# For Italy was sufficiently
antagonized by the imposition of sanctions to be driven into
the Axis camp# Abyssinia did not remain a victim in an
isolated war# Great Britain and France, chemselvos, bacon©
victims of their own unfortunate methods of saving the baia .cq
of power in Europe#
The crisis of the *500, which began in Manchuria in 1931,
spread to Abyssinia and laterto Czec.losiavakia, Poland, and
finally the whole continent, was indicative of only one things
The League and its members were incapable of preventing world
conflagration because they failea to give theirwhole-heorted
support and effort to force the "Caesars “ of the 20th Century
to abide by their covenanted obligations.
T e importance of this study lies in the fact that the
sane choice confronts the world in 1946 as it did in 1936.
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Will the world society be warleas or lawless? The choice may
mean the survival or annihilation of civilization*
The sincere thanks of the author are gratefully
lodged for the help and guidance whihh Dr* Robert ?•
has given in this work#
aclmow-
Benedict
Jane Knowl©a ebb

PART I
BACKGROUND OP THE CON TiICT
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CHAPTER I
ETHIOPIAN HISTORY

Ethiopia covers an area twice as large as France with
a population of from four to ton million people. Its 350,000
aquare miles are entirely surrounded by the colonial possess-
ions of Great Britain, France and Italy. On the north it is
bounded by Eritrea, on the West by Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, and
on the East by French Somaliland, British Somaliland and
Italian Somaliland. Hemmed in on all sides by European
colonies, Ethiopia has no outlet to any of the surrounding
bodies of water*
Ethiopia has managed to remain an independent state in
Africa, although it has continued to be a backward, partially
uncivilized country. Its backwardness may, in part, be
attributed to the first point; that of its enclosed position
within the colonial possessions of Great Britain, France and
Italy. Various other factorsmust be mentioned, however, to
explain more fully the reasons for Ethiopia^ continued
backwardness* The communications and transport system are
very poor, there being a single railway system from DJibuti
In French Somaliland to Addis Ababa, the capitol of Ethiopia,
tfhe rainy season, which lasts from June to September, makes
travel almost impossible during this period.
The internal conditions of the country also have done
much to retard its self-development. The population may be
divided into three main groups: the Amharas, the ruling
warrior class; the Gallas who are peasants, and the Komadic
tribes who occupy the outlying regions, particularly Danakil
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and Ogaden, The Araharle race consists primarily of Bases, or
feudal barons, whose decentralized power in reality nade
Ethiopia a group of autonomous provinces controlled by local
chisf8 • The three pillars on which their power rested wore
the feudal system, the slave trade and the Coptic church.
The church maintained great authority over the masses and had
considerable influence with the ruling class.
Although the Ethippian plateau is the b©3t climate in
Equatorial Africa, ( a rich agricultural country yielding tv?o
or three crops a year, with an urJznamquantity of resources)
,
economic progress has hardly touched the country, Ethiopia,
emerging from medievalism, remains a country largely dis-
united, experiencing few advantages of modern Industrialism,
To complete a discussion of the factors which have re-
tarded progress, it is imperative to include the continual
threat of foreign control. Internal conditions alone have
not retarded Ethiopia’s progress. Perhaps the greatest
obstacle to the country’s development has been the constant
danger of attack from without. The problem then has been
two-fold: to stave off external aggression and to eradicate
Its Internal weaknesses,
henellk II, the first strong Emperor of Ethiopia, and
an outstanding figure In African history, achieved unpre-
cedented success in coping with this two-fold problem, ^ue
to his dominant personality and prestige with the local Rases
he united its two separate kingdoms and succeeded in limiting
..
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7the control of the Rases by organising a strong centralized
administration. is prestige was strengthened oven further
with the crushing of the Italian army in the Battle of Adowa
in 1896 when the country put up a common front* against the
wneray,
Menelik died in 1913 and the country returned to the
anarchy of decentralized rule by the Rases,
In 1923, France sponsored the admittance of Ethiopia into
the League of Nations# French motives are indicated by the
speech of h\ Ee Jouvenel when he said, "Was not the best
means of strengthening the government of Abyssinia to admit
it to the League?" ' England opposed this action, possibly
because the protection Ethiopia would receive under the
Covenant would hinder British and Italian policy. One
2
observer feels that French motives were not as altruistic
as they appeared, but were, instead, of a political nature.
The foreign policy of France, he suggests was interested
primarily in "putting a. spoke in the wheel of Italian policy"
by affording Abyssinia the protection of the League.
Ethiopia was not admitted unconditionally to the League,
1, League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement,
1To7 l2>, p, “THerea^ter referred to as Official Journal ,
)
2, G. Aarteili, Italy Against the World , p, 23
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some reservations being attached to her entrance.
1
The major
European powers were anxious to control the trade in arras bo
less civilized communities. It was, therefore, made one of
the conditions of Abyssinia* s entrance into the League that
she agree to conform to the Regulations of the iraporation of
arras and ammunition as stipulated in the Treaty of
St, Germain-en-Lay©.
Not until October 7, 1920, when Hailie Selassie ascended
to the throne was there again a semblance of any form of
centralized government. The problems confronting him were
essentially the same that had confronted Menelik XX, viz#,
the unification of Ethiopia by substituting a strong central
administrative system for the feudal regime of the Rases and
at the same time keeping the country from falling under
foreign control.
His task was Herculean, for his position was constantly
endangered by the conspiracy of various Rases to overthrow
2
him.
In 1931, a Constitution was presented to the country.
This was the beginning of political reforms. The Constitu-
tion established a consultative body of two chambers, the
members of the upper house to be nominated by the Emperor,
1. Council Report on the Dispute between Ethiopia and Italy.
Oct, 5, 1935. Monthly Summary of the League of Nations .
XV, No. 10 (193in
2, A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs
. p, 116
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and the members of the lower house to be nominated by the
local Rases. The ministers were ultimately responsible to
the Emperor* In viewing this Constitution one can readily
see that it did not afford any measure of self-government,
but rather provided an elaborate advisory body to the
Emperor* These efforts of Selassie were considered to be
largely "window dressing” to meet the approval of foreign
1
powers*
The Constitution, however restrictive, had achieved
certain results in that there had been a * spread of knowledge
of administrative machinery by changing the local repre-
sentatives in both Senate and Chamber every three months*^
These reforms must be Judged with the realization that
they were in their incipient stages. However, it cannot be
denied that very wild conditions still prevailed in parts of
Abyssinia.
At any rate, if the country had been allowed to develop
freely under the new emperors progressive reforms, (from
which a beginning had been made in 1931), undoubtedly,
Abyssinia might have, over a period of time, been transformed
from a feudal kingdom into a modem state governed according
to constitutional principles. Selassie*s characteristics,
have been described as "combining antiq ue virtue with en-
lightened modernism* w
1
.
3 * srsA-ns-i
Abyssinia and Italy, p. 19
Inf. Dept. Papers
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The last veatine of independence on the African continent
disappeared in 1936, when Abysainia was officially proclaimed
part of tlio Kingdom of Italy after its conquest.
.B| , - '• i; j pi
CHAPTER II
IHTERESTS OP THE MAJOR EUROPEAH
POWERS IN EAST AFRICA
.!
.
II
Africa is often referred to as the forgotten continents
The European Powers have carved for themselves extensive em-
pires and spheres of influence over most of the dark continent,
so that little of its population has escaped the colonial dom-
ination of the imperialist powers of Europe, In North East
Africa, Ethiopia, until 1935, remained the single Independent
state .. . Nevertheless, Ethiopia had been
constantly threatened by annexationist aims or efforts at
economic infiltration on the part of the three great powers
of Europe- Britain, France and Italy,
Great Britain
The British, due to their importance as an imperial
power, have, perliaps, been the most instrumental nation in
shaping decisions regarding North East Africa, Cecil Shodes 1
dream of a railroad from "Cairo to Capetown" expresses in
three words the desires of Great Britain in Africa, The
British Empire has the strongest foothold on the African
continent of either of her two other rivals (or partners)
in empire-building,
Ethiopia is strategically important for any nation
controlling Egypt, Sudan, and especially the Suez Canal,
Britain, gaining control of the Sues Canal in 1882, insisted
that no other European power dominate the Upper Nile* As time
went on, British control extended down the Nile and Britain
drew her sphere of influence by various agreements down to
.*
,
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the Blue Nile, a tributary of the Nile, into the North
Western part of Ethiopia in the Lake Tana region."^
Britain* s most challenging rival in this sphere was
France due to the later*s dominance in French West Africa,
Eq uatorial Africa and French Somaliland. It was necessary,
therefore, to force France into a "back seat” in the conquest
of empires in North Hast Africa, if Britain’s position was
to .remain secure. This Britain did In throe ways. In 1391,
Britain chose Italy as the candidate to control the East
African regions against the French by employing the familiar
balance of power methods: using a weaker power as a bulwark
against the stronger. This was implemented by the Anglo-
Itallan Protocols of March 15 and April 24, 1891, which, by
delimiting the spheres of influence of Italy and Breat Britain,
assured to Italy ’the predominant interest* over Ethiopia and
the whole of North East Africa except French and British
Somaliland*^
The second step taken by Great Britain was in 1896, when
1 .
2
.
British and Foreign State Papers. (H. M» Stationery Office*)
T^9Grry977oT^T7pp~^5T
British and Foreign State Papers . 1890-1091, Vol. 83,
pp^LsSuSl • Continued*~*SFI¥ish support was given in 1892 when
certain ports were yielded to Italy on the Benadir coast,
(Ibid, 1691-92, Vol. 84, pp. 630-635) and by an Agreement
signed at Home on May 5, 1894 the two powers define their
spheres oi active Empirical aims.
«'
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Britain ordered the reeonq uest of the Sudan region* 1 In 1098
the superior strength of Kitchener’s army forced the with-
drawal of French troops from Equatorial Africa, which had
o
reached Pashoda on the u per Nile. The third step was to
consolidate the results of this policy of forcible expansion,
ie. consolidating her position by diplomatic arrangements*
The success of this measure was reassured by the Anglo-French
agreement which reasserted British dominance of the Upper
NlXe,
S
Having taken the necessary steps to 3©onre a foothold in
the Sudan Region, the British then proceeded to maneuver for
a favorable position in regard to concessions in Ethiopia,
This was achieved in 1902 when the British signed a treaty with
the Negus Menelik whereby the British were granted (1) The
right to build a section of the aforementioned railroad from
Capetown to Cairo through Ethiopian territory, (2) A trading
station on the Sudan Ethiopian Border, (3) The Sudan boundary
line was to be redrawn to Include both banks of the Blue
4
Nile*
In 1904, the French anc3 British egotiated the Entente
Cordlale, and the conclusion was drawn from this action that
1* Probably after the defeat of Italy at Adovrn, March 1, 1896,
Britain could no longer rely on Italy as a bulwark against
Prance (in French Somaliland), for on March 12, 1896 Britain
took matters into her own hands— only 12 days later,
2, Illiara V, Koren, Italian Ethiopian dispute ,V, 6 No, 4 1935
/* 3
3, British and Foreign State Papers, 1898-99, Vol 99, pp 55-57
4 , r«^;,-i53i-sr; -for: ^pprT67-69
.• •
'
»
«
•
:
' !
• •' ' ' 1
j
-
t
1
.
.
1 '
.
’
•
.
.
*
'
.
.
.
*• .
... ...... ...
...
» « » >
14
*
Franc* and Britain had composed their differences
In December 1906, the Tripartite treaty between Great
Britain, France, and Italy was signed. Of the international
agreements negotiated by the foreign powers with regard to
their interests in East \frica, this is perhaps the most
important, because it provides the cornerstone of the throe
powers policy in this area up to the outbreak of the conflict.
Under this instrument they went on record to maintain the
political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia, and
,
in any
case, agreed to act in concert to safeguard each others
interests. A more detailed discussion of this treaty and ite
importance may be found in a later section* The significance
with regard to the position of Great Britain was that she
undertook to underwrite the validity of the Anglo-Italian
protocols of 1891 in recognizing Italian influence over
practically the whole of modern Abyssinia,
It Is to be remembered that Italy renounced any designs
on Ethiopia as a protectorate in the Treaty of 1896 following
her defeat at Adowa. But, with the ” official f * backing of the
British Empire on her interests in East Africa, Italy felt
her c&aims in this area considerably strengthened.
In 1915, the treaty of London was signed in which Italy
proposed that the two powers should act together. The Allies
made generous promises at the expense of the enemy-Gerraany and
1. WiUlam V. Koran, p 5
».
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economic exploitation of Eastern Abyssinia. 1 At chat time,
the British were unwilling to cooperate, and rejected the
Italian proposals.
Six years later, however, in 1924, after Italy had
failed to receive any compensations from the Treaty of London,
the Versailles Treaty, or the negotiations with the British
in 1919
,
the whole question of Italian and British zones of
influence was reintroduced on British initiative in 1924.
On the surgace, this would appear to be a reversal of
previous British policy. An examination of British motives
will explain the reasons behind the action.
The British had undertaken direct negotiations with the
Regent of Ethiopia with respect to the Tana dam project and
they had proved unsuccessful. Therefore, in Pecember 1928,
Britain accepted the Italian proposals of 1919 which had been
previously rejected. It was particularly specified in the
exchange of notes that the concession granted to Great Britain
was to be made within the Italian zone of Influence. Britain
further agreed that, if the concession of the dam was granted
at Lake Tana, she would recognize an exclusive Italian
economic influence in the West of Abyssinia and in the whole
territory to be crossed by the above mentioned railway 1 and...
would * further promise to support. .. .all Italian requests for
1. William V, Koren, Op . clt . p . 7
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economic concesalons In the above zone,* *
When the agreements were aired In public. Prance protest-
ed that they were a violation of the 1906 Treaty* Abyssinia’s
fears were stated to the League in the following words: "We
cannot but realize that economic influence and political In-
o
fluence3 are very closely bound up together* 1 ’
Assurances and explanations were sent by both Italy and
>
Great Britain to the Secret ary-Genoral of the League and to
the Abyssinian Government disavowing any intentions of
economic exclusiveness. Prance and Abyssinia were not the
only critics of the exchange of notes In 1925; Leonard Woolf,
a Britisher writing on the Italian-^thiopian crisis in 1935,
mentions in retrospect, the incongruity of these 1925 agree-
ments with Britain’s obligations to the League. He voices the
complaint that these agreements were a distinct violation of
the spirit of the Covenant in the following passage:
"When the Government at the end of 1934 was
faced with the truculent determination of
Signor Mussolini to ignore the League, and
make war upon Abyssinia, they (British
Government) entered the League Council meta-
phorically encumbered with a whole necklace
of albatrosses*
1 .
2 ,
"Our obligations to Italy, implied in these
documents (1906 Treaty and the Exchange of
Notes in 1925) are Incompatible with our
obligations to Abyssinia under the League*
Covenant. It is true, that these obligations
and understandings, insofar as they are in-
League of Nations Treaty Series.Vol. 50, No. 1211 "Exchange
of notes Respecting certain British and Italian Interests
In Abyssinia," Rome Dec. 14, 1925.P.51
19 June 1926, Note to Sec,Gen. of the League. (Cited in M,
;.acC*rfcney, Italian Colonial md Porolgn Policy .p.292*

cons latent with the terms of the Covenant,
are by Article SO the Covenant declared to
be abrogated; but our Government has never
publicly or openly admitted this or taken
steps to procure its release from Buch
obligations* ,,0n the contrary, up to October
of this year (1936) in negotiations with Italy
it showed that it still considered itself to
be bound by these agreements, eg, in September
the British Foreign Minister informed the
Committee of fixe, "that his government was
Prepared to recognize a special Italian interest
in the economic development of Ethiopia," 1
Returning to the immediate effects of the 1926 Anglo-
Italian notes, the unmistakable result was to illustrate the
true aims oi Italy, and to demonstrate the willingness of the
British Government to play a role sympathetic to Italian ex-
pansion in hast Africa,
The policy of giving a ‘helping hand* to Italy 1 s colonial
adventures is of the utmost importance in the understanding of
British policy with regard to the treatment of Italy by the
League,
Britain entered the system of collective security, embod-
ied in the League Covenant, with these past committments to
Italy, It is hardly surprising, therefore, that Italy, When
undertaking the Abyssinian campaign, should consider such
expansion a ’right*, the validity of which had been recognized
by the most powerful member of the League,
In a preliminary manner, a general statement of British
policy, rather of the ’British dilemma*, is well expressed
by Leonard Woolf,
1. Leonard Woolf, "The League and Abyssinia"
, (Day to Day
Pamphlets,) p,13
’* . .
! • s. J.
,
J?
’’For here was a test case for the League System
a series of obligations binding Italy and this
country to protect the independence and terri-
torial integrity of Abyssinia, to settle all
disputes without resort to war, and to apply
sanctions to any state, which violated these
obligations* On the other hand, there were a
series of obligations binding this country to
violate the independence and territorial in-
tegrity of Abyssinia into pieces and give most
of them to Italy*
"For months the Italian government made open
preparedness* . .All that time the Briti sh
Government never made dual1 either to^TiTsclf
or t o 'ifagsollnl or t o the rest of the world
which series of ^obligat ions tt proposed to
"
Sjtajrrf^y, vPnet'her in fact
,
it was going to
3taruTljy the noague . * * or whether it was
going to stand by it 3 agreements with Italy
and give that country political and economic
control over abysslnia* • .And the facts prove
that at best, the Governments foreign policy
was rauddleheaded, vacillating. Inconsistent
,
paying lip-service to the League and its
system, but continually in practice repudiating
the obligati ons—the fulfillment of which alone
could give reality to the Leajpie system of
peace, disarmament and collective security*' 1 1
( The emphasis is the author's*)
The official British policy, as developed by this outline,
has been favorable to Italian expansion* but with the advent
of the League, Britain was forced to reconcile, however im-
possible, these committments to Italy with an outward observ-
ance to the League* One of the vital reasons which forced
Britain to become a protagonist of the League against Italy
was public opinion at home. Popular opinion in Britain was
2displayed in the outcome of the vaace Ballot# Mr* Baldwin,
k issh

20
and the British statesmen were forced to keep their eye con-
stantly on the political complexion of their constituents with
the approaching elections in 1935,
Thus, although the politics of 10 Downing Street showed
a definite reluctance to punish Italy, British public opinion
was undoubtedly a vital force which pushed the British dele-
gates to go as far as they did in supporting the Genova
machinery.
British policy, immediately preceding and during the
actual conflict, will be woven into the account of the action
taken by the League in dealing with the transgressions of
ISussolini.
In 1935, Great Britain and Prance exchanged their historic
roles with respect to their attitude toward the League: Britain
in theory, acting the protagonist, and Prance, the appeaser.
FRANCE
)
From the inception of the League to 1934, Prance had been
a champion of the League and the system of collective security
for very realistic reasons.
At the peace table. Prance had championed specific in-
terpretations of the Covenant, and had been the main nation
to advocate the insertion of the sanctions clause.
What were the interests of Prance north east in Africa
and how do they affect the French policy toward Mussolini^
efforts at expansion in tills area?
*

21
The north east African possessions of France primarily
center around French Somaliland, a “barren, hardly inhabitable
strip of land on the coast of the Red Sea. Her main interest
there has been the DjibutifAddis Ababa Railway, the concession
for which was granted by Memelik in 1898. After the failure of
French efforts to control the Upper Nile, the only pre-
occupation of the French in this area has been to prevent
British financial Interests from gaining control of the French
company owning the Railway concession. This was assured in the
Tripartite Treaty of 1906.
In 1908 the railway company was liquidated and a new one
formed wfith the acceptance of ftenelik, and the railway line
was completed to Addis Ababa. The new company carried over
. 1
75£ of Ethiopia’s foreign trade. Its lucrative rewards were
attested by its annual dividends which paid 125 francs a share
since 1929, and profits on each ton of merchandise carried
o
the length of the railroad in 1933 exceeded 200 francs.
France had opposed Great Britain’s support of Italy’s
predominance over Ethiopia as a natural threat to her own
interests. T^is was clearly expressed by her protests of the
Anglo-Italian exchange of hotes in 1925.
1 . William V, ftarea* Op . pit , ff.
Nabl ons ( Gen eva) Feb • iSSS*
)
2. log. ' Git,
p.4{Citod in Journal des
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With tho rebirth of German nationalism. Prance considered
her interests in East Africa infinitesimal compared to the
threat to her homeland. The obsession with the fear of the
German danger, was the primary motivating factor of the French
policy toward the League against talcing any action against
Italy. From the first, France was interested in the Covenant
exclusively insofar as it could be employed as a bulwark of
French security, hence, the reason for a strong League, And,
in 1935, in helping to undermine the League, she correspondingly
helped to undermine her own security, paving the way for her
own downfall.
French scepticism as to the extent to which British aid
could be relied upon was no doubt one of the most important
factors forcing France to see Abyssinia for Italian friendship,
ITALY
Italy* s colonial expansion in north east Africa was not a
Fascist innovation, incubated In the mind of Mussolini? it had
been the desire of Italian statesmen for almost a century
before bin to carve a colonial empire in this area* The
aspirations for an African colonial empire were in the
embryonic stages in 1857 when Christoforo Negri made an un-
successful attempt to negotiate a treaty of friendship with
the most powerful of the Amhoric monarchies In Abyssinia.
The first successful step in the building of an African empire
was in 1869 when Guiseppe Sapeto and an Italian Naval
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Commander landed at Assab, ( a port on the Red Sea and
obtained a small piece of territory there. From this begin-
ning, the colony of Eritrea was established. The period of
the Risorgimento and the development of national unity at
home, took precedence, however, over imperialistic alma, and
therefore, African aspirations v/ere subjugated to these more
pressing domestic problems. In 1882, colonial efforts were
resumed, and Aasab was claimed as an Italian colony. 1
The opening of the Suez Canal feave the Bed Sea more
strategic importance as a link between the European and
African continent. The wave of Imperialism, at high tide at
the end of the 19th century with its glory-gold-gospel theme
song, had its affect m Italy. Under the Crispi regime, 1387-
1896, the colonial aspirations of Italy received renewed
impetus.
The first direct relations between Abyssinia and Italy
date from the negotiations between Italy and the new ruler
Menelik in 1889 which culminated in the Treaty of Ucciali.
This instrument established, as far as the Italians were
concerned, a virtual protectorate over Ethiopia. A
difference of interpretations arose, however, due to language
1. ^Thc activity of travellers and explorers became intense
and were feverish about 1880..,* The Italian Geographical
Society had been founder in 1867; there followed the
Society for Geographical and Colonial Studies in Florence,
and more especially the African Society at Naples,which
aimed at making known the bestchannels of commercial
sommunlcation with Africa. The activity of the Government
was gradually concentrated upon the shores of the Bed Sea.
(and) in 1881 the Bay of Assab was acquired. .and in 1882
this acquisition was confirmed and extended through an
agreement with England."Benedet to Croc e
.
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difficulties, and lanelik rejected the Italian claim that he
had Blgne^i away his country's independence.
In 1889 and 1890 respectively, Somaliland and Eritrea
were drawn officially into the fold of the Italian east
African empire. In 1090 lienelik allowed Italy to represent
1
Ethiopia at an anti-3lavery conference held at Eritrea,
With tnes© accomplishments paving the way for further
expansion, Criapi fervently made efforts to consolidate his
country's claims to an Italian protectorate over Ethiopia,
Since direct negotiations had failed, an accord was reached
with Great Britain in 1891 by the Protocols of Idaroh and
2
April which stated that Great Britain "recognized as a sphere
of influence reserved to Italy the whole of what is at
present Ethiopia, Eritrea and Banaliland."
With Italian claims supported by the greatest colonial
power on the globe by the Anglo-Italian Protocols, Italy un-
falteringly pursued her policy of colonial expansion, Criapi,
having pledged himself to the Abyssinian adventure, attacked
the Tigre region of Abyssinia in 1895, The military action
was successful and the region was temporarily annexed. Due
partially to lack of support by ftirliament in supplying the
necessary appropriations, the war policy of Crlspi was
17 noneclot to Tro c e , History of Italy p, 175
2, British Fprei ^nt^State 'papers t 1890-1891 , Vol.83 pp,1921
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subsequently frustrated by the debacle ensuing at the Battle
of ildowa on March 1, 1896, in which the Italian army was
utterly defeated*
"Crispin final and decisive fall, however, was
brought about**.by the Afrioan adventure. He was
led hither by his love of the grandiose, by the
vision of glory which lie dreamed that military
triumphs would bestow on himself and Italy*....
but in December, the Negus Menelik, who had long
been preparing, collected all his Rases around him
and descended upon the Italians with a large army,
which destroyed Toaelli’s force at Amba Alaja and
laid seige to the fort of Makelle. Confronted by
a wave of national grief and indignation, Criapi
could not even attempt to defend himself, and sent
in his resignation*” 1
The Treaty of Addis Ababa signed on the 26th of October
1896, following the defeat of the Italians at Adcwa, annulled
the Treaty of Ucciali* Italy pledged herself by this document
to recognize and respect the independence and sovereignty of
the Ethiopian Empire* When Grlspi was forced to resign, the
national pride of Italy was sorely wounded by the humiliation
2
suffered at Adowa.
Prom this time on, Italy was forced to act in concert with
either Great Britain or Prance, or both powers, to regain any
measure of economic or political control In this area, until
1928 when a unilateral policy was renewed*
3
The Tripartite Treaty of 1906, mentioned previously,
provided the cornerstone of Italy’s ’rights* in Ethiopia,
l*Benedetto Croce, Op. Cit. p* 193-194
2* Mussolini’ s attempt to heal this wound can be said to be one
of the important motives for reviving Ethiopian campaign in
1935*
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One of the reasons the treaty was precipitated in 1906 may be
found in the entrance of Germany on tho scone as a growing
colonial power in east Africa# ^hi a threat to the status quo
revealed itself at the Algeciras conference when Germany
stated intentions of establishing claims in north each Africa,
plus the fact that in 1906 she signed a commercial treaty with
Ethiopia#
The three powers, already well entrenched in Africa, were
not desirous of sharing their spoils with a fourth power.
Consequently, this agreement in 1906 was negotiated tc prevent
any German encroachments on the status quo# By this instrument
they received assurances from each other that their special
interests would not be disturbed by one another* The ruler
of Ethiopia, Menelik, who was not a party to the Treaty,
approved it, after some hesitation, in December of that same
year.
1
The treaty In general delimited each power's sphere of
influence# giving Italy the lion’s share—if she could get it#
The document defines the powers* interests as follows:
(a) the interests of Great Britain and Egypt In the
Hile Basin, more especially as it regards the
waters of that river and its tributaries, with-
out prejudice to Italian interests mentioned
in (b)
of her possessions and the territorial connection
between thera to the west of Addis Ababa#
1# h, i.iaoCartney, Italy* o Foreign and Colonial Policy. 1914-
1937. p. £30. pTSW; '"THoT^aFerte "^S'lenTTs considered
by many international experts as a classic example of a dip-
lomatic instrument formally drawn up for the safeguarding of
a state but really aiming at its destruction.* Doc. clt#
(b) the interests of Italy in Ethiopia as regards
Eritrea and Somaliland (including the Benadir)
,
more espcially with reference to the 'interland
<.
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(c) tho Interests of France in Ethiopia as
regards the I’rench protectorate of the Corn-
ell coast, the hinterland of her protector-
ate, and the zone necessary for the construction
and working of the railway from Djibuti to Addis
Ababa,"X
This treaty gave Italy new hopes for an Italian protect-
orate over Ethiopia and from this time on, all agreements, as
much as was possible, gave Italy a "green light" in north
east Africa,
The Secret Agreement of 1915 reiterated again Italy’s
imperialist desires In this sphere. Due to the unsuccessful
outccmo of this agreement and the peace treaties of 1919
for Italy, the consensus of opinion was that Great Britain
was (due to the above factors) sympathetic to Italy’s need
for expansion.
It was rumored in 1925 that the British were anxious
/ 9
to maintain the status quo in Africa, They, therefore,
suggested that I'ussollni seek "pacific penetration" in
Albania rather than, taking action age Inst Abyssainia at
this time, The Christian Science Monitor published a report
giving evidence of this proposal:
"In a confidential memorandum published on the
2nd of October, 1925, and based on infomition
said to come from "unimpeachable sources’ dis-
closed that Signor Eussolini contemplated ac-
tion against Abyssinia in 1925. Information
from a good source would Indicate that he wanted
to faco this (the Ethiopian) problem after having
subdued the rebel tribes 'in Somaliland and recon-
querod the whole country, or rather simultaneously
with this colonial
X. cited in william 7. Horen, T)p. Clt., p. 5
r•
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police action* This viras after the Anglo-Italian
accord concerning the respective spheres of influence
in Ethiopia at the end of 1925 and "before the con-
clusion of the Pact of Friendship with Ethiopia In
1928. From the activity that Italy had then dis-
played along tho Bed Seacoast, the British might
well havo become aware of Signor Mus s olini ’ s in-
tentions. 'i’hey did not like the Puce’s idea and
are reported to have told Signor ussolini in effect
in a friendly way: ''Instead of wasting so much
effort and money in a country so distant from Italy,
and where you might easily encounter diplomatic
difficulties with the two countries which have
interests in Ethiopia, why don’t you seek pacific
penetration much nearer at hand? What about Albania'
The British government would leave Italy a free hand
to consolidate her position in Albania, provided
that she did not seek to change the status quo in
the Red Sea area." 1
From this source* it can be surmised that any colonial
adventure incubating in Pasolini’s brain at this time was
postponed (on British advice)
,
to bo hatched at a more
propitious moment*
In 1928, Italian policy changed, and idussolini decided
on action without the support of his European powers. The
Pact of Friendship was thus negotiated between Italy and
Ethiopia, and was signed on August 2nd, 1928, by Has Tafarl
Makonen for Ethiopia and Signor Cora, the Italian Minister to
Abyssinia. The Treaty of Friendship consisted of an exchange
of courtesies for the purpose of promoting trade for the
advantages of each of the signatories. Both countries
pledged themselves by this instrument to respect the inde-
pendence of the other and to settle all differences arising
1* M. UaeCartney, Op . Git , ff. 2., p 290
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between them by arbitration.
In reality, Italy hoped to foster a development of inland
trade by offering in a supplementary convention, the use of the
Port of Assab in Eritrea to Ethiopia, Italy hoped also, that
the transit of products In this i anner would give Italian
nationals an opportunity to exploit the natural resources of
Ethiopia #
1
Due to the fact that the economic agreements in the
Treaty were largely unfulfilled by Ethiopia, it is interesting
to make a more careful examination of Its text.
”Article 1* There shall be constant peace and per-
petual friendship between the Kingdom of Italy and
the Abyssinian Empire.
Article 2. Each government undertakes not to engage^
under any protest- in action calculated to Injure
or prejudice the independence of t lie other, and the
two governments undertake to safeguard the interests
of their respective countries.
Article 3. Both governments undertake to submit to
a procedure of conciliation and arbitration disputes
which may arise between them and which it may not
have been possible to settle by ordInary^diplomatic
methods without having recourse to arms."
The results of the treaty were largely disappointing to
Italy and this constituted ono of her most substantial griev-
ances against Ethiopia. From this treaty, Italy felt she had
acquired a right to expect economic advantages and concessions#
Why Ethiopia signed it—her first treaty with any European
1. A. J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs. V.II, 1935
P* 127
~
2. Eeague of rations treaty Series, 1929, Vol. 94, No. 215
*.
.
,
'
.
.
.
.
.
I
•
-
•
.
...
•
. -
.
*
.
«- -
-
.
;
50
power—has never been explained* Undoubtedly, she feared
friendly* economic penetration by hor past experiences with
Italy in attempt to establish a rotec borate over Ethiopia*
Nevertheless, after signing the treaty, Ethiopia adopted an
r
obstructionist policy, obviously placing as many obstacles
to Italian cooperation as possible.
Ethiopia made not use of Assab, while the Italians
built their road agreed upon from Assab to the Ethiopian
frontier Without undue delay* 1
,
but the Ethiopians never
fulfilled their part of the agreement at all*
In the Italian memorandum to the League on the section
o
on Treaty Infringements, Italy stated that hindrances were
placed In the way of Italo-Abyssinian trade development, and
that 1although Italy had not missed an opportunity in offer-
ing Ethiopia counsel, * Abyssinia had barred all doors to
Italian cooperation. In solving her internal problems,
Ethiopia had appointed advisors of many othoi’ nationalities,
so that Italy 1 in practice found herself in a position of
X
inferiority compared with the other powers.’^ Although
Article 3 was nullified by the Abyssinians, and the instrument
became a useless tool of Italian policy, Abyssinia did invoke
1* Toynbee, op. cit. p* 128
2. Official Journal, Nov. 1935, p 1360
3, Between l'§28" nd 1935, an Englishman was appointed to ad-
vise on internal administration, a Swiss on judicial
questions, an American on educational and financial
questions, Belgians and Swedes on military questions, a
Russian on Public works, Germans on aviation, Frenchmen on
ForeignJolley, etc. Luring this period only one Italian
expert was appointed In an advisory capacity.Toynbee,
Op. Cit. p 128
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Article 5 at a later date*
This treaty dates the steady deterioration of relations
culminating in war between the two countries.
The impossibility of peaceful economic infiltration in
Abyssinia, led the Italians to attempt more hostile methods.
It is obvious from this brief picture of Ital o-Ethiopian
relations that, Italy, up to 1936, had been dissatisfied with
her lot in north east Africa, and that her attempts at empire
building had been much less successful than those of her other
two partners. Before analyzing the Italo-Efchlopian dispute,
it will be necessary to investigate more particularly, the
other causes, domestic and International, which have resulted
in Italy f s claim for a ’place in the African sun.*
**
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CHAPTER III
ITALY’S ROLE IN REALPOLITIK
’
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RISE OF FASCISM
Italy was never fiestinod to play a leading role in power
politics because geographical and topographical factors had
given her an inferior share in the v,'orld*s rav/ materials. Italy
is conspicuously deficiont in those resources, viz, coal, iron,
and especially oil, which are essential for Industrial develop-
ment#
While Italy is forced by nature to be more agricultural
than Industrial, her agricultural activities are not sufficient
so she must rely on imports of some staples. For example, wheat
has to be imported to feed Its population, as one- third of her
120,000 square miles la uncultivable. Italy is a poor country,
partly due to nature*s "stinginess” and partly due to the class
structure where masses of industrial workers in the north and
the peasantry of the south experience a low level of economic
well being. For these reasons, Italy has been forced to play a
limited role in power politics. It Is not surprising then,
that Italy has been more adept at "attacking only the small
and weak, mauling those already mortally wounded, or snatching
bones from the great carnivores." ^
The contributing factors in the rise of fascism, then,
were: The great disappointment in the snail share of spoils of
World War I, the discrediting of Italian statesmen among their
1. F. Schuman, Op* Cit. p 535
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people by a fooling that they had won the war but the statesmen
had lost the peace, and the impoverishment of the masses* Thu8|
* the frustration of Italy* s patriotic ambitions, and the adverse
economic conditions of the people, wore instrumental in aiding
Mussolini * s ascendance to leadership.
In his creation of the myth of Fascism, Mussolini asserted*
as its fundamental principle, the power of the nation and its
subseq uent ’ethical ’ expansion* In ardor to clarify the
Italian action in Ethiopia, a few salient points will be con-
sidered in the succeeding pages to describe the practical
implications in the philosophy of Fascism to colonial conquest.
The Fascist movement received strong support from the
soldiers both prior to Italy’s entrance to the war and in 1919.
Membership in the fascio di combattimento were comprised
primarily from this group. The clever propaganda of the
Fascist leaders played effectively upon the low morale of a
people whose psychological mood was that of a defeated nation.
The militaristic patriotism and promises of war and glory*
with the Duce playing the leading role as imperator and con-
queror were incorporated as fundamentals in Fascist doctrine.
Democracy was criticized as a static form of organization,
while the Fascist state made claims of being a dynamic, virile,
. ever-expanding movement. As Mussolini himself explained,
"The Fascist State is a will to power and an Empire.
The Roman tradition is the idea of force. In the
Fascist doctrine, the imperial idea is not only a
territorial, military and mercantile expression, but
1.
.
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also one of spiritual and moral expression* For
Fascism, the tendency to the Imperial idea means
expansion of the nation and is a manifestation of
vitality*"
1
According to the tonets of Fascism, the expansion of the
nation is an * ideal*} and its antipode, a sign of decadence*
Pathological nationalism was an invisible motive for
the Ifcalo-Ethioplan aggression, w iloh proved to be an import-
ant factor regardless of any economic considerations.
Leaders?aip and the elite principle are the foundations
upon which a totalitarian system rests* A leader, such as
SStoasolini, with a de faoto incipience, necessarily bases his
continued existence in power on his ability to mystify the
people under his control, manipulating their minds by crowd
2
psychology, symbolism and mass indoctrination*
This is the Vproe&riousness* upon which the i 4ussolini
regime rested. Did "Ussolini fear that support of the masses
was waning? Was he afraid that the colorful role of *duce*
which he had created was becoming colorless under the pressing
burdens which the Italian people had to bear? Was Ethiopia
merely a manufactured opportunity for Mussolini to revitalize
his popularity, by recreating the spirit of the Risorgimento
with the Duce emulating its great leader? It would provide
a chance for increasing the prestige of the new-born fascist
1. Popolo d*Italia* August 5, 1932 (Cited in G. Sabine, History
Of Political Theory* p* 763 )
2. (f . Sabine
,
' history of Political The or;
, p. 769
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state, both in the eyes of foreign countries as well as at home
It is logical to conclude, therefore, that, had Ethiopia been
offered Mussolini on a "silver platter" he might not have
accepted it** If an exhibition of the military prowess of the
Fascist state reaffirm Mussolini* s popularity and bolster up
the morale of the Italian masses, all would be lost If Ethiopia
were handed to Italy In diplomatic negotiations,
A colonial adventure might be a convenient means of
diverting the thoughts of the overburdened taxpayer from his
economic distresses to the glory of military conquest,
The campaign achieved this objective. The army absorbed
many of the unemployed. War plants caused a diminution in
unemployment
,
and the Italian people were led to believe they
were on the road to fulfilling their manifest destiny,
*
1, In the L&vel-Hoare Peace Plans of Dec, 1955, the major
part of Abyssinia was offered to Italy by Great Britain
and France, cf. post pp.
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ITALY'S NEED P(K COLONIAL EXPANSION
The Italian discontent over the outcome of the peace
settlement at Versailles ie partly an expression of an unsati-
ated 'have-not' nation* Some adjustment most he made between
'haves' and 'have-nots' if friction over the inequality in the
distribution of material resources among nations is to be
eradicated.
It is obvious that a country, like the United States, with
abundant resources and potential reserves is less likely to be
an 'aggressor* than a nation which is unable to support its
people through lack of sufficient resources, in times of high
tariffs and contracting world free trade.
Signor Tittoni expresses Italy's plight in this respect
and offers a plea to the League members:
”To those privileged states which enjoy a monopoly
with regard to raw mat©rials and to those whose
wealth has permitted them to acquire a monopoly
outside their territories, 1 says do not wait
to be appealed to by the poorer states which are
at the mercy of your economic policy, but come
forward spontaneously and declare yourselves to
this Assembly that you renounce all selfish aims
and before the bar of the League of Nations declare
yourselves ready to support the cause of interaction*
a.l solidarity,” 1
Very little of a constructive nature was forthcoming from
the League members in making fundamental adjustments in world
economic policy* ®he victors of World War I, not only divided
!.* Nov, 10, 1920, official journal. Special Supplement, p. 456
.:
.
.
the defeated enemy * s spoils but managed, to maintain the status
quo, preventing any future encroachment, ifussolini capitalized
on Italy* s plight and played for the sympathy of the world
rather than making any sincere attempt at internal reorganiza-
tion to raise the standard of living of the Italian people.
His foreign Minister, Signor Grandi, on June 4, 1932,
explained Italy* s problem In the following words
j
"Italy must also place a problem before the world,.*
It Is avital problem which is directly connected
with our future, a problem of undisturbed peace
and of the work of a nation of forty-two millions,
which v/ill amount to 50 millions In fifteen years.
How could these millions of people live and continue
to develop if they are compressed into a territory
half the size of France, Spain or Germany, with no
supplies of raw materials and no possibility of
renewing their stocks, confined and held captive
within a closed sea, the routes and mouths of which
are used by several countries while others control
the entrances which form the Caudine Forks of
Italian freedom, security and supply? ... .This problem,
the vital problem of Italy, arises of Itself and
must form part of the great problem of International
reconstruction Wo cannot tolerate that the
recognition of Italy as a colonial power should be
overlooked.
Italy was thus determined to expand in the only direction
37
remaining to her-—southward, bussolIni in his 2nd Quin-
quennial Assembly address on the 18th of March 1934 described
the direction of Italy’s expansion and the cadre of a colonial
policy which lias as its goal, a ’natural expansion which ought
to lead to a collaboration between Italy and the peoples of
Africa,
*
1*
^284
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Statin# in no uncertain terms that Italy would not
tolerate any efforts to impede the attainment of her objectives,
Mussolini said:
"We demand no prlvcleges or monopolies, but we
require and vlsh those who are satiated and whol
desire to retain their possessions to refrain
from blocking the cultural, political and economic
expansion of Italy.”
1
4
"Legitimate” colonial expansion, as expressed by the preceding
statement, was considered on an entirely different plane of
ethics from provoking war among "civilized" nations. It is
interesting to note the "double standard” Mussolini applied to
9 0
his colonial warfare, and no doubt, expected that the League
would think of his adventure in Sthlopia in a similar fashion.
#
As he put it,
"Was the League to be the tribunal before which
the Hegroes, the backward peoples aid savages
of the world could arraign the groat nations
which had revolutionised and transformed humanity?
0
In other words, colonial expansion since the beginning, of
the Western State System had been included in the rules
of ’fair play 1 . Ilad not Britain in the Twentieth Century en-
' 4
gaged in similar adventures? Should Italy, arriving late in
4
the race for colonies, be denied the remaining, meager crumbs
not x^reviously devoured by the already satiated empire builders?
1. 3cho de Paris, Inly 21, 1935 (cited ini:. MaoCertney, Italy* t
'
‘foreign and Colonial Policy,
)
2. Popolo D’ltalla . September 3 1935
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felt that if she were to be called on the carpet for tills
incident, she could readily manage to embarrass the other
members for similar behavior*
i
*Perhap3 the moment has also come to open up the
entire problem of colonics in all ius complexity.
This is in the interest of all civilised states,
and especially of those who wore unjustly deprived
of their share in the exploitation of the riches of
the world *
"
ITALY*S ECONQx/iIC PROBLEMS 1
Italy*s problems, as has been intimated, although not in-
superable, were not enviable* Her plight consisted of, not only
a deflcleny in the necessary raw material for basic Industries,
but also the problem of supporting a population of 42 million
on a area half the size of Prance, one third of which was unfit
for cultivation*
The period following the war had sent Italy staggering to
her knees with a completely dislocated economy* The dis-
integration of any stability was, in part, the cause of the
Fascist rise to power, when in 1922 Mussolini rode to power on
a wave of economic and political difficulties*
While the Fascist Labour Charter stated that private enter-
prise was to be maintained as an effective instrument of the
national economy, the State subordinated private interests by
the Corporate System* An analysis of Italy* s economic develop-
ment under this system is pertinent to this study, in order to
show the relationship between economic distresses and the
!r
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adventure in Ethiopia,
A separation of domestic and international economic prob-
lems is an artificial division, and the interrelationship
between the two is, other than academically, inseparable. But
for the sake of siraplifioation, this division is made in
analyzing the picture of Italian economy.
The most prominent domestic problems of concern here con-
sist of unemployment, the standard of living, the budget, and
the national debt* An analysis of these factors with a
corresponding discussion of Fascist policy in meeting them, will
give a general picture of the situation in which Italy found
itself in 1935.
The World depression in the ,30s further complicated the
Italian economy, resulting in an increase of unemployment, a
decrease in her •invisible* export tourist trade, and a con-
traction of foreign markets in general* These factors had their
inevitable repureuasions on the standard of living* A period
of deflation characterized the early thirties with prices of
all foodstuffs cut, rents lowered and wages reduced, A writer
in the Economist estimates the cumulative reductions of wages
at between 20 and 40% since the beginning of the depression.
" ••...To secure an index of real earnings from
which to judge the general standard of well-
being, it would be necessary to adjust these
figures in order to take into account a ‘620%
in unemployment.” 1
These facts demonstrate how the world depression ad-
versely affeoted the Italian population.
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Increased spending in public works, forms of insurance to
workers, and subsidise to industries comprised the major
measures that were employed to mitigate the rising trend in
unemployment
1
The pressures of deflation and rising unemployment, de-
presses the standard of living farther* Far from being eased by
Fascist policies of spending, they were affected detrimentally
by a policy which encouraged and stimulated an increase in the
o
population and restricted emigration.
To mitigate the social affects of the depression, extensive
public works and programs for land reclamation were undertaken,
however, with the rapidly rising needs of the Fascist state,
a heavy drain was put on the taxpayer* Signor Mussolini told
the Chamber of Deputies on May 25, 1954 that,
!,
I am the first to declare that the pressure
of taxation lias attained the limit, and that
the Italian taxpayer must be given & breath-
ing spell of absolute tranquility; if possi-
ble, nis burden must be lightened*" s
Unfortunately, the increase in expenditures was not
accompanied by a corresponding increase in revenue for the valid
1* Royal Institute of Int* Affairs* Cit p, 52, "further analy*
sis of the items covered by the offlcTal^eadings shows that the
rise in expenditures during the years of the depression is prim-
arily due to four factors! (1) expansion of subsidies, (2) ex-
tradrdinary treasury expenses(3) state assistance to local
government finances (4) increased military expenditures,
2* A, J» Toynbee, Op »
[
C it * Vol,XI,p,ildi
3* Royal Institute of'lnternati cnal Affalrs*Ro,15,0p.Cit ,p,51
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reasons explained above by Mussolini. The extent of the
divergence between revenue and expenditure is described in the
followings
w Since 1930-1 there has been a steady decline in
Revenue which is shown both in the fall of the
index of •real* revenue from 135 to- in 1930-1
to 118 in 1932-3 and 1933-4. This decline has
persisted in spite of the increase taxation and
tariffs. This is only natural in view of the
shrinkage of business during the world de-
pression, exaggerated by the maintenance of
the lire at the 1927 parity. ” 1
The obvious consequence of increased expenditures and de-
clining revenues is an unbalanced budget. The budget deficits
incurred between 1930-1934 amounted to a total of 14,697,000
lire and this total showed no signs of abating in 1935, as the
2debt had risen by a further 2,58ii,000 lire in seven months.
The budget deficits wore partly met by floating domestic
loans rather than incurring foreign indebtedness, thereby
keeping the burden primarily within Italy. The following charts
demonstrate the extent of the budget deficits and the amounts
of the internal debts
The trend shown by these figures reflects the repurcussions
ensuing from the overvaluation frf the lire, the decline in
experts, and the contraction of foreign markets which generally
accompanied the world crisis.
In the succedding pages, a discussion of each of these
factors in their relation to Italy* o foreign trade will complete
the picture of the economic and financial position in which she
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found herself In 1935.
Italy Vs International Economic Relations
The policy of "autarchy* 1 underlies the ma.jor actions taken
by the Fascists in their commercial relations with the rest of
the world. This drive for self-sufficiency in the early *30s
had behind it strategic motives as well as economic, perhaps,
with a view toward the necessity for self-reliance in the event
of a colonial campaign. Whether &1nssolInI was far-sighted
enough to consider the difficulties that might be encountered
with a hostile League and the possibility cf Art, 16 being
invoked, is debatable, Heveretheless, even in pre-crisis aays
wide efforts were made to free the country from the dependence
on importation of food stuffs, "The battle of the wheat did
not succeed in making Italy self-supporting," •*- “but she had
come close to independence of such imports, for her import
surplus of wheat had been reduced from 18,500,000 quintals in
1925-6 to 2,300,900 quintals in 1933-4.
The futility of complete self-sufficiency is evident in
a country which lacks such essential raw materials as coal, oil
cotton, iron, steel, copper, etc. in any great quantity. "For
rubber, tin, nickel, tungsten, mica and chromium, Italy is
t
1. Gaetano Salvemini, uLussolinI*s Battle for Wheat," Political
Science Quarterly
.
V, 46 (1931) p* 39
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completely dependent on foreign supplies." 1
The contraction of foreign trade resulted, not only from
a consciously developed drive for self-sufficiency, tut also
from the trade restrictions and tariff walls built around
practically every country after the world economic crisis*
Despite Italian policy to stabilize the lire, its financial
position in international exchange became more desperate, and
had its effect in the contraction of Italy*s foreign trade.
The lire had been stabilized officially in December, 1927,
at a rate of 19 to the dollar. Having been 25 and 26 in pre-
vious years, it was obviously overvalued. The position of the
lire in successive years continued to degenerate, and, in
nay 1934, .Mussolini made a speech in the Chamber of Deputies
to the effect that he anticipated a budget deficit of 4,000
million lire and emphasized the dangerous condition of the
balance of international payments, and the ominous efflux of
gold* 2
Stringent decrees in 1934 and 1935 were issued for the
purpose of marshalling every penny of exportable funds to
defend her exchange. All foreign exchange operations were pro-
hibited except for genuine industrial or commercial trade re-
quirements* banks and businesses were required to declare their
1, A. J, Toynbee, Op . Cjt ., Section Xll ’’The Economic Aspects
of the Conflict^ passim,
2* Ibid , p
t*
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foreign balances to the Bank of Italy. Banks and citizens were
forbidden to purchase securities abroad; and in December 1934
all banks, companies, etc. were ordered to cede their foreign
credits within ten days to the National Exchange Institute at
the current rate of exchange. In May 1935, a decree ordered
the surrender of privately held forei^i Investments. In
August of that year, these were compulsorily converted into
Italian Government Securities* The attempt to check the out-
flow of gold, however, was unsuccessful, and the loss of gold
continued, at an accelerated pace.
HTh© reserves fell from 7,397,OCX) ,000 lire at the end of
1933 to 5,883,000,000 at the end of 1934, !,i and the decree
of July 1927 fixing the minimum gold reserves at 40$ was
suspended. In effect, the ’lire was no longer on the inter-
national gold standard.
The overvaluation of the lire naturally affected the
exporter in Italy, adversely resulting in contracted markets.
Not only did exports fall off, but a conscious effort to
decrease imports was made in the Corporate State* 3 distintly
protectionist policies. The disastrous result of an internal
policy of augmented spending and a further contraction of
foreign trade necessitated further protection of domestic
industries in order to defend the adverse balance of inter-
1. A, J. Toynbee, Op . cit . . of. Section XII, "The Economic
Aspects of thi TJonfTIct*. passim.
2. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Ho. 15
Op . Cit .. p . 41
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national payments. *..By 1935 Italy had one of the hi$iest
tariffs In the world. The decline in exports, resulting
from the strain placed on the exporter by the overvaluation of
the lire, and the consciously developed curtailment of imports,
eg. wheat, had their inevitable repurcussions on the Italian
standard of living. Not only did unemployment increase, lut
the cost of living was raised by tho high tariffs and subsidies
to industries. To give just one practical example, as a result
of the wheat tariffs, th© Italian consumer paid about $75 a
ton for wheat, which would have ,under ordinary circumstances,
cost $45 a ton.
Du© to th© precariousn©3S of th© lire, th© disintegration
of the whole Italian economy was taking place before mussolini*
eyes, despite all efforts in the contrary direction.
Every instrument available to the state was used in a
frenzied effort to preclude disaster: the manipulation of the
currency, subsidies, higher and higher tariffs, etc. Bather
than relieving Italy* s difficulties, however, these measures
proved only to aggravate the conflicts. Was a war the only
solution to the country^ swiftly degenerating economic
position? Evidently, Mussolini answered yes to this question.
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Rather than face a mass uprising It was possibly easier to
promise the population glory and laurels in an African
campaign. The ntiitia could absorb many of the unemployed, a
rise in industrial production would result from the ozigienoies
of war productivity, and thus a general absorption of the
potentially rebellious segments of the population could be
- *
achieved*
Politically and psychologically, the precipitation of a war
of conquest was a shrewd maneuver. Economically, however, most
wars are unprofitable and unsound, for the people will sitiraately
have to pay for them. They are usually profitable for only a
small element of the population. As a result of vjax prepara-
tions, the already overburdened taxpayer was forced to carry an
•
- •
even heavier load.
"A notable increase of expenditures on military
defense occurred in' 1930-1, when there was a jump
of 637 #000, 000 lire. The East African expedition
is causing a far larger rise. By the end of April
(1935), it hod directly cost 620, 000; 000 'lire. In
The month of iTuly, an additional 3^5,000,000 lire
was expended.” 3-
/
Economically, in the sense that the campaign was dis-
proportionately expensive to the gains accrued from the
4 ~
enterprise, the whole project can be pronounced unwise. Re-
gardless of the possible gains Italy hoped to make, the country
did not have a wealth of exportable surplus capital for
• »
ji. i mmmmmmmmmmm
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1. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Ho. 15, Op. Cit.,
P. 54
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investment in colonies. The British Foreign Office had already
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declared that Ethiopia would he a had risk for economic
development. In a -report, they stated
"It has not been demonstrated that the extraction
of Ethiopia* s mineral resources for export could
be profitably undertaken. • • . . . .The investigations
made of the economic resources of the country do
not appear to have resulted in any dramatic dis-
covery of potential reserves." 1
llussolinl led his people through a labyrinth of economic
t
difficulties to a solution of unknown rewards which entailed
inevitably enommous material cost and human suffering.
Accepting Mussolini* a argument that colonies in Africa
would he Italy* s salvation, it should he logically considered
just "what" Ethiopia offered. Theoretically, according to
4 * ~
Italian leadership, untapped resources were aYjaitiug Italian
exploitation in Ethiopia.
The soil and climate were not only good for European
4
colonization on tho plateau, hut were excellently suited for
agricultural development also due to the fact that two to
* #• '
(
*
three crops could he grown a year. Mineral resources, however,
were considered negligible—at least by British authorities.
"Abyssinia is more or less self-supporting and her
trade figures are therefore no guide to tho rich-
ness of tho country. The soil is excellent in
many parts of the highlands, and fertile agricul-
tural crops can be raised in products ranging at
the different altitudes, from Yv’heat and barley to
rubber, bananas and cotton. But agriculture and
......I l.l—
1. Great Britain Department of
'
Overseas Trade
.
"Economic'
Conditions in Ethiopia , " TH. .! '.Siationery Office, 1932,) p.ll
ir
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Raising, which arc the main occupations, nr*
still conducted on primitive lines; at present,
the only foreign agricultural enterprises are'
some minor Belgian ooffee-growing concessions.
The country' thus offers great opportunities for
development. There is no reliable survey of the
subsoil, however, and its mineral wealth can
only be gussed at. Potash, mica, gold and
platinum have been developed commercially,
but the known deposits are small and difficult
in accessibility. There are rumors of the pre-
sence of copper, tin, oil and coal."1
The preceding, passage demonstrates that although Abyssinia
had possibilities of being an untapped warehouse, thus far this
information was vague and based largely on conjecture.
If Ethiopia wore another Garden of Eden, could Italy afford
the luxury of imperialism? Italian colonization had formerly
been o "proletarian” movement, in contrast to the British
Empire’s, in which huge profits from investments in colonial
enterprises of a globe girdling nature were made.
• 4
In 1935, Italy found her trade relations ?:ith the rest of
the world unstable. If, by conquering Ethiopia, she would gain
the animosity of the rest of the world
,
would not trade relations
become even less favorable perhaps? At any rate, the advantages
4
i
afforded by Ethiopia were nebulous, as no "proven" potential
wealth of an great quantity had been exploited by other powers
.
The Duce, despite such small economic stakes, was determined
to play his hand. He proved to be a good gsmblyr—but at the
expense of the Italian people. w .
1. Royal Insitute of International Affairs, ITo. 16 Abyssinia
and Italy
, p. 62
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ITALY AND THE LEAGUE
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Although Italy was one of the original thirty- two
signatories of the Covenant, her attitude had boon consistent-
ly lukewarm* toward active participation and cooperation in
the League and, on certain occasions, was outspokenly hostile.
What were the causes behind this apathy toward the
League? The unfulfilled promises of the Treaty of London
were still open wounds to Italian pride, These * gross
injustices* and the inequities later perpetrated at Versailles
were continual aggravations. As Italy received no share in
the division of the German colonies, and D’Annunzio* s march
on Plume was thwarted by Wilson’s idealism, Italy felt that
the League personified an alliance of the victors, for the
purpose of maintaining their empires and territories In tact.
In this setting of ideas and thoughts, Italy came to
look upon the League as an obstacle to her ’legitimate*
aspirations.
With the advent of Fascism, it became increasingly
evident to many that the tenets of nationalism In Fascist
philosophy wore incompatible with the ideas of international-
ism embodied in the Geneva machine.
Collective security was considered a subjective emotion,
not a political ideal, by Italian spokesmen. Speaking in
retrospect In 1935, Professor Coppola at the International
—• *• * •
'V- 1 ...»
.
'
•"
'
'
*
/
•
•
.
‘
'
.
.
•
*
:
•
»
*
-
-
•
'
*
'
Studies Conference analyses this concept as,
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"this myth of security, this vaguely outlined night-
mare, which has disturbed and distorted political
intelligence throughout the world and especially in
Europe
; that it is a paralysing burden on European
politics, and that it thus constitutes one of the
greatest obstacles to the establishment of,.., a
veritable peace/ 1 1
An excellent example of incompatibility of Fascist c.ioctrine$
and world organization in terras of practical applications is
explained by him in the following:
"it is perfectly conceivable that at a given moment
of its history, a people, a nation, a state, may
feel that it is not secure and that it may become
conscious of a powerful, fundamental necessity to
feel itself secure* That is its right
;
but it is
.Iso its own concern* By what means ,~how and when,
this state will feel itself secure involves a
judgment which is eminently subjective, which is
its exclusively own affair; but which for that very
reason, cannot be the object of a fixed rule and
stintless of a universal muar^nty or of a universal
law." ^
The precedence of a national policy over an international system
of collective security meant in terms of practical politics
that Italy*s •legitimate* and *natural* rights should not be
subjected to scrutiny by other nations. Rather, ly developing
its own force, its own military policy, its own special
alliances, etc* Italy could secure this satisfaction by em-
ploying methods and means to her own liking. This unilateral
system of resolving a country*s affairs without regard for
1. laurice Bourquin (ed*) Collective Security , .intern tional
Studies Conference, 19345$# p. 246
2. Ibid * p. 145
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another state has frequently resulted In conflict*
The Corfu I^dldent in 1925 e»ernplified this policy.
Mussolini* in attempting to carry out 'manifest destiny' in
the 20 's took a definite stand against Geneva* In his own
words* Bffussolini expressed his country's intransigeant position,
wIn my opinion, the Corfu episode is of the very
greatest importance in the history of Italy, because
it has put the problem of the League before the
public of Italy in a way which no number of books
could have done# Italians have never been very
much interested in the League of Nations; they
believed that it was a lifeless academic organisation
of no Importance. •• .In point of f&et, the League
is an Anglo-French duet# l*he problem may be stated
in these terras: Should Italy leave the League of
Nations? Sneaking generally, I prefer to be inside
than 'out* H 1
The hostile attitude of Mussolini to the League as early
as 1925 is well illustrated in this passage* Italy, having
seised the Greek Island of Corfu on August 51 and defied the
League to act against her by the truculent words in the above
speech, soon after evacuated the island under pressure of the
British* The incident was not pressed by Italy at the time
due to the preoccupation of the Fascist regime in consolidating
their position* Nevertheless, Corfu, demonstrated to Italian
leaders, that even meagre crumbs were denied her through the
emcumbrance of this 'academic organization',— the League of
Nations.
Having well entrenched himself in power after thirteen
years, Mussolini would no longer be bullied by the 'Ariglo-
Y (Cited in M. MacCartney, Italy's Foreign and Colonial Polfcy)
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French duet in the ,30s# Tftien both Great Britain and France
made compensations to Italy in Libya to rectify the Treaty of
London, Mussolini could hardly be satisfied as a Collector of
deserts 1 #
Mussolini was determined to have more than deserts. In
his 2nd quinquennial address on 18 March 1934 he said:
1 Italy could above all civilise Africa, and her
position in the Mediterranean gave her this right
and imposed this duty upon her# .*( Italy) did not
want earlier arrivals to block her spiritual,
political, and economic expansion* 1
The conclusions to be drawn from this brief sketch of
Italy f s general role in real politics is that manifold motives
were behind the Ethiopian campaign*
Whether she would play a diffident role and succumb to
the pressures of the more powerful members of the League as
she had with, regard fco Corfu, or act out the intransigent
role in Africa,—with Geneva, without Genova or against Geneva,
was difficult to determine in 1934# But by the end of 1835
the leading statesmen at Geneva received the answer— in actions
53
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THB vifALWAL liiCIDEiil’
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On the fifth of December 1934, an apparently minor
border incident occurred between the Ethiopian Empire and
the Italian Somaliland, The Walwal Incident was the match
that later ignited a much larger conflagration, but It re-
ceived little publicity at the time. It was an occurrance
which had as its result the precipitation of all the latent
hostilities between the two countries* The incident, taking
place eight months before the actual invasion of Ethiopia,
will bo treated as a separate unit, although chronologically
it Is intertwined with measures takenat Geneva on the larger
Issues involved between the two disputants. This is dene
primarily because the prododural arbitration of the dispute
was handled apart from the League machinery and while the
Articles of the Covenant were invoked due to this incident,
the machinery used for dealing with it was set up under the
Arbitration Clause of the 1928 Treaty of Friendship, Under
this Clause a Commission o ,r Conciliation and Arbitration was
created*
The arbitration of this dispute will be discussed under
four topics: (1) the immediate orgins of the dispute (2) the
submission of arbitration and the actual arbitration (3) the
award of the Arbiters, and (4) comments and conclusions,
Walwal Itself is a barren country inhabited largely by
nomadic tribes, there are no known resources in the area of
any particular value that would cause a rapacious neighbor to
choose It as a target for conquest* The clash at Walwal was
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classified solely as a frontier incident. It, however, proved
to be the hinge upon which rested Italy* s pretest to swing open
the dcor to later extensive troop movements in East Africa which
ultimately led to the conquest of Ethiopia*
The boundary between Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia had
never been clearly demarcated. The actual boundary was estab-
lished by an Italo-Sthiopian Commission in 1910 after it had
been fixed on paper in the treaty of 1908. However, the work
was suspended and not reamed by this Goss isslon.
iftxtual hostility had developed In the intervening years
between the signing of the Treaty of Friendship in 1928 and
1934. Italian forces had penetrated into ^alwal and surrounding
areas since 1928 and attempted to exercise some control over
the Nomadic tribes in the area* The Ethiopian government had
not officially recognised the Italian occupation of this area,
but up to 1934 had taken no action to expel the Italian forces.
The immediate suspicions arose on November 22, 1934 when
600 Abyssinians*^ arrived at Walwal* The reason for this action
.
was supposedly to provide a military escort for the Anglo-
Ethiopian eo mission which was called in on demarcating and
surveying available land for pasturage. The economic exploita-
tion of the country and the settlement of the boundary carried
on by Ethiopia in conjunction with another foreign power, quite
likely caused Italian hostilities, as this action could be
interpreted to be a breach of the 1928 treaty. Conjectures have
it is suggeateShas approximately 1000 by Pitman Potter
alwal arbitration.
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be«n mad© and supported by documentary evidence1 on both aides
as to the actual events which took place Immediately and during
the outbreak of hostilities. With an Italian demonstration of
force, the Anglo-Ethioplan commission suspended its work.
With reenforcements on both sides, a precipitation of hostilities
was inevitable, Neither party claimed responsibility for firing
the first shot.
It appeared that, from Nov, 23, 1934, onwards,
incidents had occurred in the Walw&l area after
the arrival,., of the Anglo*Bthioplan Joint
Commission for the delimitation of the frontier,
between British Somaliland and Ethiopia, ‘Phis
commission which had instructions to make a survey
of the grazing grounds, in the Ethiopian province
of Ogaden, and which from Mo onwards, was accom-
panied by a strong Ethiopian escort had found
Walwal occupied by an Italian native force. Following
various incidents the commission had withdrawn on
November 25 without an escort. After its departure
an engagement took place on December 5 between the
Italian and Ethiopian troops. Other Incidents
followed. Each of the two governments protested to
the other, holding it responsible,^
After the fighting was over there were approximately 30
Italian dead and 100 wounded. Italy’s pride being sorely
wounded, apologies were demanded from Ethiopia. Not only a
diplomatic apology A requested, but in an Italian memorandum on
December 11 to the Ethiopian government, additional requests
were mads, consisting of an Indemnity to be paid for Italian
T, Official H oiirnal , XVI (1955) p* 1605 (Italian version in the
League "-Document C, 348 M. 171 (a) 1936 Political VII)
2, Official Journal, XVI 1935 * . 1606
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losses, and compensation in the form of compulsory aalute to
the Italian flag#*' Arbitration was called for by the Ethiopians
by invoking Article 6 of the aforementioned treaty of 1928*
Both governments sent extensive documentary data to Geneva
to substantiate their position* Alien the case of Italy against
Ethiopia is discussed a more detailed analysis will be made of
Italy* s grievances*
Italy disclaimed any intentions of submitting the dispute
to arbitration procedure, her case resting on who argument that
submission would admit that Italy was on equal terms with
Ethiopia and that the incident was a clear-out attack by
Ethiopian troops without justification* When an attemfcp was
made bo put the case on the agenda tit Geneva, Italy contended
that the League had no jurisdiction in the dispute. For reasa 3
of expediency, Italy, with Anglo-French accord, decided on the
course of keeping the dispute out of the council by submitting
it to arbitration under the 1928 treaty* On January 5, 1955
tiie Ethiopian government notified Geneva that Italian troops
were massed before Gerlogubi and had committed acts of aggres-
sion on the twenty-eighth of December, Britain and France
desiring no serious rupture with Italy persuaded the Italians
to settle peacefully the dispute in order to obviate the
iTfoYTft . ^une^ 3.955 P* 249
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necessity of action by the Council, On January 9, as a result
of these combined pressures, an exchange of notes between the
Abyssinian and Italian ministers announced that both parties
were ready to undertake direct negotiations. The Council,
therefore, postponed discussion to allow direct negotiations
to take place. After two months of negligible work on the
negotiations, the only constructive suggestion being that a
neutral zone be declared in Ogadon region until a settlement had
taken place, Ethiopia notified the League on March 16th that
prospects for a settlement had broken down and demanded that an
Arbitration Commission be set up as soon as possible, as
provided for in the Treaty of 1928, and Invoked Article 15 of
the Covenant. On March 22nd, Italy replying in a note to the
Secretary-General of the League, jus tifled Italian troop
movements in the area by the fact that there was an increasing
threat to her colonies from *barbarous * Ethiopian tribesmen.
The applicability of Article 15 to this case was also denied
by the Italian delegate. Italy professed willingness to
?
negotiate in the following words;
’’The Italian government, although not considering,
for its part, the phase of direct negotiations to
be at an end. , .declares, nevertheless, that it lias
not, and has never had, any intention of evading
the procedure laid down in Art, 5 of the Treaty of
1928.*,," 1
Following these exchanges of notes, the Ethiopian govern ent
I, <5f. 'A. J. Toynbee, 0g>. Clt
. pp 158-142
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proposed that a thirty day time limit be fixed for the appoint-
ment of arbitrators.
In conjunction with a memorandum issued at the Stresa
Conference, the Italian government announced its readiness to
appoint arbitrators, and if a deadlock arose, the willingness
to settle the dispute by the appointment of a 5th arbitrator
was stated.
The Ethiopian delegate failed at this time, however, to
have his government * s plea accepted by the Council, viz. that
Italy should at least be asked to give assurances that no
further military preparations would be undertaken during the
arbitral procedure.-1
In spite of Italian readiness to submit the dispute to an
Arbitration Conmlss ion, they repudiated the Ethiopian proposal
in the latter*® memoranda to the League, and opposed any sub-
mission of the boundary question to an Arbitration Commission#
The only point on which arbitration was to be undertaken
..-^was the question of responsibility for the fight at
Walwal on the 5th of December and the subsequent
indidents. . * * while the determination of the Ifcalo-
Ethiopian frontier must be effected in accordance
with the provisions of Article 5 of the Italo-
Ethiopian Treaty of Friendship of 1928. ..after the
present dispute had been settled.’'^
After some discussion of the questions over which the
1. A, J . Toynbee ' Op. C it . p .49
2. Official Journal, June (1935) p. 273^-4
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Commission should have jurisdiction, the arbitrators cie
appointed# ^ Count Luigi Aldrovandi-Marescotti and Signor
Raffaele Montagna were chosen by Italy and Professor Pitman B.
Potter and Monsieur Albert De Geoffre de la Pradelle were
Ethiopia* s selections# The Italians claimed that by choosing
non-nationala f the Ethiopians were giving proof that they did
not have the juridical talent available within their own
country to deal with such matters# The Ethiopians, however,
retorted that by appointing non-nationals, they were demon-
strating their willingness to accept an impartial verdict*
TJp to this time, Italian diplomacy had been successful
in keeping the Walwal incident off the Council Agenda, but by
May 11, the anxieties of the Ethiopian Government over the in-
flux of Italian troops into East Africa reached such a peak
that a dispatch was sent to Geneva urging the Council to act
2
without further adieu*
On May 25th, the Council passed two resolutions which
stated that if an understanding was not reached in the
Commission by July 25th, the Council would meet on August 25th
to ‘examine the situation*# This could be, of course, regard-
ed as a further diplomatic victory for Italy, by obtaining a
few more months grace in keeping the dispute out of the Council
hands# 5
1* Mew York Times* May 15, 1935.
2. Text' of tfote in Official Journal. May (1935) p#572#
3# ci*. Post "ACTI03^TmT l,^T’mrTSAGUE COUNCIL? CHAPTER V.
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Thus seven months had passed before any arbitration mach-
inery had been set into motion* The actual examination of the
incident by the Commission took place at Milan on June 6th and
the first meeting was devoted entirely to procedure and juris-
1
diction*
On June 25th, the meetings were again convened, this time
in Scheveningen In the Netherlands* M3&» Jeze and Lessons were
appointed as agents to aid the arbitrators. The proceedings
all seemed to be running smoothly until July 5th when M. Jese,
the Ethiopian aide, claimed that Walwal was within the territory
of Ethiopia* The Italian delegates promptly deolared that they
would withdraw from the meetings If the Ethiopian allegation
was accepted as a basis for further negotiations* In supporting
this stand, Italy denied that the Arbitration commission had
the authority to decide whether Its jurisdiction extended to
this matter. Whereupon the Commission adjourned on July 9, having
Q
delivered two separate opinions.
The impasse reached over the Italo-Ethiopian imbroglio
was again considered by the Council, acting on the bases of its
May 25th resolutions^ convened in Special Session on July 31s tf
On August 3rd, the Council issued a resolution which stated that
the frontier question did not fall within the province of said
1 • pitman Potter
,
0£* Cit* p. 11
2. For a complete Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of the
Commission at Scheveningen, Paris and Bern, see Annex
H,L,N,0, in Pitman Potter, Walwal Arbitration.
....
••
.
*•
- .1 i
'
*
;
'
• U?
,
,
-
, .
'
. . •
'
'
,
'
.
•
,
: .
, .
.
.
,
,
' r
.
. ....
(
Commission* In other words, the Commission could not debate
tliis matter (the sovereignty of W'alwal) and must concern it-
self solely with elements in the dispute other than terri-
torial sovereignty*
1
It is difficult to interpret any such action as thbs
other than as favorable to Italy*s position. When a funda-
mental question bearing on the outcome of a justiciable award
is barred from consideration, arbitration becomes a farce I
In the final meetings of the Commission, Ethiopia yield-
ed to Italian threats that refusal to arbitrate would lead to
the scrapping of the whole machinery by Italy, which in turn
might lead to further conflicts* So, although Ethiopia was
dissatisfied with the Council^ resolution of August 3rd and
its effect upon the work of the Arbitration Commission, they
agreed to the appointment of M, Polifcis, Minister of Greece
in Paris, as the 5th arbitrator, and on August 23rd a unani-
mous award was written, which was signed by all five members
on September 3rd* Fixing the responsibility of the incident
on neither disputant, the decision read as follows*
"..•The Commission is inclined to think that
this incident was due to an unfortunate chain
of circumstances, the first shot might have
been accidental, TLike the numerous and fre-
quent shots that preceded it. It is quite
oomprehensibl© that, in the nervous, excited
1. Official Journal . XVI (1935) p. 1610 .
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and suspicious state of mind of the opposing
troops, who had for weeks been placed in a
dangerous neighborhood, this shot led to the
regretable results which, ensued#
Consequently,
(1) that neither the Italian Government nor Its agents
on the spot can be held responsible in any way for the
actual Walwal incidents the allegations brought
against they by the Ethiopian Government are dis-
proved in particular by the many precautions taken
by them to prevent any incident on the occasion of
the assembly at Walwal of Ethiopian regular and
irregular troops and also by the absence of any
interest on their part in provoking the engagement
of December 5th, and
(2) that, although the Ethiopian Government had no
reasonable interest in provoking the engagement,
its local authorities, by their attitude and parti-
cularly by the concentration and. maintenance of
numerous troops in the proximity of the Italian
line at Walwal, may have given the impression that
they had aggressive intentions, which would seem
to render the Italian version plausible, but that
nevertheless, it had not been shown that they can
be held responsible for the actual incident of
December 5th# i
Even the impartial award, which laid the req> onsibiliby
to no one, snowed signs of partiality in such phrases as
’which would seem to make the Italian version plausible*,
thereby absolving the Italian Government to a greater degree
than the Ethiopian Government*
Many criticisms are for bhcoming of the arbitration of
this dispute from the preceding resume of its most important
aspects. Pitman Potter had made an illuminating analysis
1. Official Journal. XVI (1935) p* 1554# ( League Documents® exx)
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»
of the implications of the work of the Commission on which
he served as a member.*^
It may b© generally agreed that the results of the
Commission ended in failure, in the sens© that an award of
any consequence was not made. The causes for failure may be
partially ascribed to the defects of the Arbitration Clause
of the treaty of 19&8 . Rather than clarifying, it created
confusion over the type of action and jurisdiction in which
such a Commission should engago. The fact that a formal
compromise was not required by the treaty, resulted in a lack
of agreement on jurisdiction matters as well on fundamental
issues.
Closely related to this factor, is the confusion arising
from the Treaty over the type of activity the arbitrators
were to engage in* Were they to be partisan, diplomatic
representatives of the two disputing parties, or v/ere they to
be impartial judges, relying on the documentary evidence only
to arrive at a judicious settlement?
The Ethiopian Government interpreted the 'Treaty in the
latter frame of reference, by appointing non-nationals.
2
The Italian Government, however, in many press releases,
referred to the members appointed by them to serve on the
Commission as ^Italian representatives, * thereby connoting
something quite different from an impartial judge.
1. Pitman Potter, Loc. Cit.
2. Naw York Times . Ttay IS, 1935.
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The Ethiopian-appointed members wore vociferous in under-
lining their status# ‘They repeated tills statement of position
— that they did not regard themselves as diplomatic represent-
atives appointed by the Ethiopian Government. •• * ^
The crux of the problem lies in the interpretation of the
meaning of arbitration. Obviously# a prerequisite to a common
understanding of the interpretation of arbitration, must be
universally accepted standards. It seems impossible to believe
that arbitration can be successful if arbitrators are merely
diplomatic representatives for the parties involved in the case.
Perhaps, the ‘political 1 mistakes of the Council members
did more to hinder arbitration than anything 0I3Q. The council,
by not allowing the Commission to consider the juridical status
of the disputed territory, indicated its desire to emasculate
any power which the Commission might have held. Because of a
desire to deal with Italy ‘delicately*, the Council ’never
developed the courage or the power, for political or personal
2 ^
reasons.. to deal effectively with the issues*. by not only
failing to shoulder its responsibility, but in addition hinder-
ing the mac *linery of arbitration, the Council mad© me more
display of its political feebleness by not taking the bull
by the horns.
Mr. Potter himself declares that the solution, aftor a
1. Pitman Potter, Op. Cit.
, p. 22
2* Ibjd. . p. 28

careful examinatio* of the documentary evidence, was perfectly
clear., vis, that the Ethiopian Government van sovereign over
Walwal
.
0 All the documentary evidence available at the
tiro©, indicated that the frontier between
Ethiopian and Italian Somaliland in this
region lay one hundred or more kilometres
cast of VTalwal . ” l
The Italian request that this question of the territorial
sovereignty or w.U.wa.1 be omitted fror: the discussions of the
Council, only substantiates the Ethiopian position.
The decision of the Commission, therefore, was of little
significance in tlrnt txie award admitted of doubletalk, Due to
Anglo-French pressure, in. the CcuncArbitration Commission was
forced to refrain from pronouncing judgment on Italy, even
though the documentary evidence showed Italy to be responsible
for aggravating the conflict*
In this case, it appears logical to assume that the
Arbitration machinery was accepted by one disputant only for
the purpose of delaying the case in caning before the League
Council, while it was invoked by Ethiopia in a bona fide attempt
to settle the dispute. Had the Council members nob wished to
Indulge in procrastination, the case would have come normally
on the C0uncil agenda much earlier. But the arbitration
Commission was an. effective means of allowing Italy more time
in which to engage in her preparations, while demonstrating
outwardly to the League and the world the active part she v/as
1* P. Potter, Loc* Cjt*
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taking in peace-making.
This was indeed a clever manoeuver, and wittingly or
unwittingly, the great powers in the Council became accomplices
in Premier Mussolini^ scheme*
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PART II
PRELUDE TO WAR

CHAPTER V
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE LEAGUE
CCD NOIL
(January to September 1935)
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l*h© match that had been lit at Walwal in the waning days
of 1934 was fanned into a hot flame by early autumn of 1935*
It is a corollary that it is comparatively easy to put out a
fire in one room, but it becomes increasingly difficult as the
fire spreads to all part 3 of the house.
This is the dilemma which those at Geneva found themselves
in 1935* As it was Ethiopia that felt the greatest heat from
the smoking embers, it felt the necessity of calling the
attention of the League to the danger.
On January 3, 1935 (after the Italian Government had re-
fused to submit the Walwal dispute to arbitration) the
Ethiopian Government sent a telegram to Geneva reporting an
Italian aggression against an Ethiopian garrison where ItaL ian
troops were massed before Gerlogubi, and requested *in
application of Article 11 of the Covenant*, that every measure
1
should be taken to safeguard peace,
*
During the Intervening period before the Council met on
January 19, Anglo-French pressure was put on the Abyssinian
delegate M, Tecle Hawaraite, to achieve a settlement by direct
negotiations with Italy,
The Ethiopian Government agreed to this; however, pursuant
2
to their request on January 3d, they submitted a memorandum
to the League stating the Ethiopian grievances and*reasons for
1. Official Journal, XVI (1935) p.1607
2 , Official JoumalTXVI (1935) pp. 253-275,
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which they had asked the application of Article 11 in full,
and also discussed in Memorandum the feasibility of having the
dispute placed on the Agenda.
The Italian Government, desirous of keeping the dispute
out of the C 0uncil, proposed that * since direct negotiations
1
had not broken off that the Ethiopian request be postponed]
The Italian delegate, Baron Alois!, declared that!
"The Hoyol Government conscious of its good
right and prepared as it is and always has
been to seek in conjunction with the Ethio-
pian Government for a satisfactory solution
of the question—which for its part does
not regard as likely to affect the peaceful
relations between the two countries—considers
that the discussion of the Abyssinian Request
could not facilitate in any way the contin-
uance of the direct negotiations with a view
to an understanding.
1
’ 2
Italy then proceeded to submit the dispute to the Commission
of Conciliation and Arbitration under the Treaty of 1928. A
careful analysis of Aloisi*s statement shows that his words
do not coincide entirely with the facts. Originally, the
Italians had demanded reparations and apologies. They had
refused to submit the dispute to any arbitration, which does
not describe Italy* s actions as always having been favorable
to seeking a pacific settlement by Arbitral procedure.
Nevertheless, agreeing on January 19th to submit to arbit-
ration was much more expedient than allowing the Council to
consider the question immediately. By doing this. Premier
1. Ibid., pp. 1607-1G08
2. ISSI# pp* 1605
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Mussolini received six months* grace with wMch to prepare his
country in fulfilling his manifest destiny,, with little or no
interference from Genova, and without having to so much as tie
his hands by any proposal to cease his war preparations until
a pacific settlement had been reached.
Thus, the first Italian victory took place in January,
when the Council took note of the Ethiopian request for app-
lication of Article II and decided to postpone its discussion
of the dispute until the next session. At the time, however,
it appeared that this decision had been the result of a comp-
romise on the part of both the Abyssinians—by not pressing
the matter to be placed on the Council Agenda— and by the
Italians -- by agreeing to arbitration. The two facts that
(1) feverish war preparations by Italy beginning in February
and continuing, and (2) the continued refusal of Italy to
abandon the original intransigeant stand on Walwal showed the
transparence of Italian sincerity.
Only one achievement, resulted from these early diplomatic
measures, via. a neutral zone was established, in the Walwal
1
area in order to prevent further clashes. On March 13 the
zone Y7G.3 demarcated, but it proved extremely advantageous to
Italy since it extended roughly along the front of the
positions held by the Italian forces In the quadrilateral
Gerl ougubi-Ado-Walwal-Afdub, leaving all the posts which had
1. Ibid.
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been occupied by the Italians In their possession.
Meanwhile, before any arbitration machinery could be set
in motion, constant troop movements and warlike measures were
reported in Italy with one of the most important Fascist
Soldiers, General de Bono, having been appointed High
Commissioner for Eritrea and Somaliland. The Italian strategy
was to defer any action of arbitration by relying upon direct
negotiations. 6
Italy had, In reality secured satisfactory assurances that
Abyssinia would not precipitate further Council action for at
least a month. This strategy was in a large measure success-
ful, for, from January 19th until March 16th, Geneva received
no communicaticais from either of the disputants.
On March 16th, Ethiopia became alarmed at “the continual
3
despatch of troops and war material" to the Italian colonies
of East Africa and regarded unofficially the Italian r^usal
to arbitrate as another means to gain more time to continue
the military preparations.
In a communication to the Secy. General, 4 Ethiopia stated
that direct negotiations had broken down and claimed that Italy
1* A. J . Toynbee, Op » bit. p # l41*
2. On the 8th of March Abyssinia suggested the initiation of
arbitration procedure as urgent In the face of the complete
divergency of views to which the Italian Government replied
on the 18th of March that the 1928 treaty provided for resot
to the procedure of arbitration, and conciliation only when
ordinary diplomatic methods were exhausted and that in their
opinion ordinary diplomatic methods could not be said to be
3. Official J qurnal
«
XVI October (1935) p.1608. (exhausted.
4. Itild . . %Vl May (l935) p.572, (Text of Communication.)
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had declined the offices of a third power, and while Ethiopia
had made a solemn declaration to accept any arbitral award of
the commission* Italy had persisted in the demands for rep-
arations* Ethiopia, although not unwilling to aocept arbitral
procedure, was desirous in having the dispute laid down before
the Council for a full investigation (as provided for in
Article 15.) and was also anxious that the League take any
measures necessary to guarantee her lights* under the
Covenant (Art 10) • of territorial integrity and political in-
dependence* Italy retorted with the argument' that such pre-
parations as had been made were necessary for the defense of
her colonies. In passing, this argument although often re-
peated by Italy (up to the actual outbreak of hostilities) has
little validity when one considers that it was possible for the
other two limitrophe powers, Great Britain and Prance, to live
peacefully with Abyssinia for a half century without finding
her a serious threat to their colonial possessions as Italy
now did*
Italy, although claiming that her war preparations in
East Africa had been only dictated by the necessity of pro-
viding for the safety of her colonies,
1
expressed a partial
willingness to compromise in allowing the procedure under
Article 5 of the treaty of 1928 to come into play.
1, Hote to Secretary General of League, March 22,
Official Journal
.
May (1955) p. 574
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Ethiopia, anxious to make any proposals to speed the
machinery of the law and order, which she hoped would preserve
the integrity of her nation, attempted to force Italian Puce
to play Ills liaud rather than continue this game of evasion
through an Italian acceptance of the follcwing agreements;
(1) A time limit of 30 days be placed on the appointment of
arbitrators, inviting the Council to appoint arbitrators to
fix the procedure, to define the questions to be settled, and
in particular, the question of the Italo-iSthiopian frontier
in accordance with existing treaties and (2) that all military
preparations be suspended during the period of arbitration.
The Council, in the extraordinary session of April 16th,
was then confronted with the concrete problem of having to mako
the decision whether the Italo-Ethiopian dispute should be
placed on the limited agenda of that session or remain on the
agenda of the ordinary session in May. Another Italian dip-
lomatic victory ensued when After an exchange of views, the
Council decided that the question should remain on the agenda
» 1
of its ordinary session in May. The Council members thus
indulged in another period of procrastination. This tire
,
however, the urgency of the European situation called them to
Stress to deal with Germany, which was threatening again to
destroy the European balance, Britain and Franco were more
interested in placating Italy than Abyssinia in view of the
I. Official Journal. XVI (1935) p. 1606
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European situation, viz « to prevent the break up on the Gtresa
front created in April. Therefore the two Ethiopian proposals
came to naught, and Italian military preparations continued
throughout April and May with unabated vigor.
Before the Council was to meet in its ordinary session
in May, the arbitration procedure made little headway. It
was impossible for the two parties to afp?ee upon a basic
compromise. Italy barred from the discussion the (1) inter-
pretation of the Treaty of 1908 (deliniating the frontier)
and (2) the ownership of Walwal. Other procedural problems
1
arose such as the nomination of arbitrators. Having made
little headway the disputants confronted the League with
precisely the same problems as in the extraordinary session in
April. On May 20th before the opening of the Council session,
Ethiopia sent a communication to Geneva denouncing Italian
military preparations on the Ethiopian frontier and again
asked the Council to make full inquiry and examination on the
basis of Article 15 of the Covenant.
After four requests for action on the part of the Aby-
ssinian Government since January the Council finally passed
two resolutions which did little more than request Italy to
settle the dispute in accordance with the Treaty of 1928.
They were as follows:
First Resolution:
1. Cf »Ante
”
Walwal Arbitration. n Chapter IV.
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(1) Whereas at the meeting of the Council In
January 1935, the Italian Government and the
Ethiopian Government agreed to settle the
dispute which has arisen between them as the
lie suit of the incident at rtalwal on the 6th
of December 1934, in conformity with Article
5 of the Italo-Ethiopian treaty of the 2nd
of August 1928.
(2) Whereas direct negotiations through dip-
lomat ic channels having been exhausted, the
two parties have nominated their arbitrators
as provided for in Article 5 of the above
mentioned treaty;
(3) Whereas since the 5th of December, 1934
other indidents have taken place on the Italo-
Ethiopian frontier and the two Governments are
in agreement in entrusting the settlenient of
these incidents to the same arbitrators in
accordance with Article 6 of the Italo-
Ethiopian Treaty;
(4) Whereas the Italian Government, in view
of the request which has been made to it,
makes no objection regarding the nationality
of the arbitrators nominated by the Ethiopian
Government
j
(5)
Whereas the two Governments agree to fix
the 25th of August next as the date on which the
procedure of arbitration and conciliation shall
be concluded;
The Council,
Requests the Secretary General of the League of
Nations to communicate in the meantime to the
members of the Council all information which
may reach him from the two parties, in particular
regarding the development of the arbitrators *
work. 1
Although the Italian Government waived its objection
concerning the nationality of the arbitrators appointed by the
Ethiopian Government, the concession was a meagre one, for the
1, Cited in A*.J. Toynbee . Op « Pit, p. 154
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Ethiopian request that the Italian Government should abs tain
from sending to East Africa additional troops and munitions
or additional specialists was not acceptable to Italy* The
Italian Delegates* (Baron Aioisl) replied that no such re-
striction on his country* s sovereign rights could be tolerated
and that such a request implied Italy* s unwillingness or
’Bad Faith* in complying with the Arbitration procedure which
they had already expressed they would abide by*
So that, Italy by accepting the first resolution, gave
the impression that arbitration machinery could now be set in
mot ion{however. Home reported that mobilization of men and
despatch of troops to East Africa would continue*
Therefore, the Italian delegate, in making concilatory
gestures appeared to actwardly to accept the olive branch
instead of a rifle to settle the dispute* Actually, the
rainy season was beginning which would preclude any military
action that might be taken am/ay in a campaign, and Mussolini
still did not have his hands tied by agreeing to any proposal
to suspend troop movements to East Africa*
The proposal to concl\*de the arbitration by August 25th
was liberal in its time limit as arbitration had begun in
January having already allowed Mussolini a half year* a grace
in which to prepare for any eventualities in -ast Africa.
By the second resolution the council delayed taking any
action for two more months and left the two partied with full
liberty to settle the dispute in accordance with the
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Arbitration machinery set up in the Treaty of 1928,
The Council decided in this second Resolution:
"to meet if, in default of agreement between
the four arbitrators for the settlement of
the dispute, and understanding should not
have been reached by July 25th between these
arbitrators as to the selection of the fifth
arbitrator (unless the four arbitrators agreed
to tlie extension of this period) j Council also
decides to meet to examine the situation if on
August 25th the settlement by means of concilia-
tion and arbitration should not have taken place."
Certainly neither of these resolutions could be considered as
satisfactory in a solution of the dispute, the Council once
again evaded squarely facing the responsibilities. It was at
this time *before the horse had escaped from the barn* that
discussion of preventive measure should have taken place in
the Council, Could the Council close the Suez Canal? Could
the Machinery of collective security be applied before a
conflagration broke out? These problems were not even dis-
cussed inside the League* but the great powers continued to
offer morsels to Italy over the diplomatic bargain counters
outside the League, Specific measures taken by the Council
will be reconstructed in the following pages to complete the
story of attempts at settlement within the League machinery,
but important diplomatic negotiations outside the League
will be dealt with separately in which some of the factors
mentioned above will be discussed in less of a cursory manner
than at this time.
1, 0YficTaF~?l>urnal ~Wl June (1935) p. 640
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Can It be said that the Council, then, in omitting such
pertinent considerations, failed to fulfill its obligations.
Implied and written, in the spirit and the letter of the
Covenant? In the first place, Abyssinia v/as given no guarantee
that it would not be open to an attack after the rainy season
had ended, nor was promise exacted from Italy to stop or oven
curtail her military preparations. By accepting arbitration
procedure, Italy cloaked herself with assurances of not having
to fear any discussion in the Council on such hostile proportions
as closing the Suez Canal*
Far from requiring Italy to refrain from the use of force,
England and Prance offered proposals to placate their
Bellicose neighbor* The Council even failed to force Italy to
%
show her hand or defying her alms* nevertheless, in June,
British proposals were sent to hussolinl whereby Ethiopia
would cede territory to Italy and would then bo duly com-
pensated with an outlet to the sea by a corridor through
British Somaliland. Certainly, if the imperialist British were
willing to make such concessions as giving away territory in
their empire, they could undoubtedly be pressed even further*
If they were willing to buy Italy off, why should Italy not
’jack up the price*? Or so Italy’s reasoning might have been*
For, how could the British have boon aware of what Italy would
be willing to settle for in the absence of any definite Infor-
mation as to the scope and extent of Italian aims In Ethiopia.
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"uch ’ultra vires’ actions as these were undoubtedly part
of the reasons why forceful measures in bringing Ialy “on the
carpet” In the Council were underlined. How could any
country contemplating aggression believe in the sincerity
of the member states of the League who carried a big stick
at Genova, and who, outside the League offered them bribes
and peace offerings to show that the big stick really was only
a hoax?
On May 15th, before the Council had passed the afore-
mentioned resolutions. Premier LussolinI said before the
Italian Senate, ’Italy is the sole judge of' what measures
are necessary (in Ethiopia) and she will tolerate no inter-
ference, no matter by whom 4 Tills should havo been an
adequate cue to any Member State who professed an adherence
to a system of collective security that here was a country
threatening to throw overboard the obligations of such a
system. Although the May bbfch resolutions were entirely
Inadequate, they were at least an ostensible demonstration
that the Council had ‘considered’ the dispute with some
seriousness and had set a definite date when the Council would
take action—late as that date sight be in view of the serious-
ness of the Situation* In spite of the conciliatory attitude
of London toward home, Italy rebuffed them and the Council
resolutions In actuality, by the continued dispatch of troops
1. Hew York Yimeg* May 15, 1935
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into the disputed area during June.
On June 19th the Ethiopian government having already
put the fate of its country into Council hands, became
increasingly alarmed when little or nothing had teen done by
this body to check the continuous influx of troops into Italy’s
colonies in East Africa. Consequently in a comminique from
Addis Ababa dated June 19th, they pointed out that the ’Italian
Government had not ceased to send troops and munitions of war
in large quantities into East Africa. *1 The Ethiopian Govern-
ment proposed that the Council should immediately appoint
neutral observers to proceed to Ethopia and inspect the
frontier districts* These observers would make an inquiry
into all alleged or real incidents and would report to the
,o#ncil direct.
Certainly, such an offer demonstrated the good faith of
the Ethiopian Government and at the same time undermined the
validity of the Italian argument that these frontier incidents
had been provoked by Ethiopian bandits.
As might have been expected, arbitration had reached a
deadlock by July 25th due to the continued refusal of Italy
to include in the basis for negotiation the q uestion of
’ownership of Walwal’, The Council convened in Special Session
on July 31st in accordance with the resolutions of May 25th.
Having reached an impasse in the Arbitration Commission,
1. Official Journal . XVI (1935) p. 1609-10
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the Council, it was hoped, would deal with the situation
thoroughly and effectively in order to avert a serious crisis
which involved not only the political and territorial integrity
of Abyssinia but threatened to undermine the whole system cf
collective security. If the League for a second time failed
to restrain an anrressor, and thereby condone an act of
aggression, its prestige cculd not help but disintegrate in
the face of such circumstances. A prerequisite to the restraint
required to prevent an aggressor would 3r;era to be a cor.non
front of the Member States within the League, so that any
concerted action would be effective. This unfortunately, v/as
not the caso. Previously to the Summer of 1935 the Britiffii
had shown a greater illingnesa to placate the tempestuous
feelings of Italy. (Even in July the newly appointed Foreign
Minister, Sir Samuel Jioare, had reiterated the Government
policy as sympathetic to Italian Expansion.) ^ But Italian
press became vociferously An^lophobe in character as the Summer
took Its course and this had no small effect on the British
population who in turn made their impression on the British
Foreign office# The British, therefore, felt compelled to
'accede to' the repeated requests of Ethiopia to examine and
take action on the* situation* The French, however, were
reluctant to make any move which would sever the cord of
friendship with Home, (the cord which had been tied on
. 2
January 7, 1935 in Home by M. Laval and Premier Mussolini.)
T. debate ~in li ouse of Commons July 11, 1935
2. Cf. Ant# pp. 85-86
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The Council session beginning July Slat had these varied
viewpoints in the background as if they were on a jbalette*
After a throe day deliberation within the Council, another
Ita3 ian victory was forthcoming, this victory clearly emasculated
the Arbitration Commission's jurisdiction over sovereignty of
Walwal and made the whole Arbitration machinery nothing more
than a mockery* Although Walwal in itself was unimportant as
a frontier incident, the fact that capitulation to Italian
demands by the great Powers was so forthcoming must have even
surnrised ItalyJ
The Council, in depriving the Arbitration Commission of
any power, stated that the two parties (Italy and Ethiopia)
had not agreed that the Commission should examine frontier
questions or give a legal interpretation of the a reement and
treatise concerning the frontier*
As sson as the Commission wa3 deprived of deciding the
important issue involved, it soon was able to make the arbitral
award which put the responsibility on neither party* On
August 8th, the fifth arbitrator was appointed and the unanimous
award of the Commission was rendered.
Undoubtedly, by the strange logic of power politics the
'Big Two', England and France, felt that by giving in on this
trivial point as they had done by '.heir decision of August 3,
they would keep the avenue clear for friendly bargaining with
Italy in the forthcoming Three Power Conference, cneeagain
the olive branch was presented to ussolini when he was invited
,.
.
c
"
;o Paris to confer with hr. Laval, Mr. Eden and Baron Alois!,
1
Hrio three powers aenembled around the bargaining table on the
hot summer day of August 15th. One renders If a Judicial
i lettleraent of the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia was the
purpose of the meeting, why Ethiopia, also vi tally interested
<iiid Inexorably implicated, was not even invited. On the
contrary, it v/as unofficially released in the press on the
ijtoming of the conforence that the "British are ready to let
Laly take land in Ethiopia#"'*'
The srail pov/ers in the League who looked for guidance
o England and France for sene firm handling of transgressors
0f the Covenant, certainly, found little to emulate in such
©ace-making enterprises as had been perpetrated on Ethiopia,
the victim of such aggression. Should these who failed to
observe their obligations receive compensations for doing so,
hile those who put their case and their fate before an inter-
national tribunal bo punished by sacrifices asked of them for
qluch action?
This bargaining outside the League did little to strengthen
tilhe Covenant or to aid the enforcement of obligations of a state
vino opposed them.
During the latter part of August and into the fall the talk
dlf an impending threat of a ’European conflagration 1 was in the
air# The Italian pre:.s became increasingly hostile towards
1# Meadlines p.l Mew York Tines August 15th, 1935#
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Britain, warning that Italy* s plans were not to bo hindered
by any other power. The British meanwhile, were reinforcing
their fleet in the l edifcerranean while the French were trying
simultaneously to placate botn London and Rome in order to keep
the seams of Stress front from splitting wide open.
The Council after its infamous decision of August 3, was
waiting to examine the situation in general at its Session in
September. The settlement of the Lalwal incident did little,
however to quell the rising tension generated by the dispute
before a discussion of the phase of the dispute immediately
preceding the outbreak of hostilities in October.
An examination of the policies in Britain and France in
retrospective analysis will clarify the part each played in
particular in their relationship to the dispute between
Ethiopia and Italy; and in turn, hew British and French
policy molded the action taken at Geneva.
'Q
*
,
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CHAPTER VI
BRITISH AHR FRKNCH ?01 ICIES
TOWARD ITALY
c.
M
.
PftKNCg POLICY
Returning from Geneva to Paris and London, the capitals
of the two nations who played tho most important rolos and
exerted the greatest influence on the working of the Genova
machinery, one is faced with a few obvious facts. Here are
two sovereign states, which, because of the power they v/ield
in proportion to the other members of the League, can render
its action effective or itnpotent. Those that created the
League, fashioned it to function success fully only if the
nations participating wished it to do so. It is necessary to
see h<m the policies of the Quai d'Orsay and the British
Foreign Office affected the Geneva Machinery.
The pattern of French diplomacy in the Ethiopian question,
unlike the British, was .relatively simple. Ill the actions
of M, Laval made at Genova were to put a brake in the effective
working of its machinery* The motive behind the French effort
to slow down any measures to hinder the Italian aggressor in
his military adventure can be found traced back to the Italo-
French talks of January 7th in Rom© when negotiations took
place in the Pal&rse Venecia, 'for the purpose of reestablish-
ing complete harmony between Italy and France
*
J
-
Ostensibly, the conference resulted in the following:
"The Colonial demands made by Italy have been
partly accepted by Franco, which has ceded to Italy
aen , January C.
•
.
•
.
.
a tract of 44,5U0 aquaro miles south of Italy’s
Libyan colony* .At the same time. Prance ceded to
Italy a small strip along the coast south of tho
Italian colony of Eritrea facing the Strait of
Bab-el-h&ndeb* ........
Another agreement included a provision that Italy
should have a shire in the ownership of the Railway
from Addis Ababa to Jibuti
,
Preach Somaliland,
'
1
But it was assumed in almost every diplomatic circle that
between the lines of this agreement • Laval had reached a
tacit understanding with II Dues whereby Italy’s friendship
could bo counted on in the event of the German threat, and in
return,- A. Laval would give -ussolini a free hand in Abyssinia,
iussolini’s cl ief bargaining point was waving before the rhench
the possibility of an Italo-Germun Alliance against France,
which needed no fuel to add so the already flaming pathological
obsession the 1 ranch had with regard to the German danger
•
The French also felt obliged to bargain Ethiopia for Italian
friendship because of the uncertainty of British support in
the event of trouble on the continent* Various diatribes had
appeared in the French press acouSL ng Britain of hypocrisy
and isolationism when it camo to making any genuine commitment*
owhloh would support Franco in the hour of danger. And the
facts that when German conscription was reintroduced, when
Germany was allowed to rebuild her Navy by oho Anglo-German
Naval Agreement and when Hitler tore up the Locarno agreement,
only proved the logic of the -reach argument
.
1, New York Times . January 8, 1935
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Despite the French Anglophobia, the two powers managed to
develop as we 11-concerted policy, which produced an almost
indentical effect throughout the whole dispute* Although the
motives of each v/or© different, the results proved to be the
same, for both powers intended to placate Italy as much as was
possible without outwardly flaunting the League, but for
different reasons.
Signor Mussolini realized the French were inhibited by
fear of their historic enemy, and he thus capitalized on the
disintegrating effect upon French morale v/hich he knew German
conscription would have* With the Franco-Italian reapproche-
ment as the basis for the ’script* for • Laval* s role at
Geneva, Franco’s position in the League resembled *the posture
of the rabbit which crouches, paralyzed by terror, under fcho
malignant spell of the advancing stoat. 11
Some observers find it impossible to ascribe the whole
motive behind the French position to the German danger.
"There was*. in 1935 a powerful body of opinion in
France which blessed M. Laval ’ s good understanding
with Signor Mussolini not so much on account of any
military value which it might be expected to have
for France in a future war with Germany but rather
on account of its expected effect in a struggle on
the French home front. For there were Frenchmen who
hoped that the Franco-Italian entente would give
"The Leagues 5* the victory in their competlon with
the * Front fopulaire* and would thereby bring France
over from the Parliamentars-Democractic into the
Dictatorial-Fascist camp."
T~. Op. Clt’. p. 39 A* J. Toynbee
2.
-P » p. 36 A, J * Toynbee
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GREAT BRITAIN »S POLICY
It is difficult to speak of a British policty toward the
Italo-Bthiopian conflict without running the risk of generaliz-
ing to the extent that no account Is taken of the various
factors within the country which actually created a dual policy
throughout the affair* The Government had one, fairly stabilized
policy toward Italian expansion in Hast Africa which had been
the result of a consistent evolutionary development * The
Foreign Office had been trained to put Imperial interests first,
and therefore, the British policy had been shaper. toward Italy
with this in mind.
In a political democracy, however, public opinion is (or
should be) an effective weapon In guiding the tiller of the
ship of state* And it may be accredited to British public
opinion that a formidable cliange In the earlier Government
policy, from condoning Italian expansion in East Africa to a
harsher policy of attempting to restrain Italy, was made.
It was evident from the results of the British Peace
Ballot, taken immediately preceding the Italo-Ethiopian conflict
in England, that the effects of the first world war did much
to impress on the mass of Britishers that they would do well
to hitch their fate to the League bandwagon, rather than to
approve of imperialist adventures which might again result in
a general Eu opean conflagration, oven though such an
adventure might not be an immediate threat to British imperial
interests.
i,.
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The pro-League and the anti-Leaguo advocates in Britain
had many problems to solve of a theoretical nature, which
3ooner or liter made them take a definite stand on the Italo-
Ethiopian situation# Was the legitimate security of the
British Empire contradictory to a system of international law
Andorder? The question, of course, can be answered emphati-
cally in the negative, for, if the security of the v/crld 3ociet;r
is assured, certainly the British Empire crould also benefit from
the reign of law established# On the other hand, if Britain
put all her weight behind the fulfillment of the Covenant, it
is reasonable to assume that it would be the British navy that
would be called upon to make the greatest sacrifices if the
Covenant were challenged* And it was precisely this considera-
tion that made 10 Downing Street anxious to avoid the risk
of entangling the Empire into war. Theoretically, the League
would punish an aggressor, but practically, it would be
Great Britain^ responsibility to carry out most of the
punishing# Was the British Empire, in the absence of an
adequate international police force, in a position to defend
the peace and security of the world, militarily? One astute
observer of international relations has this comment on
the * at ate* of the United Kingdom in 1935.
11 #.#Xn 1935 t i© British Empire was only one of three
principal naval powers in the post-war world, and
both of the other two— the United States and Japan-
lay outside Europe in strategic positions from which
they could take the British I£npire in the event of
a conflict# • #At the same time, the conquest of the
air load robbed Great Britain herself of the
'.
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iraraemorially old strategic insularity, . Nor was the
delicacy of the British Empire’s condition at this
date merely external and strategic. The Empire was
also in the throes of an immense internal metamor-
phosis through which it was changing itself from a
collection of colonies, d pendencies, and protectorates
of the United Kingdom into a Commonwealth of Nations
freely associated on a footing of equality. When
this transformation was complete, the Empire-turned-
Commonwealth might look forward to becoming stronger
than ever before. But so long as the process lasted—
and it was bound to be alow— it manifestly rendered
the whole organism peculiarly vulnerable. 4
Despifce the fact that Britain might be expected to contribute
the greatest amount of military strength in the event of a
conflict, and despite the fact that British sea powor was be-
coming increasingly vulnerable to air power, the results of
the Peace Ballot clearly showed that public opinion was over-
whelmingly in favor of throwing all the British power and
prestige into making the League a strong, workable organism.
The Peace Ballot was ponsored by a private organization, the
League of Nations Union, and was carried out by this group
with the aid of many other groups forming a National Declara-
tion Committee,
The questions on the ballot were:
1, Should Great Britain remain a member of the League
Of Nations?
2, Are you in favor of an all-round reduction in
armaments by international agreement?
3, Are you in favor of an all-round abolition of nation-
al military and naval aircraft by international
agreement?
1, A, J, Toynbee, Op , tit • p« 45
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4. Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for
private profit ho prohibited by International
agreement?
5* Do you consider that, if a nation insists on atteking
another, the other nations should carabine to compel
it to stop by,
(a) Economic and non-military measurea?
(b) If necessary # military measures? 1
On June 28, 1955 the results of the Peace ballot v;ere published
in the London Times with statements by prominent British leaders
including the Archbishop of Cantebury, who said that
"the results of the ballot were most remarkable and
they would do well to press upon the gov*t«, upon
their M.P.*3 and upon their fellow citizens that
twelve million people had recorded that decisive
vote... .The result was primarily a great declaration
of faith in the League of Nations
'J’o the question whether if necessary, military
measures should be taken against an aggressor, more
than six million people replied in ‘ he affirmative.
Without some such assurance as this, it was really
impossible to insist upon the carrying out of what
was called the collective system.^
‘he following figures show in percentage the record of the vote 5
Question Xes m Doubtful lbstention
n 95.9 3.1 0.1 0.9
#2 90.6 7.5 0.1 ,1*8
#3 82.5 14.6 0.1 2.8
#4 90.1 6,7 * 0. 3.1
#5a.
b.
86.8
58.7
5.5
20.3
0.2
0.4
7.4
20.4
Total vote cast j 11,677,766
Lci^cn lines7
1 L.QC . C 1, t/
.
.
London"""'times
,
June 28, 1935 p. 18:
June 28, 1935
2
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“The total number of votes cast represented more than
37,9 per oont* of the total number of voters over the
are of eighteen In Groat Britain and Northern Ireland,
and nerhax*® fifty percent of the voters who had actually
been canvassed. These were astonia inj fibres for a
px’ivate enterprise which had been carried out without
either the official organization or the artificially
stimulated excitement of a general election.
The government, therefore, frou the impressiveness of these
figures, realized that their future policy must rest upon
strong support for the -League and sanctions, if the members
wor© to be returned to their seats by the same electorate who
had overwhelmingly shown their colors in the 'cace allot.
As the It&lo-Eth±©pi«i coni lie t grew in proportions, in the
succeeding days of 1935, the populace who rad e. pressed tram-
selves in the Peace Ballot, continued to create a current cf
feeling in support of Geneva which * swelled into a flood which
swept away both the die-hard and the Pacifist opposit ion. , ‘"
The Foreign Office continued •buslness-as-usual *, and yet,
while not receiving th© publicity that such * impressive
*
events as the Peace ballot obtained, were engaging in many
activities which were to become later no less sensational in
importance.
Tiie supposition is not fantastic that the Government was
aware of Mussolini* a intentions as early as January 1935. It
will be remembered that Italy had become a colonial power in
Hast Africa partly because Britain had actually encouraged
imi*T ~~
2. A, 7* Toynbee, op . cit* p# 46

and supported Italy’s alms in this area, and hacked them up
with the prestige and oww of the British Empire, It was reo a oil-
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able to assume at this tine that the United Kingdom would look
with no leas favor on Italian intentions in Abyssinia tnan they
had done in the past, unless it would involve any risks of war.
Hot only had this been the consistent policy of Britain, but
the fact that the British appeared favorable to the Pact of
Friendship signed in Rome between M. Laval and L. . us3ollni
on January 7, 1925, seemed to indicate that the British.
Government did not intend to oppose Fussolini* one observer
9
is even willing to go so £ur as to say that:
"Sir Sidney Barton, the British minister in Addis Ababa,
knew all about Fuss olini * s plana and the acquiescence
in them of R* Laval, (on Jan. 7)
,
and passed his
knowledge on to London early in January."!
The Italians knew that in order to clear the way for any plans
to crystallise in Abyssinia, that diplomatic negotiations with
both 9re&t Britain and France must take place .first for the
purpose of securing assurances that thoy would disinterest
themselves in Italian activities. In this plan, Fussolini was
successful with regard to France by the agreement in Rome o
January 7th, and he cleverly took the opportunity when he
communicated tills agreement to the 'u-itish to make similar
overtures to Britain. .Bier* the Italian -.mban sudor disclosed
the text of the Franco- Italian Agreement to the Foreign Office
1^ G,"“ ^Hn;alns ^ the ForId. p* 67
rc
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on Jan, 29th, he also * intimated that they would be glad to
exchange views with the United Kingdom concerning the mutual
and harmonious development of British and Italian Interests in
Abyssinia, 1
As a result of this overture, an investigation committee
was set up to consider the ,harmonious interests 1 which the
Italian Ambassador mentioned* Sir John haffey. Permanent Under
Secretary of State for Colonies, was the Chairman of the
Investigation Committee Some months later, when the Maffey
2
Report was published. It proved to be quite startling for the
reason that It was drawn up with the allegation of a possible
Italian conquest of Abyssinia* Acccording to the Italian
publication, the most important of the nine conclusions of the
Maffey Committee read as follows:
•There are no vital British Interests In Abyssinia
or adjoining countries such as to necessitate British
resistance toan Italian conquest of Abyssinia* Italian
control of Abyssinia would on sene grounds be
advantageous, on others disadvantageous* In general,
as far as local British interests are concerned, it
would be a matter of indifference whether Abyssinia
remained independent or was absorbed ty Italy.
Prom the standpoint of Imperial defense, an inde-
pendent Abyssinia would be preferable to a an Italian
Abyssinia, but the threat to British interest appears
distant and would depend only on a war against Italy
which for the moment appears improbable* 0
m * JV '^oynbeeV £p. Git*, p, 144n
2 m nIn the Giornale d *Xtalia of the 20th of February, 1936,
Signor Gay&a published—partly verbatim and partyly in' the
form of a precis--the contents of a confidential British
state Paper which had fallen into Italian hands*.The Britia
Secretary of State did not deny the authenticity of the
Document and he admitted that It had com© into the hands
of Signor Gayda by “theft or disappearance, 15 through, an
Indiscretion or a deliberate . - -
±‘QC * G j,t * p * 42 *n
3* .Excerpts from the Maffey Report (cited in M* MacCarfcney,
±12* 272
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This was the best and only assurance, (If it may bo called
that) that the British would give Italy a free hand in
Abyssinia* Lith British past policy, their apparent pleasure
of the new found friendship between Paris and Home, and now
the apparent lack cf British interest in Abyssinia as dis-
played in the B/laffay deport, it was reasonable for the Italians
to assumte that the road fco conquest had been adquately pre-
pared by diplomatic aneuvers. When the British later became
the protagonists of a ’sanfctioniat policy 1 in the League,
Italy was naturally taken by surprise by this reversal of
policy.* It is well to note here that the statements of the
Maffey deport refute the later accusations of Italian critics,
wiz., that British motives in supporting a strong League
policy were entirely selfish* They alleged that Britain’s
reasons for thwarting Italy’s expansion in Last Africa was
due to a desire to retain exclusive control in Lake Tsana
area and to maintain in tact British, control over the Led Sea.
The findings of the faffey report indicated British indiffer-
ence in this area.
Although the Government ’s policy changed little, as early
as February 1955, the Foreign Office was well aware of the
temper of the British electorate as indicated by the Peace
Ballot. And they well knew that such indifference to an
’imperialist adventure* as shown in the Maffey report was
already quickly becoming anachronistic. Knowing this.
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Sir Eric Drummond, tho British Ambassador in Home, warned
Mussolini,
'....of possible reactions of Italian policy
on British public opinion and on Anglo-
Italian relations." 1
Hot aiu&ouc to precipitate a situation, however. Sir
Baric’s warning was softened by ‘ ir J0hn Simon when he assured
tie House of Commons that Italian mobilization was purely pre-
Sven after two appeal! to Geneva from Ethiopia to invest if
gate the conflict, Britain:
had no interest in opposing the Italian plan
and several good reasons for not hindering it..
It would bring order and progress to a backward
part of Africa and. go a long way to nesting
Italy’s colonial giie vances, which now pre-
vented here fron collaborating with Britain and
France, With an Empire of her own, she would
enter definitely Into the group of satisfied
powers. ..... :,:tJ
Partly because Germany was again becoming a t.-reat to
European security by reintroducing conscription, hussoliai's
intentions seemed comparatively less threatening to the British
in the early days of April 1935. Consequently, when a three
power conference was planned to be held at Stress at the in-
stigation of France, Sir John Simon declined to reply when he
was asked in the Bouse of Commons whether h® would question
hussollni concerning his intentions in the Italo-Ethipian
dispute. It was the French protest against German conscript-
ion that was number one on the Btresa Agenda, and it was un~
sr 1 embarrasing * their
cautionary.
s
'
.
.
colleague, over ifassolini, such a minor matter at Stress, as
Abyss inial
It was Mussolini Who played host to the British and
French delegations in Borne* The very fact that they were both
willing to visit hussolini, evidenced that it was they who
sought out the friendship ol II Duco* The meetings wore held
in aii atmosphere of cordiality between the three powers*
Because the British delegates did not take the oppor unity to
question f%ssollni regarding his aims in Ethipia at stresa,
it was felt that they had left themselves open to Mari© in
fallinr: to interrogate the Italian delegation* It could be
argued, on the other hand, that the reason they did not do so,
was because It was the British ana French who were seeking to
secure the partnership of Italy as an ally In the political
i.Iaglnot line against Germany* They w ere, therefore, in none
too favorable a position to bargain with .. ussolini
,
for it was
they who were asking favors. It would be natural to presume,
however, that Italy had as much to gain fro a *peaceful 1
Europe- -whi clx the dtresa front was supposed to establish
as the British and French* If this b© so, it could be assumed
that Mussolini might have been approachable on -the Abyssinian
question*
When the Parliamentary opposition debated in April 1956
the British Government’s failure to Interrogate Mussolini on
the Ethipian conflict at dtreaa, fcliay brought fort: \ the point
that * .
.
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"Signor Mussolini had said since. . .that he was
prepared at the Stress conference to reopen
the question of the rectification of Italy *s
position in Abyssinia.'’ i
Mussolini at the time, however, had stated his reluctance to
discuss the matter in the League. The British, therefore,
should have taken the opportunity to discuss it at Stresa.
"Signor Mussolini had announced at Stresa that
he would not send a representative to attend
the meeting of the Council If the dispute with
Abyssinia were placed on the Agenda.'
1
2
When the later course of events shoed the weaknesses of British
and French policy, the Opposition wasted no words in arrang-
ing the British Governments share in the responsibilit of
having missed a valuable opportunity at Stresa to attempt to
find out Mussolini’s intentions.
’It has been admitted (said Mr. Attlee) that
they (the delegates to the Stresa Conference)
never mentioned Abyssinia throughout the whole
course of these discussions. That was one of
the most criminal blunders in the whole course
of British diplomacy in these disastrous years,
because evidently Signor Mussolini wa3 expect-
ing that this subject would be raised. .. .Was
Signor lussolini to blame for having assumed
that, if this opportunity for a straight talk
about Abyssinia was let pass that was as good
a hint that the British Government would not
take too seriously a subsequent demand to
do what he wanted to do in Abyssinia?" §
The Ethiopian question, conspicuous by its absence on the
Strexa agenda, was thus laid aside for the more pressing
1. A, J. Toynbee, Op. Clt. p* 148 n.
2. A. J. Toynbee, A. CpTCTt . p. 149 n.
3. Ibid.
,
p. 148 n*
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problems of European security* Unfortunately, the whole
problem of European security was unmistakably linked up with
the manner in which Britain and France demonstrated to the
more aggressive powers how they would be dealt with if they
conten©la tod a breach of their obligations*
Stresa failed to be an effective •Front* against Germany;
it proved only to be a conciliatory gesture to Italy, which,
in turn weakened the Western Powers* position with regard bo
Germany,
When I talo- Ethiopian relations grew increasingly ominous
as oach month passed, it was evident that no metamorphosis in
British policy was &oihg to occur. Regardless of how loddly
the opposition in Parliament or other unofficial groupd in
Britain cried out against appeasement, the Government con-
tinued-—right down to the ignominous Laval-Hoare Peace
Proposals in December 1935—to bribe Italy with various morsels,
all of which %s sol ini found cotapletely unsatisfying and un-
tempting.
Rather than make any attempts to tlireaten Mussolini with
sections unless Mussolini ceased his war mobilization, Mr,Eden
visited Rome carrying on olive branch in his brief case* It
was on June 24th that the British proposal was officially
announced. It consisted of ceding outright to Italy a portion
of Ethiopian in the Ogaden region, and in turn, Britain would
cede to Ethiopia an outlet to the sea through British
Somaliland* It was no less a generous offer than a
.•
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nefarious one* This endeavor—inspired no doubt by British
noblesse oblige- -was rejected by Italy with contempt,
Tliis policy of conciliating the ’bluffer par excellence 1
was forcing the Government into a very trying dilemma. It
consisted of trying to maintain in tact tlie friendship of Italj
in order to avoid any risk of war between Great Britain and
Italy, while also trying to placate the vociferous British
public opinion which was demanding that British prestige be
used to strengthen the League in tldte supreme test* The French
were forced into a similar dilemma, but for a different reason
than the British, Prom the French point of view it v/a3 nec-
essary to maintain the friendship of Italy as an ally aginst
the resurgent power of Germany which for a second time
threatened to upset the European balance of power, the French
felt that even more than ever they would not repudiate Italian
friendship, since only a few days before on June 13th, the
Anglo-German ftaval Agreement had been concluded, which in
reality condoned Hitler’s repudiation of disarmament.
In June, which was the bei£ time to have thwarted II Duce’e
plans for conquest, the situation could still be kept in hand
due to the fact that : us s ollni could notnhave moved a soldier
anyway once the rainy season had started. There were members
in arliament who recorded themselves for immediate action
in regard to thwarting Italian aspirations, Mr, Attlee brought
to light the following preventive suggestions which might be
taken to hald further Italian troop movements.
•r
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"The vital point in this matter is the control
of the Cuts Canal, and Italy ought to bo told
quite plainly that, in that event (of an
aggrension) she would not have the use of the
Suez Canal. -.This matter ought to be decided
at once***
’'the matter had already drifted too far, (he said)
,
the League of Nations would he destroyed al-
together if within the circle of the League Powers,
(states) were enabled to carry out military
.fillibustering enterprises." 2
He also stressed that the most important act which the British
should make,
’....was to convey to the Italian government, either
publicly or privately that we regarded this matter
as one of national honor and vital necessity,
and that: we Intended to see the Covenant upheld." °
Nevertheless, in the host Palmerston tradition, vr
.
.Eden re-
plied to Mr. Attlee f s statements with the following ju3ti-
fication of the Government f s policy.
“
...Nor have we been animated by any
desire to oppose Italian influence
In Ethiopia. Our rights in that
country arc already amply protected
by treaties. In fact, there Is no
reason whatever why Brltidi and Italian
interests should not be mutually and
harmoniously developed side by side, for
neither do they, or need they conflict." 4
If the contents of the Maffey report wore not assurances
enough to Mussolini that Britain would disinterest herself,
certainly these practically identical words of Mr* Eden*s In
Jutne, (after FOUR appeals from the Ethiopian government to
consider the dispute,) were a sufficient guarantee that Britain
TT ” : ouse "ox^otriuona Debate* London 'limes* dune 8* 1935.
2. Ibid.
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Would mako little trouble for Italy,
In July, the British Government’s policy in dealing with
Italy took on a distinctly sympathetic hue when Sir Samuel Hoare
stated in the House of Commons that
"We have always understood and v;ell understand'
Italy’s desire for overseas expansion. Indeed,
we have in the past done our best to show our
sympathy with Italian aspirations in a practi^.
way. In 192*5 we ceded Jubaland to Italy, and
in the presont negotiations showed our wil-
lingness to endeavor to ensure for Italy some
territorial satisfaction by a reasonable and
legitimate arrangement with Abyssinia ."1
Not only was the Abyssinian Government faced with the
4:
‘
inertia of the League, but by the decision of the British
Government on July 25th, they were forced to abandon the hope
.
of any material aid in warding off the advanoes of Its rapacious
neighbor.
"Sir Samuel Hoare announced the Government’s
decision to withhold for tho presont licenses
for the export of arms to either Abyssinia or
Italy, though the transit of consignments to
Abyssinia across British or British protected
territory would bo permitted, in accordance
with the terms of the 1930 treaty . 2
4 #
The British, by this order, made no distinction between
victim and aggressor, and took on extremely "cautious" position.
At the League Council’s session of July 31st to August 3rd,
it was generally agreed that the more important issues would be
taken care of outside the Loaguo framework in another conference
in August. Conversations opened in Paris on the 15th with the
following headlines appearing in the press on that clay:
rr i
2 .
Britain and Ethiopia. Its
and munitions in Ethiopia
le ea-
s, July 12, 1935
ob:
y of 1930 had been signed by Italy, loanee. Great
>ject was bo supervise the trade in
a in the adjacent territories.
arms
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"British are Ready to Let Italy Take Lane in Ethiopia/' 1
Speculations on the Conference consisted of reports that
Britain had suggested a series of economic concessions with
sane grant of territory, ‘which it is obvious in advance the
2
Italian dictator would refuse, ‘ Despite such rumours,
Baron Alois!, the Italian delegate in a press interview on the
opening day of the conference, made his position plain by
stating that * ,.,the only satisfactory guarantee (for economic
concessions) would be political ascendancy plus military
occupation,*
The basis for negotiations at Paris seemed to rest on a
compromise whereby Sthiopa would not be high-pressured to
relinquish her sovereignity while Italy* s grievances by seme
economic advantages in that area would be redressed. The fact
that the Italian delegate came without plenary powers, and
that *Baron Aloisi*s instructions appeared to debar him from
4
making any detailed statement of Italy*s demands,* the
British and French set about the work at making a settlement
which would be satisfactory to Ethiopia, to Italy, and within
the framework of the Covenant, This was a most difficult task*
In a report to the Council after the Conversations broke down
on August 18th, Ur, Eden discussed the nature of the Anglo-
French Proposals:
1* New York Times, August 16, 1935,
2. hoc , 'Eit,
3. rScT VTu
4. rocT rrfit
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"While not failing to recognize tliat the situation
of Ethiopia might call for extensive reforms, it
seemed to us that these reforms should be freely
assented to by Ethiopia in the fullness of her
sovereignty and without anything being imposed on
her contrary to her independence her integrity.
As a member of the League o.f Nations, Ethiopia
might appeal to the League for the collaboration
and assistance necessary to assure the economic
development and administrative reorganization of
the country. France, the United Kingdom and
Italy, as limitrophe Powers, would be parti-
cularly well qualified to lend this collective
assistance, Whether a mission for this purpose
v/ere entrusted to them by the Council with the '
a33ent of Ethiopia or whether the Council of
the League of Nations v/ere t be invited to
give its approval to a treaty concluded between
the three Powers and the Ethiopian Government.
The wo lie of reorganization was to have ex-
tended to the mosu varied fields of national
life, such as economic, financial, commercial,
and constructional development; foreign
settlement; modernization of administrative
services; anti-slavery measures and frontier
and other police services. The free activity
of foreigners in the economic sphere would have
been respected.
On the other hand, the collective character of
the assistance would not nave prevented particular
account being taken of the special interests of
Italy, withoutn prejudice to the recognized rights
of France and the United Kingdom.
Finally, we did not examine, but ?/e did not in
any way exclude, the possibility of territorlaal
adjustments to which Italy and Ethiopia night agree
1
This speech merely read as an obituary of the meeting
after the news that 1 the end cane) suddenly and unexpectedly
when Premier 1 "us sol ini of Italy sent a flat rejection of the
1. Official Journal, XVI October (1935) p. 1620
c
(Anglo-French) proposals,'
The British and French could hardly acquiesce in Italian
plans if they had, a3 they apparently did, envisage the cession*
to Italy of all of the Lowlands of Abyssinia, and the establi3
ment of a military protectorate over the remainder of the
territory, coupled with the rights of Italians to 30ttle and
2develop economically as they saw fit.
The impasse reached at the August Conference seemed to
indicate that the last hope of averting the crisis outside of
Genova had disintegrated, 'If Britain and Franco further
capitulated to I*fussolini f it could only weaken the structure
of the League itself so much so as to disrobe it of even the
least vestige of moral authority which it mi ;ht retain at this
-•the 11th hour.
1, York Times, August 19, 1935
2 4 V " liean, The Lea;-tue and the 1 1al o-Athi opian ispute,
(Geneva Studies Conference Ift, No«3,)pVS
rqft!
CHAPTER XXX
ITALIAN POLICIES AND VAR MOBILIZATION

10G
Premier Mussolini's plan for an African empire, which
included in it Abyssinia, showed the careful forethought of
one of the most assiduous and audacious dictators in Europe.
Signor Mussolini, before he wished, his exact intentions
officially known by the world, he acted the rule of a peacemaker,
and when such pretense as he ^ade became lass necessary, he
abandoned that role for a more truculent perfor ance.
Vi/hethe2’ his fore sightad plan include, utilising the walwal ,
incident to demonstrate the later necessity of sending troops
to Ethiopia and thereby justifying his increasingly intensive
mobilization, can only be speculation* At any rate, as the ten-
sion over the situation grew, it became evident that much
larger issues were at stake, and Walwal was pushed into the
background as a minor incident.
It is historical fact that after Mussolini secured his
position diplomatically with the two most important league
powers in January 1935, troop move ants began in early February
toward the direction of east Africa, He may have judged that
Italy* s diplomatic and military support in Europe would sell
at a premium to Franc© and Britain in the ©vent of German
resurgence, Italy must have also figured that these two powers
would necessarily, in the light of such developments, be forced
to capitulate to his demands of a colonial campaign* »*ben
Mussolini cast the die in favor of conquest by force he took
the long chance that Britain and France would not frustrate
his African designs. He used two weapons to preclude any
.-
'
•
.
.
.
.
hindrance of the development of his African adventure; the
first, which lasted (arbitrarily) until Juno, consiateo. of
assuring the League, and especially Britain and Prance, that
his intentions were purely peaceful, 'Hie argument was used
over and over that Ethiopia wa3 a bad neighbor and therefore
that the troops sent to East Africa were only to protect
Italian colonies, The VV'alwal incident may have been manu-
factured to demonstrate the valifity of this position.
The second method used to prevent a possible frustration
of Italian plans were threats. Mussolini played upon the fear
which haunted Britain most—being drawn into a war with Italy.
In the summer of 1935, when a firmer League policy was being
talked of, especially by the British, Italy declared that
sanctions would be considered an *unfriendly act 1 which would
mean war 1 At just what moment iiussolini decided to transform
his bluffing game into one of earnest It is unknown. If the
British attitude toward the German breach of its international
1
obligations was any cue to the way Italy might be treated,
under similar circumstances Mussolini could have made up his
mind then*
The first indication in the press that the Italian boot
was clicking its heel in a military cadence, was on February 11
X* Hitler 1 s unilateral repudiation of the disarmament .
chapter of the Versailles Treaty on the 16th Martfh 1935#
.•
.
.
-
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when extensive troop movements were reported withih Italy.
Even at this early stage of the dispute, speculations,
based on information from ’well-informed circles’, which later
proved entirely valid, were made that
"The 30 movements have colonial ends in view. A
call has gone out, it is said, for volunteer
reserve officers to bo pressed into active service
and sent to Italian Somaliland and Eritrea0to assume
charge of the training of native troops.
And not to be forgotten were the weapons of war also included
on Mussolini’s carefully drawn up list.
"It is said in official quarters that large
quantities of ami unit ion and war materials
of all kinds either have been delivered or,,
are on the way to Eritrea and Somaliland. °
It was evident from such rep orted and other equally ominous
headlines as ’Italians Mobilize Army of 55,000 in Abyssinia
Crisis’ that the decision had been made to start II Duce’s
war machine rolling without further loss of time. It took no
great Insight to conclude that
"Premier us sol ini undoubtedly had decided on
mobilization partly because of the clarafleation
of the European situation as a result of the
Franco- Italia# accord and the Italo-British accord
In bond on.
Italian war preparations began nine months before the opening
of hostilities in October. It was In this early period of
1. New York Times, Peb. 11. 1935
2. New York Times, P©b
.
11, 1935
3. New York Times, Peb. 12, 1935
4. New York Times
,
Peb. 12, 1935
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preparations that Italy attempted to mask its warlike in-
tentions and to silence Abyssinia’s efforts to make the world
aware of the danger that threatened. And until the last moment
Italy was successful in frustrating Abyssinia’s efforts, while
Italy continued to gain more time to mobilize all her re-
sources, without having her hands tied once by any agreement
or decision by the Leage to force Italy to cease the warlike
activity.
On February 23rd, the first notice as to the destiny of
tli© troops whichhad been mobilizing in Italy for sonetime.
appeared in the following headlines,
1
BIG EMBARKATION STATION SET UP AS TROOPS LEAVE
FOR DUTY IN AFRICAN COLONIES.
The Vulcania, a 24,000 ton ship sailed from Naples with nearly
2,000 men on that date, and at C-eneva, 1,300 faore men sailed
for Africa. The lid was off. The stream of men and supplies
to East Africa has begun.
If one was willing to read' between the lines, the signs
of the times looked ominous* and it appeared that Mussolini’s
efforts were planned on a large scale.
"At Naples, the centre of Premier Mussolini’s
Concentration of troops it was estimated that
25,000 men had arrived, ready to embark at a
moment’s notice. The flow of troops had been
almost continuous since January 29, when an
Ethiopian-Italian clash took place at the border
of Italian Somaliland and Ethiopia. 2
1. New York Times, February 23. 5:1
2. TBIdT
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On February 24th, another sign prosagin the possible
type of warfare which might follow in the months of 1935.
It was reported that
"thirty thousand barrels of aviation gasoline
have been unloaded at the Eritrean port of
Massawa." -
And one who wished to attach significance to these reports
did not even have to read between the linos to discover that
"the Italian Government is proceeding with
undiminished vigor with its military
preparations." ^
But the British or the French did not become alarmed by such
news. Through the official eyes of the Foreign Office, s.ch
events were viewed as "rattling the sabre" mere ’bluffing f
which would in time straighten itself out and be forgotten.
On February 15th, the House of Commons was assured by the
Secretary of State, Sir Slohn Simon that
"His Majesty* s Government had been informed
that the precautionary measures taken by Italy,
notably the mobilization of two divisions, in
no way imply that it is the intention of the
Italian Government to abandon their endeavors
to seek an amicable settlement of their
differences with Ethiopia ‘ 3
Italy had planned on little opposition from the French when it
was reported that General de Bono $ad said upon his departure
1. Hew York Times, February 24, 1935.
2. Few York 'Times, February 25, 1935.
3. Quoted in G. Martinelli.
,
Italy Against the World,
pp. 67-68
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for East Africa to take up his duties as High Commissioner that
"there would he no opposition on the part of ,
France to our eventual operations out there." 1
It is hardly ten&ble that the British and French lack of
concern over Mussolini *s intentions was such naive assumptions
which Sir John simon stated to the members of Parliament on
February 25th.
The pathetic target of Mussolini *s bullying protested
earnestly against Italy* s growing bellicosity. M. Yesus,
the Abyssinian charge * in Home read a ’solemn declaration"
on February 28th in which he
"swore on his country^ honor and his Empire*
s
honor that Abyssinia had never attacked and
would never attack Italian colonies
M* Yesus ended with the solemn declaration
that Abyssinia wished to live in peace with
her neighboring colonies belonging to three
great powers." 2
This avowal of peace seemed tragic and a bit riduculous
in terms of the power relationships of the two countries in-
volved. Italy f s army was organized on a modern, mechanized
military machine.
During the initial period of the embarkation of Italian
troops to East Africa, Abyssinia received little assurance
**rom the League that the dispute would even be put on the
basis; Abyssihia*s could scarcely emulate Pasolini *s
1
.
2 .
G. Martelli, On. Cjt
. p. 68.
New York Times, February 28, 1935.
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Agenda. Furthermore, At,ySsinia could have hardly been en-
couraged by the *Big Three* at Stresa in an atmosphere of
the utmost cordiality, in which Italy was not even questioned
on Italo-Ethiopian relations.
Few other nations felt the urgency of the hour, before
it would be too late to act, as Abyssinia did when in May
she made the appeal to the League,
"At this critical hour in history the
Kthiopian Government earnestly appeals
to the Council to see that the territorial
integrity and political independence of
Ethiopian, a member of the League of Nail ons
are respected and preserved against aggression.” 1
As a retort, on the following day that Ethiopian^ appeal
was published by the press, Lfussolini warned the powers Ito
leave Ethiopia *s fate to Italy in a speech to the Italian
senate. This speech could be interpreted in no ether way than
exemplifying Mussolini *s intentions to flout the principles
of the Covenant and take matters into his own hands.
If the statesmen of Europe were willing to believe
Mussolini*s actions were only sabre-rattling, here wore his
own words to support his action*. It is impossible and
unnecessary to render an account of all Mussolini’s statements
of policy bearing on the dispute. It shall be sufficient to
demonstrate the general trend of Italian policy by typical,
representatives speeches. It was in this speech of May 15th
1. May 14, 1935, Mew York Times
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to the Italian Senate which perhaps more than any other accurate-
ly presaged the future attitude of Italy, toward the League,
toward the other powers, and toward Abyssinia. It is the
beginning of Mussolini in his truculent role, toward the rest
of the world.
" Italy is the sole judge of what measures
are necessary and she will tolerate no
interferemce no matter by whom*"
In continuing, he assures the Senate that no hostile measures
or a coalition against Italy is probable now, or in the future.
"But one rumor abroad in some foreign circles
is to be denied formally, that Is, of Franco-
Engllsh diplomatic steps in Rome, The very
word 'step* Is extremely distasteful, and al-
though some persons boyond our f rontiers
would have wished it, the truth Is that no
step has been taken up to now."
In averring a bit ostentatiously to the reason that Italy need
not fear any *steps8 in the future, he continued:
"owing to the Italo-Franco-British relations. It
is most probable that there will not be any
(steps), even in the future." 1
Speaking of the critics of recent Italian war mobilization
he states that
"it Is precisely because we wish to be tranquilly
secure in %ropo that we Intend to be well
guarded In Africa." 2
Waving his sovereign rights in the League's face, he asserts
"I wish to add in the most explicit manner that
we will send out all the soldiers we believe
necessary. And no one can take upon himselfl
New Yftrk Times, May 15. 1935.
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"the Intolerable presumption to dictate to us
concerning the character and volume of our
precautionary measures. (Enthusiastic
applause) • No one can judge tills most delicate
matter except Italy who has in her history
a dramatic, sanguinary and not forgotten
experience In thi3 regard. I prefer to be
removed tomorrow for doing too much rather
than too little when it is a question of
the safety of our colonies. 1 '
Then demonstrating Italy*s *ardent* efforts at peacemaking, he
refers to the progress of the Commission of Arbitration and
Conciliation which was considering the V.alwal incident.
"V/ith regard to the diplomatic development
of the controversy, it is known that we have
not refused to confe : with representatives
of the Ethiopian Government .. .We have already
for sometime communicated with Addis Ababa that
we were disposed on our side to name two
representatives for Italy on the Conciliation
Committee.
And then, in a note of warning,
"But it is our duty not to harbor any dangerous
illusions, in view of the noteworthy Ethiopian
armaments and the advanced preparations for
Ethiopian mobilization.
Referring specifically to the nature of Italian mobilization
to date, he continued his speech with the following pertinent
material.
"Ides ire to reconfirm to the Senate that we
will maintain under arms for all the time
necessary the three classes of 1911, 1913,
and 1914. I believe that a total of 800,000
to 900,000 doldiers is sufficient to guarantee
our security. They are men perfectly trained,
with morale that is 'superb*.
They are equipped with the most modern weapons
made in our war industries, which-- I am re-
vealing no secret—have been working full time
for some montiis.
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"Relying on this gathering of forces on land,
30a, and sky, we will continue to practice
a policy that will be full of decisive and
concrete cooperation with all European
powers, large or small... Our military machine
threatens no one, but assures ponce. '
In other words, Mussolini made it clear that Italy was de-
termined to see his *colonial adventure * through, and they vjere
prepared to go to all lengths to secure their aims in East
Africa. It must be noted, however, that from his words in
the concluding paragraph his speech, he was still anxious to
assure the great powers that it would not threaten their
interests in the area, nor did he wish his military expedit-
ion to be raised above the level of a colonial campaign. As
is true of all great imperial powers, the criterial or plane
of ethics of a war of colonial conquest was always quite
different from a war between two equal powers. Mussolini
attempting to explain Italy* s plane of ethics in this fashion
to assure the other powers that he was not intere3tedt in
provoking a European conflagration. This speech seems to
mark the end of one stage of Italy*s diplomatic maneouvering
to secure his aims. His stalling measured as a shield for
military preparations no longer was necessary* Italy was
casting off the mantle of peace, and averring her true aims
to the world.
This wa3 due to the fact that May is the beginning
of the rainy season in East Africa which makes field
operations of any sort extremely tmfavorable. 'The summer
...
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rains make the terrain impassable for any considerable body
of troops, Mussolini knov/ that no ’coup’ could be planned
before 8eptember anyway. He, therefore, could afford to make
his position clearer.
fhe fact that Italy refused the British offer of June
24th, 1935, added reality to the erystallation of Mussolini ’s
intransigeant position. One observer describes Mussolini’s
position on the offer by saying
’’The proposals were rejected, by Mussolini
with contempt. Hi 3 attitude, indeed,
suggested that it was insulting of
Britain to send a junior minister like
Mr. Eden with such a miserable offer.
’You can imagine my reply*” he wrote to
DeBono. -*•
The August conference held in Paris on the 15th, evidenced
that the British Government had not abandoned the naive hoee
that Mussolini would, still compromise for a peaceful settle-
ment, even though Baron Afoisi had made it plain that military
occupation was the sina qua non of a successful agreement.
On August 19th, Mussolini again showed his intransigeant
position to Britain and Prance when i&issolini gave a flat
HO to the Anglo-French proposals.
"The end came suddenly and unexpectedly
when Premier Mussolini sent a flat re-
jection of the proposal put to him by
the British and the French, offering
i. G* ;*artelii, Italy Against the -oriel p. 88.
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what they deemed the moat favorable basis
of a discussion short of granting in ad-
vance his maximum demands "for political
dominance of Ethiopia, 11 1
These were not favorable omens that it was to be an
easy job ahead to deter Mussolini from his intended pursuits,
British public opijiion was crystallizing into a growing
^hostility in the summer of 195b against any such aggression
as Mussolini might plan against Abyssinia, In retaliatory
measure, a anti-British campaign was launched in the Italian
press against the growing hostility in Britain toward Italy,
Mussolini himself began the diatribes aginst the former ally
and friend with the following speech which he delivered in
Sardinia to review troops sailing for East Africa:
wW© have old and new accounts to settle* we
will settle them, We shall take nc account
of what may be said beyond our frontiers,
because we ourselves, we alone and ex-
clusively, are the judges of our interests
and the guarantors of our future, W© will
imitate to the letter those who are lecturing
us, They have shown that when it was a
question of creating an Empire, or of defending
it, they never took any account at all of
the opinion of the World, n ^
Such stinging words were aimed at laying bare vtiie
British hypocrisy in the Itaio-Ethiopian situation. Who
are they, the biggest Empire-builders in the World, to scold
another, who is about to commit only a minor offense?
TT^Tew Xo'FIFTIme a
,
August 19, 1955.
2. Ouofced Tn A, J," Toynbee, Op, Pit, p. 159,
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So went tho Italian reasoning
1
fh© Italian ’verbal drumfire of invective » against
Great Britain became almost equal go Italy’s diatribes against
Abyssinia* World opinion In August found It difficult to
distinguish whether the real issue was Italy vs. Abyssinia or
2
Italy vs. United Kingdom.
The motives behind this press campaign can be found in the
explanation that Italy was exploiting Britain^ fears of being
drawn into war by threats. Italy well knew that the areas
which the British Empire controlled viz.. Sues? Canal were
of vital necessity to the Italian Ease African campaign. It
?,ras necessary for success to frighten the British by threats
of reprisals If obstacles of a strategic nature were pre-
cipitated.
In August
,
such headlines as these appeared in the press:
"MUSSOLINI SAYS SANCTIONS MEANS WAR." In an interview with
the press, Mussolini stated
"It should be realized without the
possibility of misunderstanding,
that whoever applies sanctions as
against Italy will be met by the
armed hostility of crur country.
1. A, J. Toynbee, Op . Clfr
,
p. 249
2. "British opinion aidTTHe Abyssinian Dispute: “ A
Survey of the Daily papers during the second haldf
of A.-gust, 193b." X. Martin, Political Quarterly
.
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"If sanctions are voted against Italy at
Geneva, Italy will at once leave the League
of Nations, " 1
119
A press interviewer, asking his advice to other European
nations in maintaining peace, received the following answer.
which was not too complimentary to the United States
" Other nations should follow the
example of the United States and 2leave us alone to fulfill our mission,"
Mussolini made the fallowing statement before his War Cabinet
Council on August 29th, in which he appealed to British
interest self,
"Britain has nothing to fear from Italy*s
policy toward Ethiopia, Italy does not
threaten, either directly or Indirectly
British Imperial Interests, It has a
quarrel with Ethiopia, but she niether
has, nor wishes, to have one with Britain,
with whom during the World war, later in
Locarno and recently in Stresa, she has
realized collaboration of undoubted value
for the stability of Europe,
And turning in a more admonishing tone,
"To speak of sanctionaS .cannot but lead
to the most serious complications. As
for sanctions of a military character are
concerned, the necessary provisions and
measures have been taken to resist them, °
He then assured his War Council, that if Economic sanctions
were voted upon by the League, that every precautionary measure
had been taken In advance to see that the Italian population
and the soldiers in the campaign would not suffer#
1, New York Times, August 26,4-3
2, Ibid,
3, Sew ffork Times, August, 29, 1935,
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It was evident that Mussolini meant to keep his world
when he described the course Italy intended to pursue as
"with Geneva, without Geneva, or against
Geneva*" 1
1* Popolo d 1 Italia, July 31, 1935*
.
CHAPTER XIII
THE IMMEDIATE THREAT OP WAR
( September and October 1935)
,, iii.s
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WOULD TKADE V/ITH 1 iALY
During the months Immediately preceding the outbreak of
* hostilities, from August to October 1935, Italy was carrying
on a world-wide business transaction in war supplies to
feed her war machine# Thi3 commercial traffic at the 11th
hour of the dispute, played no small part in crystallizing
Mussolini* s determined effort to stand firm and defy all means
that might be used to frustrate Italy by the application of
any sanctions by the League#
Because in these few months before any action was taken
by the League to stop Mussolini, Italy was able to acquire
stocks and surpluses which allowed her to carry on a war
despite the later economic boycott imposed on her by a vote
in the League assembly#
The trade with states not members of the League, the
United States being the most important, became a difficult
problem to solve when it came to applying an economic boycott#
The League* s inability to control the trade of non-member
states with the aggressor was considered one of the important
weaknesses, and al3o an unknown factor upon which hinged the
effectiveness of sanctions.
It is, therefore, necessary to investigate Italy* s trade
t with all nations who in an indirect sense were contributing
to II Duce’s iniquitous plans by supplying him with the
instruments of war#
'.
.
.
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More especially. It is important to consider at this
point the part of the United States played, as the most
important non-nember state who traded with Italy.
Italy found many businessmen in the United States willing
to supply her with necessary supplies for her adventure in
East Africa, The flow of war profits into American business
houses stimulated their sadly depleted condition due to the
aftermath of the depression#
It was no secret to anyone what these materials were to
be used for. If the British and the French were still unaware
of Italy* s intentions, they could have learned much from
observations made in the financial section of the Times in
August that
"Italy, has prepared her offensive against
Ethiopia, has been buying far more ex-
tensively in the United States than is
generally supposed. !f ^
At that time, however, it was difficult to ascertain and
confirm exact statistics on the extent of Italian buying
because of "the reluctance of the majority of companies to
_ 2
discuss such transactions. Could the businessmen have
gotten a guilt complex over their sordid trading? Could
they have felt themselves implicated as accomplices of
II Duce In committing his aggression against a primitive and
relatively defenceless African country, and were therefore
Yl flew Yprk Times, August 25, 1935. Section III p. 9
2. TFT^
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reluctant to have such deeds publicized? Regardless of such
an Interpretation, Italy was successful in securing the
necessary supplies needed 3uch as
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"large quantities of oil, steel billets
for use in the production of shell cases,
copper. Iron and steel scrap, cotton, trucks,
^
machine tools and a variety of foodstuffs...
It was reported that Italian representatives were anxious
to secure commodities on suitable credit termis from American
firms in return for special marketing arrangements. In the
2
Italian home market. For the Abyssinian affair, it is
believed, however, that most of Italian trading was done by
payment in cash In gold. Although war cost 3 sent Italian
financial conditions deeper and deeper into debt, II I>uce
managed to obtain the purchasing power for the commodities in
this world wide transaction from an already Impoverished
3
population. : ost of the figures which were later made
available on Italian Purchasing, compared United States ex-
ports to Italy in 1935 to the corresponding period, 3jn 1934,
which in itself cannot give the whole picture, because 1934
4
v/as not an entirely normal year, it was above average.
In order to demonstrate how the flue tat ions in one Item
reflected Italv r s px-eporations for the projected campaign in
Ethippla, iron and steel scrap purchases will be used as an
irmr
—
2* mar
o. flie official National Debt as Reported in August was
Nine Billion.
4. New York Times, October 10, 1935* 17:1
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example. According to the Commerce Department figures,
ourchasen of this item "have more than doubled during July
1
(1935) as compared with June (1935). "The value of the
shipments jumped ll*om $240,367 in June to $610,161 in July,"
Taking the consignments ^onth by month, the tremendous b|tying
that Italy was engaging in during these few months of ’grace*
which still remained, was clearly reflected in the example of
metal scrap.
To show the importance of United States trade with Italy,
the words of the Department of Commerce trade experts are very
significant who disclosed from official figures that
"that the United States had been suppling a
major part of a large increase in Italian
imports of four classes of products easily
made into munitions. Italy’s foreign trade
figures, not available beyond mid-years,
show that purchases of American cotton waste,
iron and steel scrap, copper, benzol, toluol,
xylol in the first half of the year were doubled
to quadruple the volume for the first six months
of 1934. In every instance, the increase In
Italian pur'cliases was greater for, fchc 1 . "5 , than
all other countries comblheuT^
Likewise, in an even more vital commodity, oil, the U. S.
took the lead in supplying Italy. On November 6, 1935 it was
reported that
"Shipments of oil to Italy increased roughly
600/e in volume in August and September 1935
as compared with the same two months in 1934,
Commerce Department officials reported today.
1, hew yprk Times , October 20, 1935. 1:6
2. New Yo'rV. Times , November 5, 1935,
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"Four full loads of various grades of oil
left by tanker for specific Italian ports,
during the two month period mentioned."
The fury of this traffic had no signs of abating in the
United States, even after the sanctions were invoked by the
League in November.
"Statistics showed that Italian-Ethiopian
hostilities were booming the business of
American cotton growers and British
textile factories. " 2
And the most strategic item with regard to the whole dispute,
oil, was flowing readily from American gulf ports into
Italian tanks and machines.
"With a cargo of 50,000 barrels of crude
oil, the Italian tanker, Americana
arrived at Corpus Christi to take on an
addition 30,000 barrels wall destined
for Italy." o
The United States, however, was not the only country that was
benefiting from Italian orders for material. To give a brief
glimpse of the extent and nature of world commercial relations
with Italy, a few pertinent examples will suffice.
"In K©nya, the business com :unity. •
•
scraped together and despatched
to Mogadiscio every kind of portable
goods on which it was possibie to
lay hands: gasoline, kerosene, motor
trucks, beer, condensed milk, soap,
1amp s
,
railway material
,
t ire s
,
tube s
,
galvanized iron. " 4
1. Ibid. November 6, 1935.
2. Ibid. Novetaber 21, 1935.
3. IbiL November 21, 1935.
4* few York Times, September 22, 1935
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Italy had placed a large order for shoes In England, it
was reported. " Reports wore made of shipments to Italy of
2
cereals, coal, oil and timber from Russia and Turkey.
Czechoslovakia and Austria wore adding their supplies by
sending Italy coal, iron and machinery*
These random illustrations show that Italy was taking no
chances in being unprepared in case a boycott should be voted
in Geneva. Italy knew that many markets would be opened to
her by the desire for war profits. In fact, Canada was out-
spoken about it, as the government did nothing to hinder
business
.
"Canada Is not anxious to bind Itself
to neutrality as the U. S. has done.
The Government is not disposed to shut
itself off from any market that offers
(large opportunities.) 4
The Unite'-' ftates did make some effort to stop this
traffic by neutrality legislation. but the efforts were far from
adequate. In August a joint resolution was passed in Congress
which provided for an arms embargo, until February 1936
,
upon
the exportation of arms and munitions of war. The President
was required to draw un a list of the commodities to be placed
on an embargo.
Such commodities as oil, cotton and scrap iron, however,
were not on the arms list, but were nevertheless used for
T7 t< one!on Time
s
.
August 29, 1935.
2, ITew York Tines
.
September 6, 1935.
3, Tvew "fork Times , September 24, 1955.
4, ).ew Tori; " Time 3 . August 2G, 1935.
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tli® carrying on of war, without being munitions in the strict
sense. And it proved to be these items, and particularly
oil, which Italy was no3t Interested in obtaining from the
United States, and which proved to be the essential instrument
in Italy* a conduct of her campaign.
The President, realizing the serious implications of the
rise in the volume of exports to Italy oT these commodities,
rebuked the American businessmen by these words;
"This class of trade is directly contrary
to the policy of the Government as announ-
ced in official statements by the president
and the Secretary of State, as also is it
contrary to the genera^L spirit of the
recent neutrality act. * *
Concentration of the Brltisn Fleet in the Mediterranean
Great Britain was unavoidably entangled in the Italo-
Ethiopian situation, if for no other reason than the British
Empire *
3
geographical position in the Mediterranean. All
Italian troops ana supplies flowed through the Suez Canal
from various ports in Italy to the Italian colonies in East
Africa. Mot only did Great Britain control the very door
through which Italy had to pass in order to conquer Abyssinia,
but the maintenance in tact of the British Empire rested on
British control of the Mediterranean for security of its life
line. British possessions, therefore, were scattered widely
between Gibr^tar on the West and the Suez on the East. Malta
1. hew York Times, November 16, 1935.
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Aden, Cyprus, Egypt, British Social11and and the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan were also strategically located watch towers from which
the British could view Italian military movements in this area*
At the same time, Italy*s position in the Mediterranean,
with possessions on both the European and African side, could
effectively challenge the British, by virture of Italian
proximity to British locations in L^bya, and the Dodecanese.
Italy if so desiring, could put the British in a particularly
1
vulnerable position. Italian aircraft and submarine
operating in the Mediterranean waters would make British
warships extremely unwelcome there.
It is difficult to calculate the exact strength of the British
forces in 1935, as no statistics are available to the general
public. Various estimates were made, nevertheless, by compet-
ent observers who had been acquainted with Britain* s military
power for many years. Mr. Toynbee surmises that:
"As for the state of the British fighting
forces in the autumn of 1935, It seems
that they were seriously unprepared
perhaps not so seriously as was believed
abroad—-but seriously enough in the light
of what was known in Downing Dtreet about
German rearmament and German intentions.
As regarded the prospects in the event
of an Anglo-Italian war, the United Kindom
Government appears to have believed that it
would cost the British Navy the loss of six
or seven warships to bring Italy to her knee-3.
In Downing Street it was held--whether rightly
or wrongly would never be known—- that naval
losses of this magnitude In a war incurred in
*
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“fulfillment of British obligations under
the Covenant of the League of Nations
would be taken extremely badly by public
opinion in England. It was also held
that an exaggerated estimate of the extent
of British losses would gain currency
abroad, and that such a situation would
expose both Germany and Japan to a tempt-
ation which might peihaps prove Irresistible
—
to fish in troubled waters,
1
Thi3 display of strength of British Naval Power seemed to
be the extent to which British officialdom was willing to go.
in the hope 3 that Mussolini could be forced to retreat from
his Abyssinian plans, by such a gesture. But Mussolini was
not to be foolod by gestures which had no actions behind them.
Mussolini later called the British bluff and, going ahead with
the plana of conquest, showed the world that Britain was not
willing to H stick its neck out”.
Mussolini must have been aware of this British attitude, for
time and again he appealed to British self-interest, saying
,f Italian policy did not endanger the present
European equilibrium,
.
.and that it constituted
no threat to local British interests,,,,” 2
Nevertheless, Mussolini must also have feared that Downing
Street, pushed by nritish public opinion, might be forced on
the other hand to crusade for the enforcement of the Covenant,
which would include the application of sanctions and possibly
even military action.
Mussolini, therefore, continually warned that reprisals
1. A. J. Toynbee, Op. Git, pp, 250-251, ff.3.
2. New Yprk Times,
"
august 27, 1935.
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would be forthcoming to any member of the League who engaged
in sanctions to thwart Italy, This, of course, would mean
that Britain would bear the brunt of any friprisala’ which
Italy might care to engage in. Why the British decided to
display their naval power In the Mediterranean immediately
preceding the possibility that sanctions might be voted at
Geneva, is not known. If they did not intent to carry through
this gesture, it was of little value. The British could argue
that if French cooperation had been forthcoming with regard
to mutual assistance in that area, the British navy would have
gone ahead with enforcing the Covenant against an aggressor.
It seems strange nevertheless, that Britain did not seek
diplomatic harmony on this point with France before engaging
in this unilateral action.
At any rate, the British went ahead with their Mediterr-
anean plans. The first indications that Britain intended to
be prepared for any event that might take place at Geneva,
was in the middle of September "when it became known that the
Mediterranean fleet had been joined by a large part of the
1
Home Fleet, On October 7th, two more warships joined the
2
Fleet in the Levantine waters from the Far East.
By tills British display of naval strength, Mussolini in
return threatened to reinforce their Libyan land forces and
3
possibly through this territory attack Egypt.
A, J. Toynbee, Op. Cit, p, 253,
2, Hew York Times, Oc toller 7, 1935.
3. TTornnfuiirque” from Rome on September 14, 1935(cited in A. J*
Toynbee. Log.
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The Purpose of the British was to deter the Italians
from participating in an Italo-British war. The Italians,
not easily scared, on the other hand had as their purpose to
conduct the Abyssinian war without interference; and this
could be achieved most successfully if they could get the
British to agree on a symmetrical reduction in Naval strength
in the Levantine waters.
The offects of the British reinforcement of the British
;
fleet in the *mediterranean and the counter-reinforcement of
Italian land forces in Libya started a long chain of diplomatic
negotiations between the two powers
,
in order to secure assur-
ances from each regarding their intentions. Italy suggested
that the basis for an understanding should be
"The symmetrical cancellation of the naval
and military measures which the two
governments had respectively taken in the
- mediterranean." 1
Italy had previously assured the British that Italy had ‘no
aims, immediate or concealed which could he damaging to the
interests of Great Britain.
And the British in turn had done likewise,
"Sir Samuel Hoare sought to allay Italian
apprehensions and personally assured
Mussolini .... that British naval measures
Tl Informal verbal note to the British Government from the
Italian Ambassador in London on October 5th. (Cited ia A. J.
ToynboA, On. Cjt
.
p. 255*^
2, Declaration of the Italian Council of Ministers in New
York Times, Sept mber 28, 1935*
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"were motivated solely by the violent tone
of the Italian press, and were purely
precautionary in character, and implied
no aggressive intention against Italy,"
With such assurance, Italy felt that logically the Britis
would accept Italian proooal mentioned above. And as the sit
uation developed, Italy found herself on the winning side of
all her deals with the United Kingdom. Foij British spokesmen
reiterated in the ensuing months of the dispute, in various
forms, although the substance was always the same, that, Italy
might rest assured that no acid, on would be taken by Great
Britain against Italy. The British Ambassador to Rome,
Sir Eric Drummond, was cast for the part of carrying this news
to the Italian Government.
Prime Minister Baldwin, On October 19th, made it clear
also that Great Britain v/ould take no isolated action against
2
Italy. Tills could have been reference to nothing but
the British fleet in the Mediterranean.
It became evident by these utterances that Italy could
rest assured that It was very unlikely that the British navy
would be used to frustate Italy
1
s north African campaign.
Thus, even if the League condemned Italy, what could the
Geneva machinery do to stop Italy, without the wholehearted
support of the British military forces?
If these conciliatory gestures on the part of the British
1. New York Times, September 23, 1935
2. London Time's, October 20, 1935.
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Prime Minister ana the British Ambassador in Rome were in-
dicative of the British position, asthey turned out to he
—
Mussolini, in October, knew full v/eli that he could carry out
the Abyssinian campaign to his liking, without the inter-
ference of the British navy, and despite G©neva. As it later
came iio pass, the British never used thoir warships to bloeade
the uuoz Canal in an attempt to enforce the decisions of the
League Assembly, flic Suez Canal, upon which Italy depended
upon almost wholly to send troops and supplies to the fighting
area, v/a s Italy's achilles heal. If thus use had been denied
the aggressor. General De Bono hi* self stated the consequences!
millions of Italian soldiers would have starved in Africa due
to lack of supplies, and Italj would have had to abandon the
1
Abyssinian adventure.
*
THE QUKSTXO H OF CLOG IMG THE SUEZ CABAL.
The strategic consideration of whether the Canal should
have been closed to an aggressor who had violated its treaty
obligations laid down in the Covenant, hinged on two political
qtiestions. (1) Did the British Government have legal juris-
diction over the Canal, and (2) Does the League Covenant super-
cede the Convention internationalizing the Canal insofar as the
two are incompatible?
The British, well entrenched in Egypt by de facto control^
were in a precarious legal position.
1. Cited in G. Eartelli. Op . Cit. p. 135
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’’Great Britain had been in military-
occupation and in partial political
control of Egypt for no loss than fifty-
four years, while she had been conducting
the administration of the Anglo-Egyptian
Sudan for thirty- seven years, she had not
yet succeeded in acquiring any regular title
to her de facto position in either of these
two portions of the Kile Basin, but had
allowed her desultory endeavors to place her
relations with Egypt on a comprehensive treaty-
basis to peter out, time and again,.,.” 1
In regard to the Suez Canal in particular, it was operated
by an private Egyptian company, in which the British owned the
largest bloc of shrea, although a minority viz. 353,004 out
2
of 800,000. The Convention of 1888, established that the
Canal shall be always open and free, in time of peace and in
war to all. However, would not the application of Article 16
of the League of Nations Covenant override the Convention of
Constantinople? Can not Article 20 of the Covenant annul or
abrogate any previous treaty or convention which proves in-
compatible with the carrying out of the Covenant. Thus it may
be argued that the basis of the Convention of Constantinople
in establishing rules and regulations to cover all cases may
be modified by the League Covenant.
The next problem is found in the question whether the
British G0vernment had a legal right to x^rotect the Canal.
Prom a juridical point of view, it could be argued that, Egypt,
formerly a British protectorate, and now sovereign over the
1 .
2 .
A. J, Toynbee, 0j>. Cit
.
p.
R. L. Buell, The Suez Canal
Geneva Special' "Studies, "'Vol
251.
, VI. No. 3, {1935) .pp.
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canal, had not acceded to the Convention of 1888* Egypt had
made no treaty recognizing tho British claim to defend the
that in 1914 the British Government found it necessary and,
therefore juridically possible, to close the canal to hostile
warships. If in time of stress, as the World War was consider-
ed, it could be closed, why not in 1935, when the threat of
war between two members of the League was equally Imminent?
If ever a common front was needed, hero was the golden
opportunity fcr the French and British to show their unity of
purpose.
On September 10th, when M» Laval, Sir Samuel Hoare and
Mr, Eden were gathered at Geneva for the meetings of the League
Council, an interchange of views* took place which shaped the
whole manner of the way Italy would be dealt with in the event
Italy committed an act of aggression, These conversations are
of vital importance to the real key behind the British and
French actions in the ensuing months of the dispute, which
finally ended in disaster.
There were two problems to be discussed of primary im-
portance, and the first hinged on the outcome of the second.
The First was whether or not military sanctions would be taken
1
*
canal. B'rom a realistic point of view, it may be argued
Anglo-French Discussions during September
aha 0ctQberl9o3
1. Of. A. J. Toynbee, 0o. Pit, p, 251
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against Italy, The second was the problem of reciprocal
assistance in the Mediterranean, The British didn’t want
hostilities between the United Kingdom and the Italian forces
to break out without the protection and aid of French ports
and land forces. France, however, as has been demonstrated,
was unwilling to lose the friendship of Italy over Abyssinia
tinless British would come to France’s aid in the event of an
outbreak of hostilities in Europe. 11. Laval was willing to
demonstrate France*s fidelity to the Covenant in doing so it
would not mean weakening the bond of frienddaip with Italy
which had been sealed in Rome on January 7th. The British
naval movements In the Mediterranean made French policy of
conciliation difficult, however, as the two cohorts were
simultaneously waving an olive branch and a big stick.
The British spokesmen felt, and probably justifiably do,
that if the British fleet was to be used as the naval guaranty
behind the enforcement of sanctions, certainly, the French
Government could be expected to share in the responsibility
of supporting the Covenant by similar measures. The French,
anxious to secure satisfactory agreements with Britain regard-*
ing Germany and not being successful, carried the negotiation!
to great lentils over the character and nature of "mutual suupOrt
The 11th hour, by November 1935, had passed, and it was
evident that Britain and France had muffed the bail. It was
also evident that the British lion’s tail was In no position
••
:
•
•
•
•
'
'
" "
•
.
•
.
.
.
•
'
:
~
.
••
, ; v ,
-
<
'
*
. ,
.
*
157
1
to be twisted, because it was safely tucked between its legs.
Returning to the conversations of the three spokesmen in
Geneva on September 10th, it at once becomes clear why the
French and British G0vernments decided to retire behind the
lines of fire, not allowing their own forces to be contaminated
with the gunpowder of another war which did not concern them
directly.
Th© Laval-Hoare understanding of September, a prelude as
well as the foundati ons to the abortive Laval-Hoare peace plan
that was placed before the world only four months later, con-
sisted of an agreement to rule out any form of military
sanctions against Italy. At the time, these agreements were
not divulged. It was not until December when M* Laval reported
to the Chambre des Deputes that the world became aware of these
private agreements to emasculate the Generval machinery before
it was even set in motion. In his own owrds he explained this
understanding between himself and Sir Samuel in the following
words
•
"We were convinced that our first effort at
conciliation had failed and that hostilities
were going to begin almost immediately# We
turned all our attention to the question of
how themechanism of collective security should
be put into operation. Without waiting for the
official meeting of the Council, we discussed
and examined— in that spirit of close cooperation
which ought always to animate French and British
statesmen—the grave situation with which the
1# G. Martinelli, £2 * Cit. P « 134#
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"World was going bo be confronted by the
Italo-Ethiopian v/ar. <7e found ourselves in-
military sanctions, not adopting anfr measure
of nava l MockadTo novor ~ con^rmplatinr^ tMo
iSSISDSft
.
out everything that.
,
mu/fit read t,o .v;^rA
* >
-
!
-
Xf these conversations had been aired openly at the time, those
listening to the speeches of Sir’Sanuel and h. Laval on Septemb
j
11th, the following day, at Geneva before the League Council
er
might have interpreted their words in a different light*
2
But their ignominous double talk consisted of bluffing
the world into thinking that something, along the lines of
concrete action, might be expected of both. rfhe British and
the French in dealing with Italy* For as Sir Samuel himself
said
“...His Majesty’s Government and the British
people maintai n their support of the League
and its ideals as the most effective way of
ensuring peace, and secondly, that this
belief in the necessity for preserving the
League is our sole interest in the present
controversy, selfish or imperialist
motives enter into our minds at all. It is
not, however, sufficient to state one’s
belief and paint one’s idea. It is necessary
not only to hold a belief but bo consider how
it can be applied. It is necessary not only to
have an ideal but to consider what are the best
measures of achieving it....
1. Statements made to the Chamber cf Deputies in Par*is on
the 17th of December by M. Laval* (cited in A. J. Toynbee,
Op. Pit
,
p. 183)
2,
'"' The word" Bluffing’* i3 used, in the sense that while British
and French Spokesmen promised wholehearted and active support
to the League, actually they did not Intend to do the utmost
if it were necessary, ie, they were not willing to risk going to
war with Italy and enforcing military sanctions tc bring Italy
to her knees, which Article 16, actually required the States
members* for the effective fulfillment of this Article*
.'
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"finally, to complete the system, there is an
obligati. on to take collective action to bring
the war to an end in the event of any resort
to war in disregard of Covenant obligations..
me do are the conditions in which we find
ourselves. The obligations of the Covenant
remain. Their burden upon us has been in-
creased many fold. But one thing is certain*
If the burden is to be borne it must be borne
collectively. If risks for peace are to be
run, they must be run by all* The security
of the many cannot be insured solely b;r the
efforts of a few, however powerful they
may be« Tf
The next phrase which $ir Samuel uttered gave perhaps the most
cause for the proponents of the League to rejoice in hoping
that the British Government would lend all its force in the
backing of the Covenant:
On behalf of the British Government I can say that
they will bo second to none in their intent! on of to fulfill
to the measure of choir capacity the Voligations which
the Covonant lays upon thorn. The ideas enshrined in
the Covenant, particularly the aspiration to establish
the rule of law in international affairs, have appealed
with growing force to the string idealism which has
itc place in our national character and they have
became A part of our national conscience.
Sir Samuel K 0are, however, throughout his speech at Geneva
made no illusion that the League was really a more powerful
body than it actually was. He carefully brought out the
spheres of limitations of the League which would hinder its
effectiveness. First of all, the League, was no world govern-
ment and its decision, therefore, did not have the force of
law as he brought out by the follow in y words:
11 It (the League) is not a super-Ltate,
nor even a separate entity existing of
itself, independent of or transcending
./
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"the States which make up its membership.
The member States have not abandoned the
sovereignty that resides In each o^tker.’t
,
nor ripe a the 'Covenant require that Ihey"
*
should withcut their consent In any matter
touchinp; their sovereignty accept de-
cisions of other members or the League,
.'..'ifaey (members) do not act at the bidding
of the league f but in virtue of agreements
to which they themselves are parties or in
pursuance of policies to which they
fchemselves assent*
£lus the fact that national sovereignty allows each state to
act according ot its own dictates, the League also has an
important limitation the lack of world-wide support.
"This lack of universality inevitably
introduces the element of uncertainty
as to how far we can count on world-
wide support in the work of organizing
and maintains peace.
In the closing words of his speech, he again underlined
Eritain*s willingness to meet its obligations.
"The attitude of the British Government has
been one of unwavering fidelity to the League
and all that stands for, and the case now
before us is no exception, but, on the con-
trary, the continuance of that rule. The
recent responsen of public opinion shows how
completely the nation supports the government
in full acceptance of the obligations of
League membership, which is the oft-pro&aimed
keynote of foreign policy. 1
In an address delivered before the Assembly also two
days later on September 13, Premier Laval backed the Leagued
authority— in words, by affirming the words of the British
Secretary of State. He nevertheless modified the strength
of Sir Samuel* s words by leaving open the door of tconciliatior) »
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through which Britain and Franco might escape when their roles
were brought out in their true iniquitous light,
"I conserve the hope that Council v*ill
bo ‘able trithin a short space of time
to succeed in its role of cone illation, M
He also took the opportunity to affirm again the friendship of
France with It sly which had been 'definitely settled' on January
7, 1935,
The collaboration of the British and French on the linos
of the discussions which took place between Sir Samuel and
Premier Laval on September 10th and lith at Geneva was the
beginning of the pattern which emerged in its final form as
the Laval-Hoard Peace Plan in December. Sir Samuel's words
were so true that
“the support which the Governments
of the member StateS^9^peftds 8u ij?:ft$ue »
amount of support those Governments
receive from their peoples. If this
na'i onal support is strong, the League
will be strong, 11
Infertunateljr for Sir Samuel Hoare, the national support
for the League in Britain was strong, but the Government did
not heed this mandate from the people. This was so obvious to
the Government in December when the abortive Laval-Hoare Peace
Plan came to light, that Sir Samuel was made the scapegoat of
the Government's policy and was forced to resign, because he,
as spokesman for the United Kingdom, failed to exercise the
will and power to apply the principles of the Covenant. The
people of Britain, who had elected the Government primarily on
this issue, had instructed him# as representative, to do so.
..
'
•'
.
•
*
.
.
.
.•
*: V
.
, .
. .
.\.,v .
• •
.
.
.
.
, . .
)PART
OUTBREAK 0?’
)
III
WAR
.
CHAPTER IX
THE LEAGUE AND THE DISPUTE

Italy T s Car-^e la Presented to the League Council
•'lien the Council mot on 1optember 4th,
,
it was
in accordance with its own decision of last August 3rd
when it had boon agreed that the Council should
"meet in any event on the 4th of September
to tindertake the general examination in
its various aspects of the relations
between Italy and Ethiopia. 1 ’
At the first meeting, Baron Alois!, Italian
representative at Geneva, took the opportunity to
present a voluminous report setting forth the Italian
case against Ethiopia.
In brief, the Italian charges were four: (1) the
infringement of treaties by Abyssinia, (2> Abyssinia
represented a danger to the safety of the Italian
colonies in Africa (3) there was chronic disorder in
that country (4) it was a mistake that Abyssinia had been
admitted to the League, Prom these charges, the Italian
representative drew the following conclusions;
’’All this clearly shows that although Abyssinia
i3 a member of The League of Hat ions which
requires the respect of existing treaties and
of the principle of international law, that
Government has systematically violated the
treaties they have signed and have shown that
they do not possess the degree of governmental
organization which is essential to membership in
tna community of civilized nations,”
.. ,
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Italy was taking the offensive. It was Abyssinia that
should be punished. Perhaps the Italian policy makers
felt that it would be only a matter of time before some
chieftain roul 1 allow another border incident 'jo occur,
which could bo used by Italy as a pretext for starting
their campaign.
COiaMITTEB OF FXVS
On September 5th#, another attempt at ‘conciliation,
‘
(known In other than diplomatic circles as ‘appeasement, 1 )
was made, this time by the League itself. The French
and British governments never seemed to lose hope that
it would be possible to reconcile Italy ‘s intransigent
aims with the independence of Abyssinia, without complete-
ly emasculating the Covenant. For this purpose, A Com-
mittee of Five was appointed by the Council on September 6th
to ’’make a general examination of Italo-Ethiopian relations
1
and to seek for a pacific settlement.'* Those members
of the Council appointed to serve on the committee con-
sisted of the United Kingdom, France, Poland, Turkey, and
Spain. Senor Pe Madariaga, Spanish representative, was
appointed Chairman.
1. Official Journal. XVI, (1935) p. 1145.
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From September 7th to September 24th olovon meetings were
held. The Committee studied documentary material. They
expressed no opinions on the documents furnished them, how-
ever, by the two parties, because
"As an organ of conciliation, the Committed
was not called upon to deliver judgment,
but to consider a situation and to seek to
devise a means of remedying it." ^
In its report, the Committee came to the conclusion
that it was Ethiopia, and not Italy, that needed a mend-
ing of its ways J Italy was not chastised for the in-
tensive mobilisation and military preparations that had
been carried on for months. No, it was Ethiopia that
needed modernizing i In reality, the Committee
actually found itself in accord with the Italian memo-
randum and, therefore, logically agreed with the Italian
conclusion.
The proposals, though more comprehensive than the
Anglo-French proposals offered to Italy In mid-August,
2
were essentially the same. They consisted of an exten-
sive plan for modernization of Ethiopian administration
plus the possibility of territorial sacrifices on the part
of France and the United Kingdom in order to compensate
Italy.
"They also agreed to recognize a special
Italian interest in-the economic develop-
ment of Ethiopia."
XI official °Journal, XVI, (1955) Appendix I p.1620
SI Official Journal , XVX* (1955) p. Ifll2(Of .specific _=
measures proposed, see Annex II, Off. Jour. XVI(1935)
pp 1622-24.
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On September 22nd., the Italian delegate informed
the Chairman of the Committee of Five that the Italian
Government had rejected the Committee* s proposals. The
Communique stated that
"The Council of Ministers has taken
note of the proposals contained in
the report of the Committee of Five.
It had examined them carefully. The
Council of Ministers, while appre-
ciating the attempt made by the Com-
mittee, had decided to consider these
proposals as unacceptable inasmuch as
they did not offer a minimum basis
sufficient for conclusive realizations
which would finally and effectively
take into account the rights and vital
Interests of Italy." 1
This latest proposal for *buying-off Italy* ended
as all the rest had - on the scrap heap. This new scheme
seemed to II Duce as untemptlng and unattractive as had all
the rest. Italy* s bellicose attitude could not now be easily
cast aside. The situation was precipitating, and rapidly.
It appeared that, by rejecting those proposals, Mussolini was
willing at this point of the game to take the iniative In
starting hostilities. The French and British suggestions
that Italy be compensated with the Danakil and Ogaden Reg-
ion, became merely a laughing matter to II Buce now. It
was on this occasion that he informed the * appeasers * that
he was out for bigger stakes and, consequently, was not *a
collector of deserts.*
IT 'Official "JourriaT; XVI (1955), p. 1622.
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»
Despite the fact that the Abyssinian Government accepted
the proposals as a basi3 for negotiation, tho Couaiittoe of Five
vjas forced to report to the Council on September 26th that they
had failed to reace a settlement acceptable to both parties,
4
Admitting of failure, the Chairman sent tills message to the
Council meeting:
4
"Nevertheless, I cannot believe that tho
part of conciliation is finally closed..
I would remind you that conciliation is
always possible until the' Council’s re-
port under paragraph four. Article 15 of
the Covenant, is dlfinitoly adopted.....
Tho time has come for us to contemplate
preparation of that report. The proced-
ure under Article 15 which Ethiopia had,
asked should be put into operation....." -*
Also discussed at the Council meeting was a telegram which
had been sent by Ethiopia urgently reminding the Council that
the situation was grave.
"Several months ago we gave orders to our
troops along our frontiers to withdraw
thrlty kilometres from the frontier and
to remain there to avoid an# incidents that
might serve the Italians as a pretest for
aggression. The orders have been carried
out In full. We remind you of a previous
request for the despatch of impartial ob-
servers to establish the facts in regard
to any aggression or other incident that
might occur in order to fiz the responsi-
bility therefor. We further ask the
Council to take any other precautionary
measures that it may think advisable. "2
i
t
4
X. Official Journal, XVI (1935) P. 1201
2. IHE
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COMMITTEE OF THIRTEEN
With the failure of tho Committee of Five, it ceased to
function. Whereupon, the Chairmen of the Council suggested
that, os Article 15 hod become applicable, a committee of
all the members should be established to draft its report
under Article 15. This proposal was unanimously adopted
and the Committee of Thirteen began its work in accordance
with Article 15
.
.
'1
Their report was made ready on October 5th, and in it
had been recorded all the circonstone os and events leading to
the crisis. A general examination was made of each of the
successive failures of attempts at a pacific settlement. Before
0 0
the report was finished, however, Mussolini sent Italian troops
on October 3rd over the Rover ilareb advancing into Ethiopian
*2
territory. ' Thus, the events of the day had caught up with,
and had overtaken, the Leagued handling ofthe dispute.
On that very day when Mussolini embarked upon his war
of aggression a telegram wa3 sent to the Secretary General
by Italy stating that the general mobilization order of
September 26th proclaimed by Ethiopia was the final cue
demonstrating "Ethiopia’s warlike and aggressive spirit."^
1. Official Journal , XVI (1935) p. 16Q5
2; new'Torl: Times
.
October 4, 1935
3. Official Journal . XVI (1935) p. 1603
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Cn October 2nd, the Ethiopian Government had Informed
the Secretary General of the outbreak of hostilities.
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Telegram from Etoneror Halle Selassie to the
Secretary General
We inform you for communication to the Council and
States members that Italian troops have violated
Ethiopian frontier in region south of Mount Moussa
Alii Province of Aussa between that mountain and
the frontier of Ethiopia and French Somaliland and
have established themselves in Ethiopian territory
preparing base for extensive attack. Proximity to
sea in this region and its easy access through ter-
ritory of French Somaliland make it possible for
Council either to send observers or to obtain con-
firmation of this violation of Ethiopian territory
through the Government of French Somaliland*
(signed)
Emperor Kalle Selassie
On the 3rd of October, the Ethiopian again contacted
the Secretary General of the League to inform the Council
that Italian Military aeroplanes had bombarded Adowa and
2
AddiGrat
•
THE COMMITTEE OF SIX
This situation having occurred, it was necessary that
the Council act without further delay. And so, on the meet-
ing of October 6th, the Committee of Thirteen* s report wata
accepted and the Committee added to the right to make re-
commendations in accordance with Article 15 of the Covenant. Thfc
Committee of Thirteen then appointed a Committee of Six to draw
(up a report
XVI, (1935) p. 1603

to submit to the Council not later than October 7th - two
1
days later# During the sessions of this Committee, the
Ethiopian Government firmly asked the Council to declare
"(1) that these indisputable facts constitute
a resort to war by Italy within the meaning of
Article 1G of the Covenant:
(2) that this resort to war has, ipso facto,
brought about the consequences laid down ir.
Article 16, paragraph 1." 1
The finding of the Committee of 3ix condemned Italy
as an agressor, in violation of its obligations under the
Pact of Paris, 1928, and the Covenant# The momentous de-
cision was recorded in the following words:
"After an examination of the facts stated above,
the Committee has come to the conclusion that
the Italian Government has resorted to war in
disregard of its covenants under Article If of
the League of Nations,” 2
On October 7th, the Council of the League of Nations
in the words above, had declared one of the 'big* powers an
aggressor, and thereby would follow the obligation of all
member states to apply Article 16. Following this action in
the Council, a public session of the League Assembly was held
on the 9th of October.
1# Text of the Report in Official Journal . 1VI (1935)
p. 122-5.
2. Ibid#
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Dr* Beres, the President of the Assembly, reminded the member-
state that the dispute betv/een Ethipia and Italy was still
under consideration by the Council, and that the Assembly
would not override the jurisdiction of the Council, but would
supplement its action. He then invited the members of the
Assembly to express their opinion on the Council's Report
after the report was approved brief discussion. In which the
President then proposed that a coordinating body be set up.
To deal with "measures to be taken under Article 16."
The Italian delegate, Baron Alois! argued that Italy was
being treated unfairly, in the sense that other ’aggressors]
had not been brought to trial so sv/iftly for thoir actions.
"How is it that on other occasions, when a state
of actual war existed between two original
members of the League (Japan and China)
,
the
procedure which led to the approval of the
report of the Council on the basis of Article
15, lasted not less than seventeen months?
And on the Chaco dispute about two years? Vi/here-
as this time a single month, from September 4th
to October 7th was sufficient for an immediate
award and a decision to refer the matter to
the Assembly." 1
It was unfair that other culprits had been allowed to go free
and Italy might have to pay the price for its acts. Baron
Alois! continued his discussion by saying that the League
owed much to Italy, by that country's collaboration In the
Locarno undertakings. Disarmament Conference,etc. But
Abyssinia on the other hand is an uncivilized state and
should never have been admitted. He belittled Abyssinia's
1. 87-th Meeting of the Assembly, October -9 11 ( Officia l Journal XVI)
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contributions to the Geneva machinery. Alois! then placed
his country in the position of the underdog, its colonies
not being safe in proximity to the aggressive and warlike
neighbor, Abyssinia. He told the Assembly that Italy could
no longer count on the League to protect and afford hfe
country the necessary security and therefore, Italy,
"had found herself in the necessity of
relying exclusively an her own resources
to face the danger which revealed itself
ever more grave and more imminent. 1
After the hypocrisy of Italian policy was fully aired by
Baron Alois!, the President proceeded to sum up the dis-
cussions of the member States which had followed Alois
i
f g
speech.
"Of the fifty-four members present at
the Assembly, three states expressed
a contrary opinion; a fourth, this
morning, has spoken against the
application of sanctions, and fifty
states members of the League have
expressed an opinion in accordance
with that of the fourteen states
members of the C 0uncil, by conveying,
either explicitly by their declara-
tions or tacitly, their Government^
acquiescence in the report and docu-
ments in question." 2
Later that same day, at a plenary meeting of the Assembly, the
following resolution was drafted to provide for the co-ord-
inations of measures which were to be taken under Article 16,
1. .. Ibid.
2. 87th heeting of the Assembly, October 9-11, 1935, XVI.
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now that It had coma Into effect.
The resolution * Invited* members of the League Assembly
or the Couneil to form a committee, composed of one delegate
for each member for the fulfillment of the states* obligations
under Article 16,
"The Assembly haring taken cognizance of the
opinions expressed by the members of the
Council at the Council’s meeting of the 7th
October, 1935. Taking into consideration
the obligations which rest upon the members
of the Leage in virtue of Article Id of the
Covenant and the desirability of coordinat-
ion of the measures which they may severally
contemplate: Invites the members of the
League (other than the parties) to set up
a committee, composed of one delegate,
assisted by experts, for each member, to
consider and facilitate the coordination
of such measures and, if necessary draw the
attention of the Council or the Council
or the Assembly to situations requiring
to be examined by them.' 1 1
1* Loc , Cit
'.
,
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APPLICATION OP ARTICLE 16
0? THE COVENANT TO I TALY
c.
153
The ha buro of dancti on3: Analysis of Article 16
As u result of the Assembly decision of October 11th,
nailing Italy a Covenant-breaker, a great power stood con-
victed for the forst time in the history of the league of
committing an act of aggression in violation of its covenanted
obligations, The decision of the Assembly caused the mach-
inery of collective action 6o become operative automatically
according to paragraph one of article 16, whicu read:
"Should any member of the League resort to
war in disregard of its covenants under
Articles XII, XIII or XV, it shall inso
facto be deemed to have committed an act
of war against all other members of the
League,
’
Any nation that signed the Covenant was thus bound to take
action against Italy,
The provisions of Article 16 included various measures
to be taken to punish an aggressor, Embodied in this Article
was the principle that international law should be fortified
by the enactment of penalties, (vis, sanctions,) to secure
obedience to law,
'The measures to repress an aggressor stipulated in
Article 16 were as follows;
(1) Financi^jil, economic and other measures to isolate
an aggressor (in paragraph l)
"••••(the members) undertake immediately to
subject it (the aggressor) to the severance
of all trade and financial r elat ions
,
fate
FoHilfitTon oT aTl ^Intercourse^e^vocn their
nationals and the nationals of the Covenant-
.'
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"breaking s tate
,
and tho prevention of all
fliiarlc 1alT c ociner o1a1 or personal intercourse
be tween the nationals of the (Jovenant-brealcing
state and the nationals of any other state,
whetiier a Member of the League or not.'
" (2) Military measures (In paragraph 2)
It shall be the duty of the Council in
such case to recommend to the several
governments concerned what effective
military, naval or air force the Members
oftlie he a rue of Ua b ion s Vhali severaYIy
contribute to the armerV forces to be used
to protect the covenants of the League."
Article 16 also provided for mutual support tc maintain the loss
engendered in applying this article: (in paragraph 3.)
"ill© members of the League agree, further, that they
will mutually support one another in the financial
and economic measures which are taken under this
Article, in order to minimise the loss and in-
convenience resulting from the above measures and
that they will mutually support one another in
resisting any special measures aimed at some of
their number by che Covenant-breaking state,
and that they will take the necessary stops to
afford passage through their territory to the
force 3 of any of the Members of the League which
are cooperating to protect the covenants of
the League,"
Article 16, contains, then, provisions for complete iso-
lation of an aggressor by a financial and economic boycott and
by cutting off all intercourse between the Covenant-breaker
and the rest of the world. If this pressure was not sufficient
to halt an aggressor, military force was also provided for in
this Article. The threat of expulsion (paragraph 4) was a
final penalty written in Article 16, In brief, these are the
measures which comprise what is known as sanctions.
In tho beginning stages of this discussion of sanctions.
•’
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it shall be helpful to differentiate national and International
practice in dealing with law-breakers. The Covenant makes
no provisions for penalties in order to prevent v/ar. State
laws, however, are able to prosecute persons "loitering with
the intent to coranit a felony". In practice, in the inter-
national community, it is difficult, if not impossible, to see
how sanctions could be applied against a state which had not
violated any of its covenanted obligations. The problems
resolves Itself Into a question of (1) preventive and (2)
repressive measures which could be taken to stop aggression.
It must be clearly understood that Article 16, only becomes
A.,
V >
.
operative after a resort to war and, therefore, is a re-
pressive measure and not preventive. The only preventive steps
which the Covenant suggests are in Article XI which states
that the League should discuss and deal with any "threat of
war"
.
The difficulties for the League in applying preventive
sanctions were that (1) there was no obligation upon states
to refrain from concentrating troops on the frontiers of its
neighbors, and (2) states could claim that its military pre-
paredness was for "precautionary measures", intended only to
safeguard their own country. It is therefore^ difficult to
see how sanctions could be applied against a state, merely
on the assumption that s state might commit an illegal act in
the future.
It Is necessary to note how far the originators of Article
..
.. .
'
• «
'
...
..
!
•*
1 '
' *v • •
t>X
...
t
0 :V-.L'
.
:
'
;
: ;• "
.
.
-
•
i; : ...
:
'
c t i .
'
,
;
•••
' ' •
*
.
•
, ,
.
'
-
,
'
.
„
'
"
: i . ......
•
•
•
: ::
"
•'
.v- ;-?
*
v
.
•
• il <:$
'
>
-
<•
:
.
?
.
*. •
• •
s
'
•
156
16 intended that the Members abould go in fulfilling their
obligations. Sanctions were to be applied with increasing
severity. The mildest sanction would be severing diplomatic
relations. The effect of this measure might show in a con-
crete way the disapproval of the Member States by their
departure en masse from the aggressor*s capital.
The severance of trade relations, and especially the
cutting off of materials needed for war, would, be more
effective than breaking diplomatic relations.
Military sanctions were intended by the writers of the
Covenant to be used as a last resort in forcing a violator to
cease its illegal acts. Enforcing states would have to be
prepared to accept the risks that go with the application of
military sanctions. The existence of a threat to use force
should have been an effective weapon with which to support
less severe sanctions.
The clause in Article 16, which provided, for militia ry
sanctions was modified in 1923 when a resolution was adopted
in which the Member states agreed to:
n cooperate loyally and effectively in
support of the Covenant ... .to an extent
which is compatible with their military
situation and takes their geographical
position into account." i
1. Canadian Proposal adopted by the 4th Assembly in 1923, in
relation to Article 10. (Cited in Royal Institute of Inter-
national Affairs, International Santlon3. p. 15.
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De spite this modification, the Member stato3 were still
bound to take military action if necessary. The Covenant
stated that collective force by the members was to be employed
to bring to an end the private use of force by an individual
state*
In discussing the use of military sanctions, three
problems will be considered: (1) for what purposes military
action could be used, (2) how mllitar;/ action could be organiz-
ed within the League in the event of an aggression, and (3)
,
the difficulties involved in applying military sanctions?
Possible actions that could be taken against an aggressor
might include: (1) seizing strategic points necessary to the
aggressor ( in this dispute, the Sues Canal), (2) seizing
strategic territory in the victim's territory to prevent an
aggressor from conquering it, (3) using military force to
if
Isolate the aggressor^ land or naval forces, (4) reinforcing
embargoes and blockades Imposed, with military action*
Military action could be implemented in three ways:
(l) by a national f orce, (2) by contingents from the Member-
States, and (3) by a permanent International force. Each of
these methods have obstacles and drawbacks.
In the first case, it seldom happens that one state Is
willing or able to bear the \tfiole burden of maintaining the
rule of law. Great Britain, in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute,
demonstrated a greater willingness than any other state to
;: \ : r ' ' :
.
e
'
'
•
: ,
« - -
' :
.
•
158
take action by reinforcing their fleet in the Levantine waters
but, as Sir Samuel H0ar© said at Geneva on September 11th,
Britain would not be willing to take the risks alone — the
’'burden rausb be borne collectively*”
In the second case, the technical difficulties involved
in coordinating the activities of various national units make
this method almost impossible*
Both these methods have as their chief drawback the un-
certainty of the amount of force at the disposal of the
international authority* The Covenant, while binding the
Members to employ military force, made no provisions stating
the manner in which Article 16 was to be implemented* This
uncertainty could be eliminated by a permanent internati onal
force but the obstacles to this method are that they threaten
to limit sovereignty of each state. In the modern world
sovereignty is a cherished possession, not readily relinquish-
ed* This last method, however, does not concerm us, as the
League, while providing for military sanctions in the manner
described above did not make provisions specifically for a
permanent International force*
Althought two of the ^©mbers of the League had pre-
arranged outside the League to rule out military sanctions, it
was nevertheless Important to clarify In this discussion the
nature of military sanctions. In the following pages, con-
crete examples of the employment of economic and financial
sanctions vd.ll be described in detail.
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The Coordination of Leasures under -article XVI
Both the Council and the Assembly had overwhelmingly cast
their vote in favor of approving the Committee of Thirteen^
report that a breach of the Covenant had been committed.
The problem immediately arising out of this decision
consisted of binding ways of means of implementing and fac-
ilitating Article 16, In a resolution adopted by the Assembly
in 1921 on the Economic weapon, the basis for a technical
committee to carry out this work as created:
'7. lor the purpose of assisting it to
enforce Article 15, the Council may, if it
thinks fit, be assisted by a technical
Committee# This Committee, which will
remain in permanent session as soon as the
action decided on is taken, may include,
if desirable, representatives of the states
especially affected* "
1
This v/as necessitated by the fact that Article 16 itself
made no provision for any machinery to apply the measures which
it prescribed.
Thus, to implement the imposition of sanctions, an Assembly
Resolution created the "Coordination Committee" which in reality
was neither an. organ of the League Council nor the Assembly,
but was rather a" conference of states members meeting to con-
sult together v/ith a view to implement the provisions of Articl
16." 8
1. League Document A, 14, 1927, v
2. A. J # Toynbee, Op. Git, p. 215
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The first act of the Coordination Committeo was to ap-
point an ad hoc Committee to make more detailed proposals.
This sub-committee of the Coordination Committee was called
the Committee of Eighteen and ultimately drafted the five
proposals to implement Article 16.
The discretionary powers determining the scope of the
work of the Committee of Eighteen was conferred on it by the
following resolution of the Coordination Committee:
f.
"The Coordination Committee requests the
Committee of Eighteen to continue in
session in order to follow the execution
of the proposals already submitted to
Government 3
,
and to put such new prop-
osals as it may think advisable to make
before the Coordination Committee or the
Governments represented thereon. To this
end, the Committee of Eighteen shall appoint
such sub-conmitte©, technical or other, as it
may deem fit among its own members or from
those of the Coordination Committee." 1
With this mandate, the Committee of Eighteen began the
work of drafting proosals on October 11th, 1935.
The five proosals suggested by the Committee included
an Arms embargo, financal meas tires, prohibition of imports
of Italian goods and an embargo on certain exports to Italy,
and guarantee of mutual support to member States talcing part
in economic sanctions.
The first proposal, the arms embargo, had as its purpose
the closing off of all supplies of munitions to Italy, and
also even those contracts, which were in process of execution.
1. Official Journal, Special Supplement, Ho, 145,p.20.
..
c
•
... :
i. •
'
.
.
.
,
. ... . • L. • • •
.
.
:
•
,
! .
161
The embargo, embodied in Proposal I, was swiftly adopted and
sent to the Governments. This was perhaps carried out with
greater effectiveness than any of the other proposals.
"The Arms Embargo was suggested after 3 p.m,
on Friday, October 11th, and was on its
way to tile various Governments., soon after
six o'clock that same day . " ^
The arms embargo list v/as practically identical to the
list which President Roosevelt had draftedonly a few days
previously.
The second proposal was started on its way by a special
sub-committee consiting of experts “tostudy the essentially
IT 3
technical question of financial measures . The purpose
of the second proposal was to prevent further financial re-
sources being placed at Italy’s disposal.
The object of the third and fourth proposal, regarding the
economic boycott of Italian goods, was to deprive Italy of the
pm-
1
chasing power by limiting her export trade. It was pointed
out that this measure should be relatively effective "since
about 70,4 of Italian exports were to 1 eaten applying sanctions,
-ith regard to an embargo on exports, more difficulties
confronted the C0mmitstee due to the fact that it was necessary
1. A. E. Hlfdaley, 'hie First S^nt-ions hxporiment
,
p. 2
2. Officii Journal*. £peo£al' dup'ioiemeirb . pp. 319-20.
^fr^PEr^rrrii, for more detailed reference of
items included on tho list.)
3. Official Journal , Special Supplement, Ho. 145, p. 50-34
4. Official 7oarnaI
.
Special Supplement, Ho. 145, p. 37
-c
c
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to reach an agreement on the particular classes of products
1
to bo placed upon the list of supplies. The most important
undertaking wa3 the drafting of a list of the materials which
Italy depended upon for the carrying on of the war.
For this purpose, another Committee was pip posed by
Mr# Eden to deal with this problem.
"The Committee of Eighteen decides to
undertake an immediate study of the
application of measures concerning the
embargo on raw materials and products
essential to Italy for the continuance
of hostilities, and concerning the
cessation of Italian exports to countries
Members of the League.” *
The main task of the Economic Committee which had been
created by the above resolution, was to deal with an expert
embargo, thus distinguishing the work from the importation
proposal. T0 facilitate the application of this study,
Mr. E^en suggested that (1) each State would supply the
Secretariat with lists of products which it considered essent-
ial to prohibit (2) the Secretariat would compile a composite
list complete with relevant statistics; and (3) by a general
discussion the Committee of Eighteen would decide on the
3
contents of the ult imate proposal. The fifth proposal
drafted consisted of an agreement whereby the Members of the
League would mutually support one another in the measures
1. Official Journal, Special Supplement. No. 145. d. 38
2. Ibid# , p. 56-59
3. Itold#
. pp. 20-21
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proposed in order to minimize the loss and inconvenience
resulting from the above measures.*' " ^eans of executing
the provisions of mutual support in financial and economic
measures to be taken under Article 15, were not so simple as
they at first appeared. It was extremely difficult to calculate
in Dollars and Cents how much loss or inconvenience each
member suffered as a result of a restriction of its trade with
Italy. The aim to equalize the inconveniences suffered by
the participating States was not realized by any explicit
agreement with regard to giving one State any special aid.
The only agreement reached consisted of assuring to States who
suffered particularly serious losses owing to the " suspension
by Italy of the payment of debts,
11 the mutual support provided for by paragraph
3 of Article 15 would be special given in
order to make good sugh losses by all ap-
propriate measures.
2
Before this proposal could be effected, however, some
means of measuring losses had to be found. Various plans
were suggested of a technical nature to mitigate the effects
3
of the other four proposals.
It Is not possible in an investigation of tills length, to
review in detail, the intricate, technical problems confront-
ing the sub- cotrsnittees working on the application of these
!• Official Journal. Special Supplement, fto. 145, pp. 15-16
2. , NoT'H'6, p. 34
3. ^or a more detailed report of these plans, of. Official
Journal. Special Supplement, No. 145, pp. 125-130.

proposals. It will be sufficient to e:xplain the essence of
the measure proposed, and the manner in which they were applied,
extended, and supervised.
In passing, it is worthwhile, to note that the proposals
above mentioned, were drafted and presented to each Member
State In ten days
,
after It began its work. This fact, in It-
self cannot be minimized, and due credit should he given to
those who worked out the problems in this untrammeled field.
Sanctions, it will be remembered, had never been applied before
in any dispute. These serving on these committees had no
precedents to guide them; no lessons of history to show them
pitfalls, errors, and to guide them as a rule of thumb. The
members of these committees had accomplished the task of
setting up the whole machinery to deal with sanctions — in a
few hours 1 notice, and working under the high pressure of
knowing that each hour lost meant that much less prestige for
the League in attempting to stop a law-breaker , The realiza-
tion that if the League was allowed to collapse, which meant the
whole system of collective security ?/ould go vwith it, was an
excellent stimulus to the several committees and sub-committees
to finish their v/ork in drafting their proposals without delay
After the Prop03als had been adopted by the Coordination
Committee, all that remained wa3 the notifications of the
particular Governments regarding the measures which they had
164
taken, as individual States, to implement these Proposals
These replies were counted and summarized In a draft
s'
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resolution of the Coordination Committee.
"Taking note of the facts:
(1) That forty-three Governments of States Members
of the League have already expressed their willing-
ness to accept Proposal III and forty-four Proposal
IV adopted by the Committee on October 10th, and
that six others, which, owing to their distance
from the scat eh* the League, did not immediately
receive tho full text of these proposals have
expressed their readiness to consider them favorably;
(2) That nealy all these Governments have declared
themselves ready to put the proposed measures into
force by the middle of November or b£ such date
as may -be fixed by the Coordination Committee;
Decides to fix November 18th as the date for the
entry into force of all these measures;
Invites all Governments of the Members of the
League to take the necessary 3teps so that these
measures nay be effectively applied throughout
their territories by November 18th;
Requests each Government to inform the Committee
through the 3ecrctary-C mral of the League, withill
the shortest possible tin, of the measures which it.
has taken in conformity with the above provisions.
This Resolution, which delayed the application of Article
16, for sixteen more days, can be laid to the fact that the
British and French ministers, MM. Laval and Eoare, desired
to delay as long as possible the actual enforcement of this
2
Article,
1, Official J ourr.il , Special Supplement, No* 145, p. 110
(^or "ESirtner Reference to the Replies of the Government)
2. A. J, Toynbee, Op . Cjt. p. 232,
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Sanctions and the Laval-Iioare Peace Plana
Thus, while the Coordination Committee was laboring
over satisfactory methods of frustrating Italian aggression,
the policy of the powers continued in the line they had pre-
viously tended, viz. a settlement of the dispute by concil-
iation. It Is obvious to anyone who ventures to analyze
these two policies which were being carried out simultaneous^
ly, that they were Incompatible. These two divergent policies
resulted in the failure of both, and the success of neither
a strong coordinated effort to stop Italy, nor Italy*
s
acceptance of the later Laval-Hoare Peace Plan Proposals,was
achieved.
It became increasingly evident, by the way Italy was
frantically securing all the oil from many countries, and
especially the United States, that it was thi3 commodity v/liich
was the key to the successful prosecution of her Abyssinian
campaign*
For an example of Italy*s buying of this key-product in
the UnIted States, the papers during the month of November
carried reports almost every day of Italian commerce in oil.
On November 1st, on the front page of the Hew York Times,
a communique transmitted by the Treasury Department to the
State Department M showed considerable increases in American
« 1
exports of cotton and oil to Italy this month.
1. New York Times
.
November 1, 1935.
'.
.
'
.
£
e
On November 5th, an editorial by Clarence Streit appeared
in the sane newspaper, in which he stated that it had been
reported to him from ’'well- informed circles in Italy 11 that
Italy, by various economies could scrape through^ if assured
her normal supply of oil from the United States, The
British, of course, were troubled by American oil policy, as
it v/as still an unknown factor at Geneva, The United States,
on the other hand, was perhaps waiting for some decisive
action at Geneva, before following suit in complying with an
oil embargo. In a hews item on November 8th, the British
position was clarified:
"It is pointed out that oil is vital to Italy-
far more important than the cotton and other
goods she is buying in the United States—and
that the closing of the American oil market to
her would be a great and possibly decisive
aid for the League of Nations effort to Q
shorten the war by economic pressure. :
The fact remained, that while each power was waiting for
someone else to act, and Geneva was still pondering through
proposals in sub-committees, technical committees, etc., Italy
was using every moment to her advantage to drain United States
oil wells to meet her needs. On November 6th,
"Pour full loads of various gradesof oil left
by tanker for specific Italian ports during
the two month period mentioned as ag&inst
less than one tanker for the same ps riod
of 1934 , These shipments totaled 334,437
barrels in 1935 for the first nine months.
1. New York Times, November 5, 1935
2, Ihi’d
,
7 " November 8, 1935
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"as compared v/ith 65, 478 in 1934. As
Against no crude oil bought during this
period in 1934, 150.364 barrels wore
bought in 1935*" 1
Italy, throughout the .fall of 1935, not only continued
being supplied with oil by the United States, but she was
also supplied by the Anglo-Persian Company and from Russia
2
and Rumania l
In a debate in the Committee of Eighteen on October 19,
the realization that if the Italian Government were to be
stopped, oil must be added on the embargo list* While dis-
cussing Proposal No. 4, "Embargo on Exports, Senor de
Madoraiga opened the debate by stating that it was illogical
to include such items as iron ore and scrap iron on the
3
embargo list, while the finished products were not.
Mr. Riddell, the Canadian delegate, then came to the support
of Senor de Madariaga, the Spanish delegate, by saying that
any plan of economic sanctions, if they were to accomplish
4
their purpose must be comprehensive*
Mr. Riddell then took the opportunity to put forward a
concrete proposal with regard to extending the embargo on
exports to petroleum and its derivatives as well as iron and
stoel. It ran as follows:
"It is expedient to adopt the principle of
the extension of the measures of embargo
provided for in the said Proposal to the
following products? Petroleum and its f.
derivatives, C0al, Iron, cast iron and steel*" °
II
1. Ibid* * November 6, 1935*
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Parenthetically, it is interesting to note, that after
Kr* Hiddell had made this proposal, the Canadian Government
1
would not stand behind him and support him. At the
Minute 3 of the S0oond .'Session of the Committee of Eighteen
on the seventh meeting, Ur, Hiddell* 3 proposal, which had be en
sent to an Economic sub-committee for re-drafting, was pre-
sented a3 Proposal 4 (a)
,
in the following form:
"In the execution of the mission entrusted to
it under the last paragraph of Proposal No. 4,
the Committee submits to Governments the follow-
ing proposal:
It is expedient that the measures of embargo
provided for in Proposal No. 4 should be ex-
tended to the following articles as soon as the
conditions necessary to render this extension
effective have been realised:
Petroleum and its derivations, by-products,
and residues;
Pig iron; iron and steel (including alloy
steels)
,
cast, forged, rolled, drawn,
stamped or pressed
Coal (including anthracite ami lignite,)
coke and their agglomerates, as well as
fules derived therefrom.
If the replied received by the Committee to the
present proposal and the information at its
disposal warrnt it, the Committee of Eighteen
will propose to Governments a date for bringing
into force the measures mentioned db ove. c
On the 7th of November, this proposal was coimunicated to
Governments of the League through the Secretary-General#
1* A, J. I’oynbee, Op. Cit
.
.
ff. 1# p# 274
“On the first of December the Canadian Premier declared that
ir*
. Riddell’s proposal merely represented his personal opinion
and that uhe Cauadian Government had not taken the initiative
in any such action#” A few days later he was appointed a
delegate to the Pan American conference.
2, Official Journal
.
Special Supplement, 146, p. 46#
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i
But this vital proposal was conveniently shelved until December
1
12th
,
when the Committee of Eighteen convened in its third
session. One may well ask what was happening to this proposal
between November 7th and December 12th. When time was at a
premium, it could not help but appear wasteful to allow a whole
month to elapse before acting on such a vital measure.
It was during this period that M. Laval gave his most
effedtive help to Signor Mussolini. For by the French Premier’s
actions. Proposal No* 4 (a) was not only denied the support from
the two big powers but it was actually hindered by the maneou-
vers and acts of political sabotage by M. Laval.
This help consisted primarily of postponing, if only for a
few days at a time, the consideration of this Proposal. On the
19th of November, M. Laval had succeeded in reaching an agreemen
with Senor de Vasconcellos, chairman of the Committee of
Eighteen to postpone the meeting until a later date. The date
agreed upon was the 29th of the same month. On November 29th,
M. Laval, again succeeded in hindering the Geneva machinery
by securing a few more days for 11 Duce. M. Laval’s plan of
procrastination in order to obstruct the Committee of Eighteen*
s
work, was successful, for it was not until December 12th that
t
1. By December 12th, ten States had sent replies stating their
willingness to place an embargo on the above items. They were
as follows: Argentina, India, Czechoslovakia, Iraq, Finland,
Netherlands, New Zealand, Rumania, siam, and the U*S. S.R.
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the Committee reconvened for its third session.
This breathing period between November 29th and December
12th, which M. Laval had secured for Italy, also gave Britain
and France time to converse and draft their "peace 11 proposals.
In this manner of subterfuge, Laval was to use this golden
opportunity to change the whole course of events from the
application of sanctions to another, final attempt at con-
ciliation— or appeasement. M. Laval realized he must work
quickly if he wished to secure a 'settlement by diplomatic
negotiation, * before impending sanctions were applied. On
November 50th, Laval met with the Italian Ambassador, Signor
Cerruti, in Paris; and at the time it was speculated that the
actual genesis of the Peace Plan was incubated. Laval un-
doubtedly attempted to sound out the Italian spokesman as to
just what the minimum demands that were acceptable to Italy
were.
Armed with this 'information
* ,
M, Laval invited Sir
8amuel Hoare, chi his way to Geneva, to stop at Paris and dis-
cuss the problems confronting the two pov/ers and the League.
The opinion has been voiced that, on Inis occasion, Laval
'bombarded K0are into unconditional surrender," when he
conveyed the message to Sir Samuel of the conversation
1. Messages despatched from Geneva on November 20th, 1935 to
L© Tempa. Manchester Guardian. November 26. 1935 ( cited in
XT 7. Voynboe. Op. CiT.' $7 3V&.
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between Cerruti and himself to the effect that, if on December
12th an embargo on oil was recommended and approved, Mussolini
would retort with an attack on the British fleet in the
Mediterranean. Also going back on his word previously, Laval
seems to have backed down from his agreements of mutual
assistance in October, by now 3aying that the French ports
1
could not aid British warships because of their size.
A nefarious bribe was then prepared by the British and French
technical experts in order to sell Italy the idea of stopping
the war, and thereby, diminishing any chances of an attack on
the British fleet. The plan itself was more generous than
any previous Anglo-French proposals. It cut three big slices
off the extremities of the Ethiopian empire and gave then: to
2
Italy outright. It also contained a clause In which
Italy was allowed to have exclusive economic rights, known in
International law as a "sphere of influence", ( in this dip-
lomatic deal it was titled "Zone of Economic Expansion and
Settlement. ") These proposals were submitted to the Italian
Government and the Ethiopian government, on the 11th and 12th
of December respectively, (only a matter of hours before the
Committee of Eighteen was to meet to decide on an oil embargo,
had its effect on this group.) The Laval-Hoare peace plan had
its intended effect upon this Committee, viz:
1. London Times, December 9* 1935 (cited in A, J. Toynbeo,)
Op. C.it
»
p. 292)
2. Cr. Map of the Laval-Hoare Peace Proposals, on the
following page.
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"It was as if the elaborately erected
scenery of Genova had suddenly collapsed,
revealing the two League Powers sitting
at a table with Italy and calmly arranging
the partitioning of Abyssinia. ,f 1
1. G. hart©Hi, Op. Pit, p. 215.
..
PART IV
FAILURE OF THE LEAGUE TO FORCE
ITALY TO STOP MILITARY
AGGRESSION AGAINST ABYSSINIA
(••
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CHAPTER XII
ULTIMATE BREAKDOWN OF ECONOMIC
SANCTIONS
',
rV
JL74
In the quest for Ethiopian peace, British and french
sponsors justified the Laval-Koare peace proposals on the
ground that a "negotiated" peace would prove less disastrous
for the world than the complete collapse of one or the other
belligerent. The London Times on December 17th, expressed aptly
the reaction of the world to these proposals:
"These proposals are the negation and the
abandonment of the principles upon which
the League of Nations i£ founded, .A settle-
ment on the lines of these proposals would
place a premium upon aggression and upon
the violation of international engagers nts,
"
Both the French and British knew full well and agreed that the
real foe European peace was not Italy, but Germany, It was for
this reason that they were willing to seek a "negotiated" peace
of this sort. Their dilemma was that overy concession made by
ov/ers to : end the dispute and thereby draw Italy back
into tha European concert, merely convinced the Nazis and
Fascists that aggression v/ould bring substantial rewards.
The failure of these proposals to be accepted by either
party left the League states no alternative but to continue
with the application of sanctions. The Resolution which had
been adopted by the Committee of Eighteen on December 13, showed
that fifty-two governments had accepted Proposal I, and fifty
of them had entered them into force. Fifty- two Governments had
also accepted Proposal II arid forty- seven had entered them
into force. On Proposal III, fifty governments had accepted
them, and forty-three had begun its application. On Proposal
. .
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IV, fifty- one governments harl accepted it and forty-five
governments had entered then into force. Forty- six govern-
ments had accepted Proposal VI.
This clearly showed that the great majority of the hember
states of the League showed a willingness to act upon the
economic sanctions proposed by the coordination Committee.
There were only fair states who stated they did not wi3h to
take any action. They v/ere: Albania, Austria, Hungary, and
?araguay f Another state, Switzerland declared ito neutrality.
Proposal IV (a) had not yet been acted upon when the
Laval-Hoar e proposals were confronted to the disputants. It
was, therefore, evident by the presentation of these peace
proposals^ that in December 1935 France and Britain were not
prepared to adopt the alternative of more drastic sanctions
like an oil embargo. As each month passed, the application of
an oil embargo on Italy would have less effect.* Italy, it
will be remembered had been frantically buying surpluses in the
period between August and November. And after sanctions came
into force in November, Italy campaigned to save and conserve
all t|?e country* s resources* The government encouraged the
substitution of synthetic alcohol for gasoline, for example.
In this way, even if an oil embargo had been applied by the
first of the year in 1936, it is doubtful how greatly It would
have hindered Italy’s ability to carrj out its military program.
In the fourth session of the committee of Eighteen, which
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was held on January 22, 1936, the Committee, rather than acting
upon Proposal IV A, made the
''appointment of a committee of experts
to conduct a technical examination of
the conditions governing the trade in
and transport of petroleum and its de-
rivatives, by-produets and residues, with
a view to submitting an early report to
the Committee of Eighteen on the effective-
ness of the extension of measures of embargo
to the above-mentioned commodities," ^
The Expert* s report on oil was not made ready until
2
February 12. Thfcs report dealt with questions of imports,
consumption, stocks and sources of supply.
The Committee summarized its findings under the following
seven heads:
"(1) The figures given above with reference to consumption,
to stocks, and to supplies which might be en route at the
moment of the imposition of an embargo on the export of
petroleum and petroleum products make it possible to
estimate roughly the period which would have to elppse
before such an embargo, were it to be universally-
applied, would become fully effective. In the con-
ditions prevailing at the moment of its session, the
committee is of opinion that this period may be taken
to be about three and half months.
(2)
In the event of such an embargo being applied by
all states members of the Coordination Committee, it
would be effective if the United States of America was
to limit its exports to Italy to the normal level of
its exports prior to 1935.
(3)
If such an embargo were applied by the states
members of the coordination committee alone, the
only effect which it could have on Italy waul# be
to render tKe purchase of' petroleum more ' 81
cuif and expensive.
(4)
In view of the possibility of substitutes being
1. Official Jrairnal, Special Supplement, No* 148, p, 7
Knyt of _ ommi ttee of EarnsLrth _ fftr _ the.. Technic-%a&elSf S&C
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''used to some extent for petrol, an embargo on the
export of petroleum and petroleum products v/ould
be strengthened were it extended to cover in-
dustrial alcohol and benzol.
(5) The effectiveness of an embargo imposed by
states members of the Coordination Committee on
the transport of oil to Italy is subject to the
same limitations as an embargo on exports. Were
these states alone to prohibit the use of tankers
for the transport of oil' to 1 tal;, , i t would be able
own resources, and the rest by meanLs"
r
of
r
~
vVe s e Is”"
of other states
,
but with greater ctifficulty and
For such a sanction to b© effective, the Committee reported,
that the tilted States, by necessity, would have to restrict its
export of oil to Italy to the ‘normal* level.
"for an embargo on transport of Oil to Italy to
be effective, measures of control would, therefore,
require to be taken by countries not member's of
the League of Nations.” 1
This report showed clearly that the imposition of an
oil embargo could not have any direct effect before "three
to three and half months Slapsed, which would mean May if it
had been voted upon. And it was in May that the Abyssinian
resistance collapsed and the Italian victory was realized. It
is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the oil embargo if
voted on in February »/culd have had no deterrent effect to the
Italian war machine.
The findings of the report indicated, however, that the
1. 11 it seems clear that with the application of an embargo,
with restrictions from the N.S. supply of export to ’normal
*
peace time supply, Italy would have been left with only 13 to
15 weeks’ supply of oil.” Noyal Institute of International
Affairs, International Sanctions, p. 70.
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oil sanction could have effectively .frustrated Italy f 8 attempt
to conquer Abyssinia if it had been Imposed before the end
170
of November 1955, that is, five months before the Italians
actually succeeded in bringing the war to an end without this
handicap.
Italian hostility was aroused by the consideration of
the oil embargo to such an extent that uss odini in a speech
before the Chamber of Deputies on December 6th, stated that
Italy would regard the oil embargo a3 a military sanction or
an act involving war against her.
On the other hand, he assured the League that the oil
embargo would not worry Italy In the lea3t
,
nor deter her
from its course. It is undeniable that an embargo on oil,
imposed at the proper time, might have successfully frustrated
Italian war aims, and unqu.estionably would have put a great
i
strain on her economic system in general.
On. the first of February Mussolini made it clear to the
world, and especially to Geneva that
"Surope Is sliding down the ever more steeply
inclined plane of sanctions, at the bottom
of v/hieh lies, ineluctably, war. At a certain
moment, the embargo will end in a blocade; and
the blockade will mean war—no longer a limited
operation of colonial security, but a war of
extermination in Europe: war on the Alps and
on ’The vorfoil s i&opesn rivers. . . •
It will be the students of Paris, Brussels
and the other great European cities who, to-
gether with the country people, will have to march
into the burning fiery furnace.” 1
1. A. .T, Toynbee, On. Pit
.
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Mussolini *s terrifyinh words that he would eec to It that
African conflagration would spread to Europe
,
frightened the
new French Foreign Minister,’*’ M. Flandin rufficiently so that
he further asked Ur • Eden to agree to postpone the oil sanction
when they met on March 2nd at Geneva.
M. Flandin suggested that he and dr. dden make a nother attempt
179
to mediate between the two belligerents, and
MMr. Eden appears to have asked and obtained
over the telephone Mr. Baldwin*s consent to
his falling in with M. Flandin^ wishes.
2
fhus, in achieving again the success of not having the
oil sanction imposed, M. Flandin ! s victory, although not as
timely, was equally as efficient a3 M. Laval l s in December.
Between March 2nd and March the 12th, when this dis-
cussion of the oil sanction was taking place and a decision
had not yet been made. Hitler took this opportune period, on
March the 7th to re-railitarize Rhlnelands.
At this point, the African question, however serious,
was necessarily put into the background. Germany^ gesture
had shaken the foundations of European peace and obviously
the consequences were much more serious to the cause of peace
than the African adventure. Mussolini »s forecast that the
dispute would :,no longer be a limited operation, of colonial
security, but a war of extermination 1 ' was to come true.
1 . Loc . C i t •
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It was even more difficult for the Br:lt5.sh and French to
antagonize Italy at this time. The oil sanction could hardly
be thought of seriously for foar of losing Italy an an ally.
On the 15th of April, when It; appeared evident that
Italian forces would overcome, the Abyssinlans, Barcti Aloloi
reappeared at Geneva with proposals for negotiations of an
armistice. The Italian proposals were co: ; unicated to the
Ethiopian delegation and were rejected by it.
There wa3 little more action that the League could take,
when Mussolini's fait accoa^ii was announced on May 9th in
a decree annexing Abys^. nia wo Italy and investing the King
of Italy with the title of Emperor:
Ml©re is the law, 0 Italians, which closes
one peried of our history and opens up
another like a vast pass opining on all the
possibilities of the future:'
(1) Tv.e territories and the peoples that
belonged to the Empire of Abyssinia are placed
under the full and entire sovereignty of the
Kingdom of Italy. " *
The first sanctions experiment had failed
1
On July 6th, the League gave the sanctions a burial with the
following words
"The Assembly,
Recommends that the Coordination Co.vn.ittoe should
make all necessary proposals to the Governments
in order to bring an end the measures taken
by them in execution of Article 16." 2
1.
( Cited In A. J, Toynbee, Op. Lit., p. 359
2. Oil icial J ournal » Special Supplement, Ko. 49, p. 56.
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In the posthumous discussions which ensued on sanctions, the
Chairman reviewed the work done*
"The Coordination Committee was set up by a
recommendation approved by the Assembly on
October 10, 1935, and began work on October 11,
1935. It was In effect a conference of delegates
of sovereign states which met to study the
coordination of the measures to be token in
reference to a state regarded by the other members
of the Council as having violated its obligations
under the Covenant.
"From the outset, political (diplomatic) and
military sanctions were elTminated.
"In view of the fact that the hearoie of nations
was not universal* it was obvious from the first
that the "system of sanctions to be applied under
Article iG cou'id^not"be complete.
Apart from military sanctions, the proposals
worked out by the Coordinati
o
n Commit lee dxa not
purp ort to be a complete ' system of sanctions
.
The economic and financial measures proposed in
the Covenant were not applied in their entirety." 1
In a word about the real Its that sanctions actually achieved,
it was stated that
"Imports from Italy to countries for which figures were
available to the end of April. .. showed a reduction of
nearly 50$.
Another indication of the aggregate affect of Proposals
II and III was to be found in the figures showing
Italy* s loss of Gold, viz., a total loss in six months
and ten days of 2m091 million lire or half the
original reserve," 2
In view of these facts, a general evaluation of the first
sanctions experiment may now be made.
1. Official Jpurnal
,
Special Supplement, No. 49,p,56-57
2. T^c. ~CIt.
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In the first place, the application of sanctions did not
prevent Italy from conquering Ethiopia, As the Coordination
Committee chairman stated, Article XVI was never fully applied#
Despite the fact that the work of the Coordination Committee
showed a definite desire to expedite the application of
measures, it was inevitable that time was required to get
sanctions into motion. Actually, it took from October 11th
to November 13th* Airing tills period a lot of goods in
transit were allowed to go through# which modified the effect
of sanctions, The British had made it clear that sanctions
would not be pressed to their whole length. This fact,
coupled with the inadequate measures that were only partially
applied, caused the downfall of sanctions.
The measures that were applied were only partially ful-
filled There was never a question of cutting Italy off from
al}. comnunication and intercourse with the rest of the world.
Tourists from League states continuedto visit Italy. Dip-
lomatic representatives never loft Rome. Nationals of League
States were free to travel on Italian vessels, Italy was not
Isolated by any measures of thi3 sort whatsoever.
The embargo on exports were also inadequat e. The ex-
port of aluminum to Italy was prohibited although aluminum
was one of the metals which Italy was able to provide herself
from domestic sources.
The boycott on Italian imports were also imperfect
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Argentina Imported, more during the sanctions period than during
1
the corresponding previous year.
The fact that sanctions v;ere not universally applied also
caused sanctions to beless effective. The United States,
Germany, Brasil and Japan were not in the League • Austria,
Hungary, Albania disocciated themselves from sanctions and
Switzerland did not apply Proposal III.
In regard to mutual support, an attempt to provide
guarantees to states suffering losses were exceedingly meagre.
The fact that so little was done to give effect to paragraph
3 of Article 15 might have proven to bo of importance had
the question arisen again.
The League applied less stringent sanctions than were
needed; and it fell far short of the universal League en-
visaged by the sponsors of Article XVI. The failure of the
League of Nations to stop Italy’s aggression against Abyssinia
may be ascribed to the preceding reasons and facts on the
results of the application of sanctions.
1. Official Journal, Special Supplement, No. 145, p. 108
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CONCLUSIONS
The result of this study has proven that the members of
the League failed to meet the te3t of either (1) preventing
a "crl s
”
before It was committed, or (2) thwarting an
aggressor’s alms after hostilities had broken out.
Britain and France were the most powerful and influent-
ial members of the League and it was to them that the other
nations looked for leadership in this dispute. Britain and
PYfi-nce failed to give the needed leadersidp. If they could
have seen the disastrous results of their policy, why was it
pursued? T^e motives behind their actions were plausible in
the light of international developments at that tine. France
was faced with the menace of Germany with no great hope of
British help east of the Bhine* France’s population was
swiftly stabilized itself at forty million people, while
Germany’s was increasing upward to eighty million. Thi3 in
itself was a very real threat. French spokesmen, therefore,
felt that circumstances forced them to agree to the Abyssin-
ian adventure for their own security in Europe. It was for
this reason that France applied a continual brake to either
peeyantive or coercive action against Italy. Britain, on
the other hand, was criticized for falling in with France’s
role, and not giving active support with British warships
to stop Italy, It is understandable that any unilateral
action which Britain might have taken in the Mediterranean
would have exposed her to grave risks of being involved in a
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war, which in turn might have exposed her to other nations
who wished to "fish in trouble: waters," More important to
Bpitfcin than having her action endorsed by fifty nations who
could do little in a Material sense, Britain wanted French
accord and aid in the Mediterranean. Because Prance was
unwilling to give the aid asked for, $he British Foreign
Office must have cone to the conclusion that the League wa 3 a
feeble reed upon which to lean. Britain naturally counted
on Italy to carry through with its threats that if oil
sanctions were applied, reprisals would definitely havo been
made
.
In criticising the British, it is necessary to ask the
question, was Britain to be the only guardian of the Covenant?
The other members of the League should have offered airplanes
as a cover for the British fleet- in the Mediterranean* here
Russia, Turkey, Rumania, Greece, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia,
Poland, etc. fulfilling their duty too? Where was the oil,
the raen, and the airplanes, needed to supplement the British
fleet? The British felt that they were the one Member state
that had moved a man by the middle of November. Sir Samuel
Koare expressed the British position in Geneva on September
11th, that if the burden is to be borne, it nm.3t be borne
collect ivel:,-
.
Nevertheless, it was unfair of the British and French
spokesmen to profess continually loyalty to the Covenant
without intending to give active support to it.
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If they wore unwilling to take the risks involved in a
strong League policy, this should have been brought out clear-
ly at Geneva and before the world. It was this ''bluffing''
and insincerity which they engaged in, which comprised the
essence of their dilemma. Throughout the dispute, they wanted
to keep Italy as a potential ally in the European concert.
If they bad wished to follow this policy through systematically,
it was folly to antagonized Italy by any sanctions at all.
If however, they wished to deal wjth Italy as an aggressor,
as a Law-breaker, they should have carried sanctions to their
logical conclusion and frustrated Italy*s aggression. By
attempting to follow both policies, that Is, both appease-
ment and punishment, they were successful in neither.
It was Britain and France who calculated the motives
of Mussolini from the beginning incorrectly. Bribe after
bribe was offered Mussolini, and none seemed to even what
his appetite. In retrospect, it is evident that the
Abyssinian adventure was based less on a need for an empire,
and more on a need for Mussolini to bolster up his regime
with a military display. Time and again Abyssinia was
offered Mussolini on a silver platter and he refused. 'The
victory of a conquest by military force was more valuable
to Mussolini at that time, than anjr diplomatic victory over
the bargaining table.
The British and French, in the author f s opinion and the
future peace of the world on maintaining the European balance
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of power, rather than demonstrating to the would-be conquerors
that, through the League, they would challenge, with force
if necessary, any contemplated aggression.
The French fell into the false hope that the war in
Abyssinia would be of little consequence to the peace in
Europe. Unfortunately, this war in East Africa could not
be isolated; it was a well-staged dress rehearsal for the
benefit of the dictators, and it demonstrated all the glaring
weaknesses of the two greatest powers in the League.
If preventive measures had been taken. It would have
been a simple matter to arrest Mussolini. General de Bono
himself, stated that if the use of the Suez Canal had been
denied Italian troops, the feeding of Italian soldiers would
have become "more than problematical, '* and the Abyssinian
adventure would have had to be abandoned. If the British
Government saw fit to close the canal during the First world
war, certainly, legal arguments and other impediments could
have been overcome. In considering what measures could have
been taken for “an ounce of prevention," during the early
stages of the dispute, the Italian military preparedness
should have been investigated in the early stages. The
Italians made no secret of it. The newspapers fro, February
1935 on carried articles almost daily abort Italian mobili-
zation and troop movements. The prerequisite to preventive
action is the principle that the international community^ if
it would apply force or coercion for the maintenance as well
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as restoration of order, must reach sane conclusion as to
guilt before using either economic or military pressure.
Provisions in the Covenant for the responsibilities In
maintenance of £>cace and security and on the other hand the
restoration of peace were tv/o very distant set of obligations,
Aithought recognition of the need for preventive action was
not overlooked, the Covenant did not lay any specific obli-
gations on individual Members to join in preventing
aggression, although each state under Article 16 was bound
to join in sanctions when aggression had actually began. An
attempt to rectify this omission was made in 1927 when the
Council and Assembly drew up a program of steps for pre-
ventive action, viz*, severance of diplomatic and economic
relations, blockades, etc. The duty of the Member States in
cases of a threat to the peace were otherwise couched in
general terms, based on the obligations laid down in Article
IX, paragraph 1, (League was to) "take any action that may be
deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. 1
It is generally agreed that one purpose of sanctions is pre-
ventive. Yet under the Covenant the duty to apply sanctions
arose, only, in the case of a resort to war by a Member of
the League, in disregard of its obligations under the
Covenant. The experience of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute had
directed attention to the possibility and necessity of creating$)
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responsibilities of taking action intended to prevent the
commission of an illegal act.
p \ The three most vital preventive measures which should
have been taken v/eres (1) investigating and determining the
intent of Italian military preparations, (2) the worId-wide
eve -of-the-war traffic In the means of war should have been
halted by collective means and (3) as a last and ultimate
measure of precaution, the Suez Canal should have been closed
to Italian troops.
Let us now turn to a critical evaluation of the re-
pressive measures which were taken after a resort to war in
breach of the Covenant had taken place.
The terms of Article 16 of the Covenant actually required
and pledged the Members of the League to use military action,
if necesa.duy, for the effective fulfillment of this article.
It will be remembered that in the conversations of
September 10th and 11th between M. Laval and Sir Samuel Hoare,
military sanctions were definitely ruled out. At that tine,
secretly, they stated their intentions not to resort to any
measures of military force.
That is why Albert E. Highley, in evaluating the success of
measures taken under .Article 16, comes to the conclusion that
"The obstacles which caused the most trouble
and which in the end destroyed the sytem -
were political in nature
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On the whole, the machinery set up to coordinate sanctions
functioned efficiently, ’Political considerations 1 ' forced
much of the delay which occured between meetings of the
committees, and finally caused the abandonment of the oil
sanction. Because of the political decision to introduce the
iniquitous Laval-il<>are peace proposals only a few days before
the Coordination C0mrcittee was to meet to vote upon Proposal
No, IV A# (placing an embargo an oil to Italy) all chances for
the success of the sanctions proposals were ruined. The most
apparent defect in the application of Article 16 was that the
sanctions were subordinated to conciliation in such a way
that all efforts to increase pressure were thwarted.
The real key to a successful application of Article 16 wohld
have been: (1) vigorous and loyal leadership by Briti&n and
Prance in a determined effort to make It succeed, (2) a known
willingness on the part of these two powers, to supplement,
if necessary
)
economic sanctions by military sanctions.
The thesis has attempted to show the reasons, political and
structural, why the League failed to suppress an aggressor,
who resorted to war in violation of the Covenant, An outline
of the preventive measures and the repressive measured which
ought to have been taken, were given in each case.
Ho intelligent person can fail to see that the survival
of civilization depends upon the ability of nations to erect laws
and enforce them on a world-wide basis.
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APPENDIX I
COVENANT CF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (RELEVANT ARTICLES)
Article X,—The Members of the League undertake to respect and
preserve as against external aggression the territorial integ-
rity and existing political independence of all Members of the
League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat
or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the
means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
Article XI.— 1. Any war or threat of war, whether immediately
affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby
declared a matter of ccncem to the whole League, and the League
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual
to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such emergency
should arise the Secretary-General shall on the request of any
Member of the League forthwith summon a meeting of the Council,
2. It 3s also declared to be the friendly right of
each Member of the League to bring to the attention of the
Assembly or of the Council any circumstance whatever affecting
international relations which threatens to disturb international
peace or the good understanding between nations upon which peace
depends.
Article XII.— 1. The Members of the League agree that, if ther
should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rup-
ture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or jud-
icial settlement or to inquiry by the Council and they agree on
no case to resort to war until three months after the award of
the arbitrators or the judicial decision, or the report by the
Council.
2. In any case under this Article, the award of
the aibltrators or the judicial settlement shall be made within
a reasonable time, and the report of the Council shall be made
within six months after the submission of the dispute.
Article XIII.— 1. The Members of the League agree that, when-
ever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognize
to be suitable for submis^L on to arbitration or judicial settle-
ment, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy,
they will submit the whole subjectmatter to arbitration or
judicial settlement......
y 4. The Members of the League agree that they will
carry out in full good faith any award or decision that may be
rendered, and that they will not resort to war against any
M ember of the League that complies therewith, in the event
of any failure to carry out such an award or decision, the
Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect
thereto.

Article XV,-- 1, If there should arise between Members of the
League any dispute likely to lead to a rupture, which is not
submitted to arbitration or judicial settlement In accordance
with Article XIII, the Members of the League agree that they
will submit the matter to the Council. Any party to the dispute
may effect such submission by giving notice of the exist®nco of
the dispute to the Secretary- General, who v/ill make all necessary
arrangements for a full investigation and consideration thereof,
2, For this purpose the parties to the dispute v/Ul
communicate to the Secretary-General, as promptly as possible,
statements of their case, with all the relevant facts and papers,
and the Council may forthwith direct the publication thereof,
3* The Council shall endeavour to effect a settl
ment of the dispute, and if such efforts are successful, a state-
ment shall be made public giving such facts and explanations re-
garding the dispute and the terras of settlement thereof as the
Council may deem appropriate,
4, If the dispute is not thus settled, the
Council either unanimously or by a majority vote shall make and
publish a report containing a statement of the facts of the
disoute and. the recommendations which are deemed just and
prcx er in regard thereto,
5, Any Member of the League represented on the Council
may make public a statement of the facts of the dispute and of
its concisions regarding the 3ame,
6, If a report by the Council Is unanimously
agreed bo by the members thereof other than the Representatives
of one or more of the parties to the dispute, the Members of thd
League agree that the;/ will not go to war with any party to the
dispute Thich complies with the recommendations of the report.
7, If the Council fails to reach a report which
is unanimously agredd to hy the members thereof, other than the
Representatives of one or more of the parties to the dispute,
the Members of the League reserve to themselves the right to take
such action as they shall consider necessary for the maintenance
of right and justice.
8, If‘ the dispute between the parties Is claimed by
one of them, and is found by the Council to arise out of a matter
which by International law is solely within the domestic juris-
diction of that party, the Council shall so report, and shall
make no recommendation as to its settlement.
9, The Council may in any case under this Article
refer the dispute to the Assembly. The di spute shall be so
referred at the request of either party to the dispute, provided

that such request he made v/ithin fourteen days after the sub-
mission of the dispute to the Council,
10, In any case referred to the Assembly, all the pro-
visions of this Article and of Article XII relating to the
action and powers of the Council shall apply to the action and
powers of the Assembly, provided that a report made by the Assem-
bly, if concurred in by the Representatives of those Members of
the League represented on the Council and of a majority of the
other Members of the League, exclusive in each case of the
Representatives of the parties to tho dispute, shall have the
same force as a report by the Council concurred in by all the
members thereof other than the Representatives of one or more
of the parties to the dispute.
Article XVI,-- 1, Should any Member of the league resort to
war in disregard of its covenants under Articles XII, XIII,
or XV, it shaL l ipso facto be deemed to have co. imitted an act
of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby
undertake immedL ately to subject it to the severance of all
trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all inter-
course between their nationals and the nationals of the
Covenant-breaking state, and the prevention of all financial,
commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of
the Covenant-breaking state and the nationals of ay other state,
whether a Member of the League or not.
2 • It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to
recommend to the several Government s concerned what effective
military, naval, or air force the r-embers of the League diall
severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect
the covenants of the League*
3 . The Members of the League agree, further that they
will mutually support one another in the financial and economic
measures which are -aken under this Article, in order to mini-
mise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measure
and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any
special moaamres aimed at one of their number by the Covenant-
breaking state, and that they will take the necessary steps to
afford passage through their territory to the forces of any
of the lumbers of the League which are cooperating to protect
the covenants of the League,
3 9
4, Any Member of the League which has violated any
covenants of the League may be declared to be no longer a
Member of the League, by a vote of the Council concurred
in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the
League represented thereon.
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Article XVII,-- 1. In the event of a dispute between a Member
and a state which is not a Member of the League, or between
states not Members of the League, the state or states not
Members of the League shal 1 be invited to accept the obliga-
tions of membership in the League for the purposes of such-
dispute, upon such conditions as the Council may deem just. If
such invitation is accepted, the provision of Articles XII
to XVI inclusive shall, be applied with such modifications
as may be deemdd necessary by the Council,
2.
Upon such invitation being given the Council shall
immediately institute an inquiry into the circumstances of the
dispute and recommend, such action as may seem best ana most
effectual in the circumstances.
3.
If a state so invited shall refuse to accept the
obligations of membership in the League for the purposes of
such dispute, and shall resort to war against a Member of the
League, the provisions of Article XVI shall be applicable as aga
the state taking such action.
inst
4.
If both parties to the dispute when so invited refuse
to accept the obligations of membership in the League for the
purposes of such dispute, the Council may take ai ch measles
and make such recommendations as will prevent hostilities and
will result in the settlement of the dispute.
Article XIX.-- Tice Assombly may from time to time advise the
reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have
become inapplicable and the consideration of international
conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the
world
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TEXT OP THE HOARE-LAVAL PROPOSALS
I.—Exchange of Territories
The Governments of Great Britain and France agree to
recommend to his Majesty the Emperor of Ethiopia the accept-
ance of the following exchanges of territory between Ethiopia
and Italy:
(a) Tigre.—Cession to Italy of Eastern Tlgre approximate^
limited on the south by the river Gheva and on the west by a
line running from north to south, passing between Alesum (on
the Ethiopian side) and Adowa (on the Italian side.)
(b) Rectification of Frontiers between the Danakil country
and Eritrea,-leaving to the south of the boundary line Aussa
and the extent of Eritrean territory necessary to give Ethiopia
an outlet to the sea to be defined below.
(c) Rectification of Frontiers between the Ogaden and
Italian Somaliland.—Starting from the tri- junction point
between the frontiers of Ethiopia, Kenya and Italian Somaliland,
the new Italo-Ethiopian frontier would follow a general north-
easterly direction, cutting the Webbe Shibeli at Iddidole,
leaving Gorahai to the oast, Warandab to the west and meeting
the frontier of British Somaliland where it intersects the 45th
meridian. The rights of the tribes of British Somaliland to
the use of the grazing areas and wells situated in the territor-
ies granted to Italy by delimitation should be guaranteed.
(d) Ethiopia will receive an outlet to the sea with full
sovereign rights.—It seems that this outlet should be formed
preferably by a cession to which Italy would agr ee, of the
port of Assab and of a strip of territory giving access to this
port along the frontier of French Somaliland,
The United Kingdom and French Governments will endeavour to
obtain from the Ethiopian Government guarantees for the ful-
filment of the obligations yfaich devolve upon them regarding
slavery and arms traffic in the territories acquired by them.
II.—Zone of Economic Expansion and Settlement
The United Kingdom and French Governments will use their
influence at Addis Ababa and at Genova to the end that the for-
mation in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of economic expansion and
settlement reserved to Italy should be accepted by his Majesty
the Emperor and approved by the League of Nations.
The limits of this zone would be: On the east, the recti-
fied frontier between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland; on the
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north, the 8th parallel, on the west, the 35th meridian; on the
south the frontier between Ethiopia and Kenya,
Within this zone, which would form an integral part of
Ethiopia, Italy would enjoy exclusive economic rights which
might be administered by a priveleged company or by any other
like organization, to which would be recognized--subject to the
acquired rights of natives and foreigners— the rights of owner-
ship of unoccupied territories, the monopoly of the exploitation
of mines, forests, etc. This organisation would be obliged to
contribute to the economic equipment of the country, and to
devote a portion of its revenue to expenditure of a social
character for the benefit of the native population.
The control of the Ethiopian administration in the zone
would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Emperor, by the
services of tho scheme of assistance drawn up by the League of
Nations, Italy would take a preponderating, but not an ex-
clusive, share in these services, which would be under the direct
control ofl one of the principal advisers attached to the Centra:
Government, The principal adviser in question, who might be of
Italian nationality, would be the assjsfcant, for the affairs in
question, of the chief advisor delegated by the League of
Nations to assist the Emperor, The chief adviser would not be
a subject of one of the Powers bordering on Ethiopia,
Tile services of the scheme of assistance, in the capital as
well as In the reserve zone, would regard it as one of their
essential duties to ensure the safety of Italian subjects and
the free development of their enterprises.
The Government of the United Kingdom and the French Gov-
ernment will willingly endeavour to ensure that this organiza-
tion, the details of which must be elaborated by the League of
Nations, fully safeguards the interests of Italy in this
region.
Modifications in the text as communicated to Abyssinia :
The first paragraph of Section II la drafted as follows:
The United Kingdom and French Governments recommend his
Majesty the Efciperor to accept, and will use their influence to
secure the approval of the League of Nations of, the formation
in Southern Ethiopia of a zone of economic expansion and
settlement reserved to Italy.
A few words have been added to the end of the first
sentence of the fourth paragraph of Section II. These are
as follows:
The control of the Ethiopian administration in the zone
would be exercised, under the sovereignty of the Etaperor, by
the services of the scheme of assistance drawn up by the League
of Nations and already accepted by the Emperor as extending over
the whole area of Abyssinian administration.
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Letter accompanying the proposals when sent to the
Leagues
Since the failure of the efforts undertaken by the League
of Nations to find a peaceful solution to the Italo-Ethiopian
conflict, the desire has been expressed on several occasions,
both in the Council end the Assembly, to see the conflict brough
to an end by an agreed settlement as soon as possible*
The Governments of the United Kingdom and Prance have
worked out together, bearing in mind the deliberations of the
Committee of Five, the bases of a settlement of this nature,
and instructed their representatives at Rome and Addis Ababa
on December 10 to lay before the Italian and Ethiopian Govern-
ments certain suggestions in this cense.
t
We have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text
of this document, which we should be glad if you would com-
municate to the members of the Council. We shall not fall to
transmit to you, in the same way, the replies of the interested
Governments as soon as they have been received.
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PROPOSALS I-V OF THE CO-ORLIRATIOR COMMITTEE
Proposal I
Export of Arms, Ammunition and Implements
of War
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the
Members of the League of Rations the execution of their
obligations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following
measures should he taken forthwith:
(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of
Rations which are enforcing at the moment measures
to prohibit or restrict the exportation, re-export-
ation or transit of arms, munitions and implements
of war to Ethiopia will annul these measures
immediately;
(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of
Rations will prohibit immediately the exportation,
re-exportation or transit to Italy or Italian
possessions of arms, munitions and implements of war
enumerated in the attached list*
(3) The Governments of the Members of the League of
Rations will take such steps as may be necessary
to secure that arms, munitions and implements of
war, enumerated in the attached list, exported to
countries other than Italy will not be re-exported
directly or indirectly to Italy or to Italian
possessions;
(4) The measures provided for in paragraphs (2) and (&)
are to apply to contracts in process of execution.
Each Government is requested to inform the Committee,
through the Secretary-General of the League, within the
shortest possible time of the measures which it has taken
in conformity with the above provisions.
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Annexe
Geneva, October 11th,
Articles considered as Arms, Ammunition and
Implements of War
Category I,
1. ^ifles and carbines using ammunition in excess of
calibre 26.5 and their barrels.
2. Machine-guns, automatic rifles and machine-pistols
of all calibres and their barrels.
3. Guns, howitzers and mortars of all calibres, their
mountings and barrels.
4. Ammunition for the arms under 1 and 2 above—i.e.
high-power steel-jacketed ammunition in excess of calibre 26. 5;
filled and unfilled projectiles, and propellants with a web
thickness of 0.015 inch or greater for the projectiles of the
arms enumerated under 3 above.
5. Grenades, bombs, torpedoes and mines, filled or
unfilled, and apparatus for their use or discharge.
6. Tanks, military armoured vehicles and armoured trains.
Category II.
Vessels of war of all kinds, including aircraft-carrions
and submarines.
Category III.
1. Aircraft, assembled or dismantled, both heavier and
lighter than air, which are designed, adapted and intended
for aerial combat by the use of machine-guns or of artillery,
or for the carrying and dropping of bombs, or which are
equipped with, or which by reason of design or construction
are prepared for, any of the appliances referred to in
paragraph 2 below.
2. Aerial-gun mounts and frames, bomb-racks, torpedo-
carriers, and bomb or torpedo release mechanisms.
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Category IV.
Revolvers and automatic pistols of a weight in excess of
1 lb. 6 oz. (6.30 graranes) using ammunition in excess of
calibre 26.5 and ammunition therefor,
fiategory V.
1. Aircraft assembled or dismantled, both heavier and
lighter than air, other than those included in Category III.
2, Aircraft engines.
Category VI.
1. Livens projectors and flame-throwers.
2. Mustard gas, LewiBite, ethyldichlorarsine and methyldi-
chlorarsine.
3. Powder and explosives.
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Proposal II
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the
Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obli-
gations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following
measures should be taken forthwith:
The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations
will forthwith takfc all measures necessary to render impossible
the following operations:
(1) All loans to or for the Italian Government and all
subscriptions to loans issued in Italy or elsewhere by or for
the Italian Government;
(2) All banking or other credits to or for the Italian
Government and any further execution by advance, overdraft or
otherwise of existing contracts to lend directly or indirectly
to the Italian Government;
(3) All loans to or for any public authority, person or
corporation in Italian territory and all subscriptions to such
loans issued in Italy or elsewhere;
(4) All banking or other credits to or for any public
authority, person or corporation in Italian territory and any
further execution by advance, overdraft or otherwise of exist-
ing contracts to lend directly or indirectly to such authority,
person or corporation;
(5) All issues of shares or other capital flotations for
any public authority, person or corporation in Italian terri-
tory and all subscriptions to such issues of shares of capital
flotations in Italy or elsewhere;
(6) The Governments will take all measures necessary to
render impossible the transactions mentioned in paragraphs (l)
to (5), whether effected directly or through intermediaries of
whatsoever nationality.
The Governments are invited to put in operation at once
such of the measures recommended as can be enforced without
fresh legislation, and to take all practicable steps to secure
that the meaaires recommended are completely put into operation
by October 31st, 1935. Any Governments which find it impossible
to secure the requisite legislation by that date are requested
to inform the Committee, through the Secretary-General, of the
League, within the date by which they expect to be able to do so
Each Government is requested to inform the Committee,
through the Seeretary-Genoral of the League within the shortest
possible time of the measures which it has taken in conformity
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Proposal III
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the
Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obli-
gations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures
should be taken:
(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations
will prohibit the importation into their territories of all
goods (other than gold or silver bullion and coin) consigned
from or grown, produced or manufactured in Italy or Italian
possessions, from whatever place arriving;
(2) Goods grown or produced in Italy or Italian possessions
which have been subjected to some process In another country, and
goods manufactured partly in Italy or Italian possessions and
partly In another country will be considered as falling within
the scope of the prohibition unless 25 per cent* or more of the
value of the goods at the time when they left the place from
which they were last consigned is attributable to processes under
gone since the goods last left Italy or Italian possessions;
(3) Goods the subject of existing contracts will not be
excepted from the prohibition;
(4) Goods en route at the time of imposition of the pro-
hibition will be excepted from its operation* In giving effect
to tills provision, Governments may, for convenience of admini-
stration, fix an appropriate date, having regard to the normal
time necessary for transport from Italy, after which goods will
become subject to the prohibition;
(5) Personal belongings of travellers from Italy or Italian
possessions aay also be excepted from its operation*
Proposal IV
With a view to facilitating for the Governments of the
Members of the League of Nations the execution of their obli-
gations under Article XVI of the Covenant, the following measures
should be taken:
(1) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nations
will extend the application of paragraph (2) of Proposal I of
the Coordination Committee to the following articles as regards
their exportation and reexportation to Italy and Italian possess-
ions, which will accordingly be prohibited:
(a) Horses, mules, donkeys, camels and all other trans-
port animals;
(b) Rubber;
(c) Bauxite, aluminum and alumina (aluminum oxide), ir
ore and scrap-iron;
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Chromium, manganese, nickel, titanium, tungsten, vana-
dium, their ores and ferro-alloys (and also ferro-molyhdennm,
ferro-silicon, tferro-silico-manganese)
;
Tin and tin- ore.
List IcI above includes all crude forms of the minerals
and metals mentioned and their ores, scrap and alloys*
(2) The Governments of the Members of the League of Nation
will take such steps as may be necessary to secure that the
articles mentioned in paragraph (l) above exported to countries
other than Italy or Italian possessions will not be re-exported,
directly or indirectly, to Italy or to Italian possessions;
(3) The measures provided for in paragraphs (1) and (2)
above are to apply to contracts in course of execution*
(4) Goods en route at the time of imposition of the pro-
hibition will be excepted from its operation. In giving effect
to this provision. Governments may, for convenience of admini-
stration, fix an appropriate date, having regard to the normal
time necessary for transport to Italy or Italian possessions,
after which goods will become subject to the prohibition.
s
Having regard to the importance of collective and, so far
as possible, simultaneous action in regard to the measures re-
commended, each Government is requested to inform the Co-ordination
Committee, throughtthe Secretafcy-General of the League, as soon
as possible, and not later than October 2$th, of the date on
which it could be ready to bring those measures into operation.
'The Committee of C o-fcrdinafcion will meet on October 31st for
the purpose of fixing, in the light of the replies received, th$
date of the coming into force of the said measures.
The attention of the Coordination Committee has been drawn
to the possible extension of the above proposal to a certain
number of other articles. It entrusts the Committee of Eighteen
with the task of making any suitable proposals to Governments
on this subject.
Proposal V
The Co-ordination Committee draws the special attention of
all Governments to their obligations under paragraph 3 of Art.
XVI of the Covenant, according to which the Members of the
League undertake mutually to support one another in the appli-
cation of the economic and financial measures taken under this
article.
L. With a view to carrying these obligations into effect,
the Governments of the Members of the League of Nations will*
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(a) Adopt immediately measures to asaire that no action
taken as a result of Article XVI will deprive any country ap-
plying sanctions of such advantages as the commercial agreements
concluded by the participating states with Italy afforded it
through the operation of the most-favored-nation clause;
(b) Take appropriate steps with a view to replacing,
within the limits of the requirements of their respective
countries, imports from Italy by the import of similar products
from the participating states;
(c) Be willing, after the application of economic san-
ctions, to enter into negotiations with any participating country
which has sustained a loss with a view to increasing the sale of
goods so as to offeet any loss of Italian markets which the
application of sanctions may have involved;
(d) In cases in which they have suffered no loss in
respect of any given commodity, abstain from demanding the
application of any mosfc-favored-nation clause in the case of any
priveleges granted under paragraphs (b) and (c) in respect to
that commodi ty
.
XI, With the above objects, the Governments will, if necessary,
with the assistance of the Committee of Eighteen, study, in
particular, the possibility of adopting, within the limits of
their existing obligations, and taking into consideration the
annexed opinion of the Legal Sub-Committee of the Co-ordination
Committee, the follovAng measures:
(1) The increase by all approbate measures of their imports
in favour of such countries as may have suffered loss of Italian
markets on account of the application of sanctions;
(2) In order to facilitate this increase, the talcing into
consideration of the obligations of mutual support and of the
advantages which the trade of certain States Members of the
League of Nations, not participating in the sanctions, would
obtain from the application of these sanctions, in order to re-
duce by every appropriate means and to an equitable degree imprfcs
cominr: from these countries;
(3) The promotion, by all means in their power, of business
relations between firms interested In the sale of goods in Italf
markets which have been lost owing to the application of sanctions
and firms normally importing such goods;
(4) Assistance generally in the organisation of the int<
national marketing of goods with a view to offsetting any loss
Italian markets which tho application of sane cions may have
involved.
They will also examine, under the sane conditions, the pos-
sibility of financial or* other measures to supplement the com-
mercial measures, insofar as these latter may not ensure sufficient
international mutual support.
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